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ABSTRACT
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD COLLECTIVE ACTION:
THREE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS
IN MALAYSIA, THE UNITED STATES, AND ISRAEL-PALESTINE
MAY 2019
HEMA PREYA SELVANATHAN, B.A.,
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN EAU CLAIRE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Brian Lickel
Collective action often aims to elicit a response from the broader public. This dissertation
presents three distinct but interrelated investigations on the societal outcomes of collective
action among both high- and low- status groups in society, grounded in a range of social
and political contexts. Chapter 1 provides an integrative literature review that identifies the
motivation for the present research. Chapter 2 examined whether and how collective action
organized by a social movement can shape the public’s subsequent attitudes toward the
movement and its goals, in the context of the electoral reform Bersih movement in
Malaysia. Chapter 3 investigated when and how public reactions to movements for social
change can promote the rise of reactionary counter-movements to defend the status quo in
the context of race relations in Malaysia and the United States. Chapter 4 examines whether
distinct modes of ingroup identification and preferences for justice can shape public
support for normative and non-normative collective action in the context of the ongoing
Israel-Palestinian conflict. Chapter 5 concludes by discussing the overarching theoretical
contributions and applied implications of studying the societal impact of social movements,
as well as considering the limitations of the present research and future directions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In many regions around the world, the status quo is characterized by social
injustices and inequalities. Status and power differences between various social groups –
whether along gender, racial, ethnic or socio-economic divides – have been
institutionalized within systems that govern society, including its laws, practices, and
norms. As a result, there is often a hierarchy among social groups, with some groups
holding greater status and power compared to others. Various theories on intergroup
relations have sought to explain how group-based hierarchies are created, maintained, and
defended (just world theory; Lerner & Miller, 1987; system justification theory; Jost,
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; social dominance theory; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle,
1994). This work helps explain why oppressive group-based structures continue to persist
in many societies.
However, intergroup hierarchies are far from static. Throughout history, people
have collectively organized to challenge oppression by fighting for equal rights, seeking
justice over past mistreatment, and advancing the interests of their group. Dramatic
changes to the status quo have been attributed to sustained collective actions organized by
social movements. Collective action refers to behaviors that are undertaken by individuals
to improve the conditions of a group. For example, the independence movement in India
led to the liberation from British colonial rule, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa
eventually put an end to policies of racial segregation, and the women’s suffrage movement
in the United States pushed for a constitutional amendment to guarantee women’s right to
vote. More recently, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights movement
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have successfully campaigned for the legal recognition of same-sex marriage in over 25
countries. As these examples illustrate, people across different regions of the world have
undertaken collective action to push for social change.
So how do social movements create social change when broader society tends to
support the status quo? One critical pathway towards long-term social change is by
organizing collective action as a tool of social influence. Social movement scholars have
long documented how collective action is organized to elicit a response from a targeted
audience, including the general public (Benford & Hunt, 1992; Giugni, 1998; Hornsey et
al., 2006). As such, collective action has been referred to as “contentious performances”
because they make claims that disrupt everyday life and the status quo (Tilly, 2008). To do
so, movements use a wide repertoire of tactics, such as strikes, boycotts, parades, sit-ins,
and walk-outs (Ennis, 1987; Sharp, 1973; Tarrow, 2011). By extension, collective action
has the potential to promote new ways of thinking, garner support for reformative policies,
and even provoke criticism or retaliation among the broader public (Amenta, Caren,
Chiarello, & Su, 2010; Burstein & Linton, 2002; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). If we view
collective action as a means to challenge unjust and unequal hierarchies in a society, then
it becomes important to understand why, when, and how the general public might respond
to collective action that occurs in their social environment.
The goal of this dissertation is to present three investigations into public attitudes
toward collective action in different social and political contexts. Across three manuscripts,
I will examine distinct but interrelated phenomenon that are part of the process of social
change. First, building on the idea that collective action is a “performance” aimed to
produce a public reaction, the first manuscript will investigate how immediate public
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responses to collective action may lead to polarized public attitudes in the context of the
Bersih electoral reform movement in Malaysia. While movements may raise public support
for its cause by organizing collective action, such actions may also provoke backlash in the
form of counter-mobilization against social change. To study this dynamic, the second
manuscript will examine how and when a sense of collective psychological ownership over
one’s country may promote threat in response to collective action for social change (which
can subsequently foster support for reactionary counter-movements) in the context of racerelations in Malaysia and the United States. Given that both low-status and high-status
groups may support collective action to benefit their own group, in the long run, opposing
actions can intensify intergroup conflict and lead to collective action that ranges from
normative actions that are largely peaceful and legal, to nonnormative actions that are
largely violent and illegal. To examine why people come to support collective action that
is normative versus non-normative, the third manuscript will focus on the ways in which
people identify with and seek justice for their ingroup, from the perspective of both Arab
and Jewish Israelis in the context of the protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taken
together, all three investigations aim to highlight the role of public attitudes toward
collective action as a way of understanding the societal impact of social movements. In
what follows, I first review extant research on collective action. Building on this past work,
I identify key gaps in the literature that motivates the present research. I then provide an
overview of the three investigations included in this dissertation.
The Social Psychology of Collective Action
Research on collective action and social change has proliferated across many fields
in the social sciences, including sociology, political science, communications, economics,

3

history, and psychology. The multidisciplinary nature of this area of research means that
there are different theoretical frameworks and perspectives that guide collective action
research in each field. Within psychology, the level of analysis focuses on the attitudes and
behaviors of individuals. In particular, this research has traditionally focused on why
people are motivated to engage in collective action. Extensive work has documented the
experiences and attitudes that lead people to undertake collective action, such as
perceptions of injustice, a shared social identity, feelings of anger, and perceptions of
efficacy to achieve group goals (for reviews, see Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Wright, 2003;
van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). While this work has been important in
demonstrating the underlying motivators of collective action, it says little about the impact
of collective action in a society (for a review, see Louis, 2009). Below, I review three key
emergent areas of research that focus on the outcomes of collective action.
The Impact of Collective Action on People’s Attitudes
Collective action can be conceptualized as a cyclical and dynamic process, in that
undertaking collective action can have psychological outcomes that serve to motivate
future actions (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). Based on this view, the
psychological predictors and outcomes of collective action are reciprocal: engaging in
collective action can lead to the reappraisal of injustice and serve to enhance group
identification, emotions, and beliefs that maintain subsequent collective action. This work
has shown that participation in collective action promotes greater anger and contempt
(Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011) as well as greater positive emotions and efficacy beliefs
(Drury & Reicher, 2005) which are important for the maintenance of protest behavior. Even
when collective action does not have its desired outcome, protesters can reappraise failure
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in ways that fuel perceptions of injustice, anger, and empowerment to motivate continued
action (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Tausch & Becker, 2013). Collective action also allows
people to act on behalf of their group, which can build politicized group identities that are
defined in opposition to dominant groups or systems of injustice (Becker, Tausch, Spears,
& Christ, 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2000). Further, participants of collective action can
derive well-being and health benefits from their activism (for a review, see Vestergren,
Drury, & Chiriac, 2016). Taken together, this line of work has revealed how collective
action can powerfully shape psychological outcomes for those who participate in collective
action.
However, if the ultimate goal of collective action is to create social change, it is
important to examine the attitudes of the broader public who may not directly be involved
in collective action but are instead the targeted audiences of collective action. Many models
of social change have argued that the success of social movements critically relies on its
ability to raise broader public support for its goals (e.g., Mugny & Perez, 1991; Subašić,
Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). By extension, research on
public attitudes toward collective action thus far has used vignette-based experiments to
identify the characteristics of collective action that elicit the most public support. This
research has shown that people are more supportive of peaceful compared to violent actions
because they find it more effective and legitimate (Thomas & Louis, 2014), as well as more
moral (Orazani & Leidner, 2018). Relatedly, collective action that utilizes extreme tactics
such as unlawful activities or inflammatory speech, reduce public support for the
movement (Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017). In fact, people tend to report having
negative stereotypes of activists (viewing them as deviant, eccentric, and radical) which
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reduces their willingness to adopt the social change behaviors that activists advocate
(Bashir, Lockwood, Chasteen, Nadolny, & Noyes, 2013). Thus, social movements face the
crucial challenge of organizing collective action in ways that can gain public support.
While past work has shown that collective action and its actors can vary in how
effective they are in gaining public support, we know little about how members of the
public react to ongoing collective action that occurs in their immediate social environment.
Capturing societal response to collective action as it occurs in the real-world is important
to test whether and how collective action can directly shape people’s social change
attitudes. Thus, extending the primary focus of prior research on how collective action
influences collective actors, activists, and protesters themselves, and building on the
research that has identified the conditions under which collective action will be effective,
I instead focus on whether the occurrence of collective action can elicit a reaction from the
broader public and subsequently influence their social change attitudes. Chapter 2 will
present a manuscript examining the public’s psychological reactions to a real-world
collective action, and how their reactions can shape support for the movement and its goals.
The Rise of Counter-Mobilization Against Social Change
While staging collective action has the potential to raise public support for a
movement, the same collective action may also provoke backlash in the form of countermovements aiming to maintain the status quo. Social movement scholars have argued that
when a movement shows signs of success – whether by raising support for their demands
or influencing public policy, counter-movements that resist social change are likely to
emerge (Inclán, 2012; Mottl, 1980; Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Counter-movements
tend to use rhetoric and tactics that are in opposition to movements for social change and
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their activities are typically fueled by social and political advances (Meyer & Staggenborg,
1996). For example, in response to desegregation efforts in the 1960s – which signaled the
success of the African American civil rights movement – segregationist private academies
grew dramatically throughout Southern United States, which reflected the White
community’s resistance to school desegregation (Andrews, 2002). To take another
example, in response to climate change and environmental movements, conservative think
tanks have made various counter-claims that attempt to delegitimize scientific evidence
that harmful global environmental change is occurring (McCright & Dunlap, 2000).
Scholars have applied several different theories to explain public support for
different forms of social movements (Cakal, Hewstone, Guler, & Heath, 2016; Milesi &
Alberici, 2016; Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2018). First, based on intergroup
threat theory, which posits that competition over scarce resources (realistic threat) and
incompatibility of values or beliefs (symbolic threat) can promote negative intergroup
attitudes, Cakal and colleagues (2016) showed that in the context of the asymmetrical
conflict between Turks and Kurds, perceiving threat from the outgroup promoted greater
collective action intentions to defend ingroup interests – which for Turks (the high-status
group) meant upholding the status quo and for Kurds (the low-status group) meant
challenging the status quo. Second, drawing on moral foundations theory, which argues
that people have basic moral intuitions that shape their moral judgement, Milesi and
Alberici (2016) found that care and fairness foundations that aim to protect individuals’
well-being were linked to support for liberal movements (e.g., intergroup equality),
whereas foundations of loyalty that aim to build cohesive groups were linked to support
for conservative movements focused on conformity (e.g., protection of traditional values).
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Third, extrapolating from system justification theory, which states that people are
motivated to defend and uphold even illegitimate systems, Osborne and colleagues (2018)
found that system justification beliefs were related to lower support for movements that
challenge the status quo but more support for movements that defend the status quo. Taken
together, this past work has shown that support for movements that challenge versus defend
the status quo may stem from different underlying motivations.
Although there seems to be a link between the occurrence of movements for social
change and the rise of counter-movements, we know relatively little about the
psychological underpinnings of the dynamic between progressive and reactionary social
movements, for example, how the occurrence of one movement may promote support for
an opposing movement. Notably, this aforementioned research has identified separate
predictors for movements for social change and reactionary counter-movements. Building
on this past work, I propose that the occurrence of collective action for social change may
elicit a public response that in turn can promote support for collective action against social
change. As a first step towards investigating this proposed link, I draw on research about
collective psychological ownership over one’s country, which suggests that advantaged
group members may defend their group’s right to determine the course of the country
because they were the first to establish or inhabit the land (Brylka, Mähönen, JasinskajaLahti, 2015; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015;
for a review, see Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). I propose that such ownership beliefs
may promote the experience of threat in response to protests for social change, which can
trigger support for reactionary counter-protests. Testing this process, Chapter 3 will present
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a manuscript examining when and why public reactions to movements for social change
may promote support for reactionary counter-movements.
Public Support for Different Forms of Collective Action
to Advance Ingroup Interests
Intergroup conflict between low-status and high-status groups can intensify when
opposing social movements continue to occur. In fact, in the context of hostile, protracted
conflicts, both groups may come to support various forms of actions to advance the
interests of their ingroup. A critical feature of intractable conflicts is that both sides view
the conflict as irreconcilable and engage in efforts that perpetuate its continuation, thereby
developing into a vicious cycle of violence (Bar-Tal, 2007). While research on intergroup
conflict has typically examined public support for conflict resolution and reconciliation
policies and efforts, it has generally overlooked public support for collective action.
Research on collective action on the other hand, has traditionally focused on actions that
occur in democratic and low-risk contexts. This work has therefore often neglected the
collective actions organized in non-democratic or authoritarian contexts in which these
actions carry considerably greater risks (for a similar argument, see Ayanian & Tausch,
2016). The generalizability and applicability of collective action research is further limited
by its extensive focus on examining predictors of normative forms of collective action,
such as peaceful protests, sit-ins, and marches, which are legally protected and even
expected in healthy democracies (Thomas & Louis, 2013).
We know relatively less about the predictors of non-normative forms of collective
action, such as illegal or violent protests, destruction of public property, and terrorist
attacks targeting civilians, which may be more commonplace in regions that face ongoing
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intergroup conflict, violence and war. Aiming to fill this gap, there have been recent
investigations into the precursors of non-normative collective action. This work has found
that non-normative collective action is motivated by distinct group-based emotions and
efficacy perceptions compared to normative collective action (for a review, see Becker &
Tausch, 2015). In particular, feeling emotions of contempt (rather than anger), as well as
perceiving a low sense of group-based efficacy, are strong motivators of non-normative
collective action (Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016; Tausch et al.,
2011; Zaal, Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011). Further, greater beliefs in the efficacy
of violent means (rather than peaceful means) to achieve group goals can motivate nonnormative collective action, thereby leading to a “nothing to lose” mentality (Saab, Spears,
Tausch, & Sasse, 2016).
While prior work has shown that there are distinct group-based emotions and
efficacy pathways to normative and non-normative collective action (Becker & Tausch,
2015), group identification and justice concerns have largely been examined as
unidimensional constructs. However, research from the social identity perspective have
shown that the content and meaning of group identities can motivate divergent group-based
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Leach et al., 2008; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Roccas,
Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). Further, work on intragroup and intergroup
conflict has shown that in response to injustice, there are different types of justice demands
that can shape the outcomes of conflict (e.g., Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013; Wenzel,
Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). Thus, integrating both these literatures, I propose that
modes of ingroup identification and notions of justice may provide distinct pathways to
public support for normative and non-normative collective action. Chapter 4 will present a

10

manuscript examining this question in the context of an ongoing protracted intergroup
conflict.
Overview of Dissertation Content
This dissertation presents three investigations on collective action that aim to
address the following questions:
1. How does the occurrence of collective action organized by social movements for
social change elicit reactions from the public audience and influence their
subsequent attitudes toward the movement and its goals?
2. When and how does support for reactionary counter-movements aiming to defend
the status quo arise in response to movements pushing for social change?
3. What promotes support for normative and non-normative forms of collective action
among high- and low- status groups involved in a protracted intergroup conflict?
While each investigation addresses a unique research question, they all share the common
goal of extending our understanding of public attitudes toward collective action by using
theoretically-driven and ecologically-valid approaches across different socio-political
contexts. Between each chapter, a bridge is provided to synthesize the findings of the
preceding manuscript, as well as consider theoretical and practical implications as a
transition into the next manuscript.
In Chapter 2, I present a manuscript on how psychological responses to a real-world
collective action organized by a social movement can promote changes in public attitudes
toward the movement and support for social change. In the context of the Bersih electoral
reform movement in Malaysia, a two-wave longitudinal survey conducted before and
immediately after a mass protest organized by the movement found that greater
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empowerment in response to the protests promoted more subsequent public support for the
movement and its goal for social change, whereas greater threat in response to the protests
promoted less subsequent support for the movement and its goals. This work suggests that
empowerment and threat responses to collective action can influence public opinion in
divergent ways. This manuscript was published in the European Journal of Social
Psychology in 2018 and will be reproduced in this dissertation. In addition to the published
manuscript, I present an addendum with additional analyses examining whether race (i.e.,
belonging to a racial majority or minority group) moderates public responses to collective
action. A bridge from Chapter 2 to Chapter 3 will consider the downstream implications of
public reactions to collective action for social change, particularly focusing on advantaged
group members who may be motivated to defend the status quo. I also discuss recent
research that has emerged after the publication of this manuscript which has examined
public responses to collective action (e.g., Saguy & Szekeres, 2018)
In Chapter 3, I present a manuscript on how reactions to movements for social
change can promote the rise of reactionary counter-movements to defend the status quo. In
particular, I focus on the role of collective psychological ownership in promoting threat in
response to collective action for social change, and subsequently support for reactionary
counter-movements. This research was conducted in two different socio-political contexts
in which advantaged group members derive collective psychological ownership over their
country in unique ways, and therefore extends prior theorizing on the ways in which
ownership beliefs develop and have consequences for intergroup relations (Verkuyten &
Martinovic, 2017). In particular, in Malaysia, the Malay majority group can claim native
ownership because they were the first to inhabit the land, whereas in the United States, the
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White majority group can claim founder ownership because they were the first to establish
the country along with a governing body. Across one longitudinal study in Malaysia, and
one pilot as well as two correlational studies in the United States, this research revealed
that advantaged group members’ greater psychological ownership over their country
predicted more threat in response to protests for social change (e.g., electoral reform, racial
justice), which in turn promoted support for counter-movements (e.g., pro-government,
nationalistic). This manuscript is in invited revision at the British Journal of Social
Psychology. In addition to reproducing the manuscript in the dissertation, I present an
addendum with additional analyses considering the role of another closely related
legitimizing myth – meritocracy beliefs – in shaping reactions to movements for social
change. Next, a bridge from Chapter 3 to Chapter 4 discusses how the collective actions
examined so far are largely normative in nature, and subsequently argues for the
importance of studying different forms of collective actions that may arise in hostile
intergroup conflicts.
In Chapter 4, I present a manuscript that examines how modes of ingroup
identification (glorification and attachment) and preferences for justice (retributive and
restorative justice) can shape public support for normative and non-normative collective
action among Arab and Jewish Israelis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This conflict is one of the longest-running conflicts of our time, which began with the
Israeli occupation of Palestine when Israel was established in 1948 (Bar-Tal, 2007). Today,
Arabs and Jewish Israelis continue to undertake various forms of collective action – with
Palestinian Arabs aiming to reclaim their homeland, and Jewish Israelis aiming to defend
their right to a Jewish state. Against this background, two correlational studies and one
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experimental study revealed that glorifying one’s ingroup promotes support for retributive
justice, which in turn predicts support for non-normative collective action, whereas being
strongly attached to one’s group promotes support for restorative justice, which in turn
predicts support for normative collective action. These findings extend prior theorizing on
collective action by viewing ingroup identification and justice as multidimensional rather
than unidimensional constructs. Moving beyond the focus of prior research on collective
action that occurs in largely democratic contexts and studying collective action from the
perspective of one side engaged in a power struggle, this research examines collective
action from both sides of an ongoing hostile intergroup conflict. This manuscript is
currently under review at the Journal of Conflict Resolution and is reproduced in this
dissertation. In addition, an addendum with additional analyses considers the role of
political orientation in shaping conflict attitudes, and how ingroup glorification and
attachment may be related to one’s political orientation.
Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes and integrates findings from each manuscript and
discuss the overarching theoretical and practical implications of this work. Specifically, I
consider how the manuscripts contribute to our understanding of the societal impact of
social movements, in terms of its immediate and direct impact on public attitudes, as well
as its broader and long-term connection to reactionary counter-movements. I also discuss
how studying a range of social and political contexts allow us to identify the role of
intergroup hierarchies and power relations in shaping collective action attitudes in different
societies. In concluding, I consider the limitations of the current research and provide
directions for future research on societal impact of collective action, in terms of its
methodology, theorizing, and real-world applications.
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CHAPTER 2
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO MASS PROTESTS
From India’s independence from British colonizers to the end of apartheid in South
Africa, history has taught us that sustained social movements can create social change. It
is widely argued that creating such social change is closely tied to garnering continued
support from the broader public (Moscovici, 1980; Passini & Morselli, 2013; Simon &
Klandermans, 2001; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner; 2008). Yet, while extensive social
psychological research has focused on people’s motivations to engage in collective efforts
for social change (i.e., joining movements as active members; see Haslam & Reicher, 2012;
Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), little
psychological research has examined the external consequences of social movements,
specifically how people outside the movement might respond to collective action (see
Louis, 2009 for a discussion). Extant psychological research on the outcomes of collective
action has focused almost exclusively on the experiences of those who participate in
collective action (e.g., Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2005),
therefore leaving the psychological impact of collective action on broader society largely
unknown.
Understanding how collective action can influence public attitudes is important for
several reasons. For one, it is hardly disputed that garnering mass support is one of the
goals of social movements to ensure its continuity and success (e.g., Oegema &
Klandermans, 1994; Subašić et al., 2008). Scholars have further noted that the ability for
protests to change public policy may critically rely upon whether protests shape public
opinion (e.g., Burstein & Linton, 2002; Soule & Olzak, 2004). The strategies that social
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movements use to impact social attitudes has also been widely documented (Benford &
Snow, 2000; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Tarrow, 2011; Vinthagen, 2015), and a key
method to engage the public is by organizing collective action, such as mass street protests,
whereby the action itself is a tool for public influence (Berkowitz, 1970; Snow, Rochford,
Worden, & Benford, 1986). Thus, collective action often occurs in public avenues and are
designed to be experienced by an audience (Blee & McDowell, 2012; McAdam, 1983;
McCarthy & McPhail, 2006), to the extent that social movement scholars have likened
protests to performances (Benford & Hunt, 1992). Various civil rights organizations also
state that any legal boundaries around the right to protest must not interfere with protesters’
ability to be “within the sight and sound” of its intended audience (American Civil Liberties
Union, 2010; Kiai, 2014).
Anecdotal evidence does seem to show that collective action can trigger a range of
reactions from the public. News media reports have described how protests can elicit
excitement, as when drivers on the street honk to show their support (Montero, 2017), but
also how protests that erupt in violence can be intimidating (Flaccus & Baumann, 2017).
Additionally, the growing use of social media for activism allows the general public to
indirectly experience protests by receiving updates about protest actions and by sharing
their own personal commentary in reaction to these actions (e.g., Penney & Dadas, 2014;
Smith, Men, & Al-Sinan, 2015). Such media narratives suggest that societal members are
psychologically engaged with collective action, even if they are not active participants in
the protests. Yet, there remains limited empirical research examining the psychological
impact of collective action on the public audience (Giugni, 1998; Louis, 2009).
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The present research aims to investigate whether collective action can directly
shape the movement and social change attitudes of broader society through the
psychological reactions that the collective action creates. To address this question, it was
important to investigate the attitudes of people who were directly targeted by large-scale
collective action in real-time. Given that we aimed to capture people’s reactions as they
unfold naturally in the real-world, it was also important to situate our research around largescale protests that would be gripping to the broader public, whereby we can expect that
essentially all members of society could have a psychological response to the protests.
Thus, the current research was designed around mass street protests that were organized by
Bersih, a major social movement in Malaysia that is demanding clean and fair elections in
response to political corruption (Y. H. Khoo, 2014). Malaysia is a multi-racial country in
South East Asia, home to more than 30 million people, mainly comprised of three racial
groups, Malay, Chinese, and Indian1, as well as several indigenous groups. Like many
movements for social change, Bersih uses mass mobilization as a means of influencing
public opinion. Over the past decade, Bersih has organized several large-scale street
protests that have captured national attention. Furthermore, historically, protests in
Malaysia has not been as commonplace as they may be in other democratic societies (Jha,
2008; G. C. Khoo, 2014), and thus Bersih’s periodic large-scale protests may be
particularly strong in triggering responses from the Malaysian public. Given this context,
we believed that the fifth round of protests organized by the movement, called Bersih 5,

1

It should be noted that the Malaysian government classifies “Chinese” and “Indian” as racial
groups and people with this designation are almost always people whose ancestors immigrated to
Malaysia in prior centuries rather than themselves being immigrants. Thus, “Chinese” Malaysians
are descendants of immigrants from China and “Indian” Malaysians are descendants of
immigrants from India and Sri Lanka.
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would be a very suitable naturally-occurring stimulus event around which to ground a prepost within-subjects design to assess whether public reactions to protests will predict shifts
in attitudes toward the movement and social change more broadly. We propose that the
occurrence of protests can psychologically impact the public by promoting differing
degrees of empowerment versus threat in response to protests, which can subsequently
mobilize or demobilize public support for the movement and social change.
Public Attitudes Around Protests
To examine the relationship between ongoing protests and public attitudes, prior
research largely from political science and sociology has examined how public opinion
indicators are temporally and geographically linked to protest events (e.g., Andrews,
Beyerlein, & Farnum, 2016; Branton, Martinez-Ebers, Carey Jr., & Matsubayashi, 2015;
Carey Jr., Branton, & Martinez-Ebers, 2014; Jones-Correa, Wallace & Zepeda-Millán,
2016; Silber Mohamed, 2013; Wallace, Zepeda-Millán, & Jones-Correa, 2014). This line
of research has provided evidence that public opinion on various issues that are tied to
social movements, such as relevant policy support (Branton et al., 2015) and intergroup
attitudes (Jones-Correa et al., 2016), can shift before and after protests occur. However, it
is important to note that this work only indirectly links protest to changes in public opinion.
People’s reactions to the protest itself and their attitudes toward the social movement were
not measured, in part because many of these studies utilized survey data that was
coincidentally collected during ongoing protests. The occurrence of protests was
retroactively determined largely based on news reports (Bada, Fox, Zazueta, & Garcia,
2006), which can also be biased in their coverage of protests (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, &
Soule, 2004). Despite these caveats, this scholarship is critical for indicating that protests
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can shape public opinion.
Some research has begun to examine the more proximal links between protests and
public attitudes. One strand of work shows that specific characteristics of protests can
influence public support for it. Specifically, using experimental paradigms in which people
evaluated protest scenarios, Thomas and Louis (2014) found that nonviolent protests
garnered more support than violent ones because they tend to convey the illegitimacy of
the situation and highlight the efficacy of the group. In another line of research, Feinberg,
Willer and Kovacheff (2017) showed that media depictions of extreme protest tactics
reduced public support for protests. This work therefore provides clear causal evidence
about how different features of protest actions can influence people’s reactions to
descriptions of protests. However, there remains a question of how people respond to the
actual occurrence of protests in their society and importantly, the impact of these protests
on the public audience that is specifically targeted by these mass actions. In one study on
the effects of ongoing protests on public attitudes, Schwartz (2016) found that when people
had direct physical encounters with protests, they reported lower political engagement. Yet,
the sentiment around ongoing protests, as reported by public opinions polls (Roper Center,
2017), would suggest that even people who do not directly encounter protests may still
have a psychological response to it. Can the occurrence of protests shift public attitudes?
One way to effectively study this question is by timing data collection around mass protests
as they occur.
Data collected around real-world political events are critical as they allow us to
study psychological processes as they temporally unfold, thereby having ecological
validity and applied relevance (Dunning, 2012). Yet, the scarcity of data around real
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protests may reflect practical constraints: protests may be unplanned or if planning does
occur, it may not be visible to researchers or the public. Researchers also have no control
over the characteristics of protest events (e.g., size, demonstration tactics, police response)
and the way in which people come to learn about them. Even when mass protests are
publicly announced in advance, researchers often have a very short window of time to
design and implement their research. These challenges may explain the lack of empirical
data on public responses to ongoing protests.
In an attempt to address this gap, the current research was designed around mass
street protests that took place in Malaysia, called Bersih 5, which advocated for electoral
reform and an end to political corruption. Given that the organizers publicly announced
ahead of time that the Bersih 5 protests would be held on November 19th 2016, we used
this unique opportunity to design and administer a survey two weeks before the event
unfolded, and then immediately after the event occurred. This pre-post within-subjects
design allowed us to assess how people’s reactions to the protests predicted their support
for the movement and for social change, over and above their initial attitudes toward the
movement and social change, thus testing whether specific reactions to the protests itself
can uniquely predict people’s attitudes immediately after the protests occurred, beyond
people’s pre-existing attitudes. To our knowledge, ours is the first study with this design
and therefore represents a novel approach for studying the immediate impact of mass
protests on public attitudes.
Reactions to Protests
It is a core assumption in the social movements literature that effective mobilization
will shift public opinion toward the goals of the movement (Giugni, 1998; McAdam, 1983).
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Past psychological research on movement participants have suggested that there are
cyclical effects of collective action, such that participation in collective action itself can
promote the emotions and beliefs that fuel future actions (Becker et al., 2011; Drury &
Richer, 2005; Tausch & Becker, 2013; van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2012). To date,
these cyclical effects have been primarily theorized as affecting those who directly
participated in collective action, and scholars have yet to extensively consider the emotions
and beliefs of those who are uninvolved in the actual action (i.e., did not physically
participate in the protests), but who may still have reactions toward the collective action
that either mobilizes or demobilizes their support for the movement and its goals for social
change. Thus, extending past research, we focus on the reflexive emotions and beliefs that
members of the public may have toward protests, which we hypothesize will shape their
subsequent movement identity and support for social change.
How might the general public react to protests? Mass protests by their nature are
designed to be disruptive (both literally and symbolically) of the social order and daily
routine of life. Members of the broader society may respond to this disruption in multiple
ways. As we review next, prior research has suggested several key emotions and beliefs
that are important in predicting support for social change, which may also be important in
understanding responses to collective action. Specifically, we propose that people may
respond to protests by having both empowerment and threat reactions. Consistent with
prior work, in the current context we define empowerment as deriving a sense of
confidence from and in the protest (Drury & Reicher, 1999; 2005), and threat as
experiencing the protest as posing a potential harm to one’s physical or psychological wellbeing (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011; Stephan & Stephan, 1996). As we conceptualize
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empowerment and threat as broad psychological constructs, we now review prior research
on the specific emotions and beliefs that we propose are a part of an empowerment or threat
response to protests.
Empowerment
It is well established that direct participation in collective action promotes positive
emotional experience (Becker et al., 2011; Boehnke & Wong, 2011; Klar & Kasser, 2009;
Páez, Basabe, Ubillos, & Gonzalez-Castro, 2007). Drury and Reicher (2005) demonstrated
that empowerment emerges during protest participation, and is experienced as feelings of
excitement and strength. Beyond the experiences of those who directly participate in
collective action, Tausch and Becker (2013) showed that feeling pride in response to a
successful outcome of a protest movement promoted future collective action intentions.
Another empowering emotion that has been found to motivate collective action and social
change is hope (Greenaway, Cichocka, van Veelen, Likki, & Branscombe, 2016). Prior
work has also found that hope predicts peaceful conflict resolution strategies in intractable
intergroup conflict settings (see Cohen-Chen, Crisp, & Halperin, 2017 for a review).
However, past research has not investigated the positive emotions that the broader public
may experience in response to efforts for social change, such as a mass protest.
In addition to positive emotions, anger about injustice is a strong motivator of
collective action (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006; Montada
& Schneider, 1989), and is also an outcome of movement participation (Becker et al., 2011;
Drury & Reicher, 2005). Given that anger is an action-oriented emotion often tied to
appraisals of blame towards a target (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Frijda, Kuipers, &
ter Shure, 1989), anger towards injustice can be construed as an empowering emotion.
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Thus, because past research suggests that both positive emotions (e.g., excitement, pride,
hope) and anger about injustice can empower those who participate in collective action
(Becker et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2012), we extend this work by proposing that the
public, who are uninvolved in the collective action itself, can also feel positive emotions
and anger about injustice in reaction to collective action.
Besides emotional reactions, there are also certain beliefs closely tied to the
experience of empowerment, in particular, perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy of
collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Believing that group actions can be successful
is emotionally empowering (Bandura, 2000), and such actions can fuel the perceived
legitimacy of collective action to challenge injustice (Drury & Reicher, 2005), thereby
promoting collective action participation (Blackwood, Terry, & Duck, 2015). Yet, protests
may only achieve long-term social change to the extent that they influence broader society
to also believe in the efficacy of collective action and the legitimacy of their claims (Passini
& Morselli, 2013; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Thomas & Louis,
2014). We suggest that in response to ongoing protests, empowerment – experienced as
positive emotional experience and anger about injustice, as well as believing in the
effectiveness and legitimacy of the protest – can promote supportive movement identity
and support for social change amongst the public.
Threat
Besides empowerment reactions to protests, it is also important to examine the
potentially demobilizing or counter-movement reactions that people may have in reaction
to protests. Due to its confrontational and often controversial nature, collective action can
clearly be threatening to the broader public. Literature from communication studies suggest
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that feeling threat in response to protests is highly likely given that the news media often
portrays protesters as dangerous and deviant (Ana, López, & Munguía, 2010; McLeod &
Hertog, 1992; Shoemaker, 1984), which can then shape public opinion on protests
(McLeod, 1995; McLeod & Detenber 1999). Consistent with this view, earlier sociological
work found that perceptions of the 1960s African American civil rights protests as unsafe
predicted reduced movement support amongst the American public (Jeffries, Turner, &
Morris, 1971; Turner, 1969). Opposition to Black Americans’ protests have also been
linked to perceptions that the movement threatened White’s status within society (Bobo,
1988). Thus, social movements may lose public support if their protests are perceived as
dangerous.
Past research has suggested that several emotions can arise during the experience
of threat, namely, anxiety and anger toward the target of threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Folkman & Lazarus, 1985), which have been found to predict a host of negative intergroup
outcomes (for reviews, see Fritsche et al., 2011; Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). For
example, in response to outgroups, anxiety provokes anti-immigrant attitudes (Brader,
Valentino & Suhay, 2008; Stephan & Stephan, 1996), and fear and anger can promote
aggressive conflict approaches (Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). We
therefore suggest that the extent to which the protests arouse threat – experienced as
emotions of anxiety and anger toward the protests, as well as believing that the protests are
dangerous – will predict oppositional movement identity and lower support for social
change amongst the public.
The present research
Our goal was to examine whether the broader public’s experiences of
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empowerment and threat in response to mass protest can influence their subsequent
movement identity and attitudes toward social change. To this end, we surveyed a sample
of the Malaysian public on their movement identity and support for social change before
and after a day of mass street protests (i.e., Bersih 5), and we also measured their
empowerment and threat reactions (specifically to the Bersih 5 action itself) immediately
following the protests. We hypothesized that people’s empowerment and threat reactions
to the Bersih protests would shape their subsequent movement identity and support for
social change.
Although ahead of time we did not specifically know how the protests would
unfold, we expected that the event would receive wide-scale public attention and media
coverage similar to prior Bersih protests. Indeed, the Bersih 5 protests drew an estimated
40 thousand people to the streets, including prominent politicians, celebrities, and civil
society leaders (Chandran, 2016). The protests took place peacefully as planned in major
cities in Malaysia including its capital, Kuala Lumpur. High-level government officials
condemned the protests and several key movement activists were arrested. The Bersih 5
protests also faced threats from a counter-protest defending the government. Both local and
international news media outlets widely reported on the protests.2
Method
Design
The study employed a two-wave within-subjects design. At Time 1, participants
were recruited to complete an online survey two weeks before the day of mass protests.

2

For news coverage of the Bersih 5 protests, see Chan and Westcott (2016), Kamal (2016),
“Malaysiakini Live: Bersih 5 Rally” (2016), and Teoh and Leong (2016).
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Participants were re-contacted the day after the protests occurred, and were invited to
participate in the second wave of data collection for up to 2 weeks. The survey questions,
data, and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/dbphm/.
Participants and Procedure
A convenience sample of Malaysian participants were recruited to complete
surveys on their social and political attitudes by TurkPrime, a crowdsourcing research
platform (Litman, Robinson, & Abberbock, 2017). At Time 1, 646 participants were
recruited. After excluding 18 participants who failed to complete the study, 12 participants
who did not identify as either Malay, Chinese, or Indian Malaysian, and 4 participants who
took a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 hours), 612 participants were
retained (296 Malay, 244 Chinese, and 72 Indian Malaysians). All 612 participants were
invited to complete the survey at Time 2. Of those who were invited, 459 participants
returned at Time 2 (response rate = 75%). After excluding 13 participants who failed to
complete the study, 2 participants who completed the survey twice, 4 participants who took
a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 hours), and 18 participants whose
demographics reported at Time 1 did not match Time 2, a final sample of 422 participants
who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 measures were retained for analyses (218 Malays,
177 Chinese, and 27 Indian Malaysians). Table 1 contains descriptive information on
participants’ demographic characteristics. Participants’ age ranged from 18-68 (M = 33.46;
SD = 9.45), with almost equal numbers of males (N = 213) and females (N =197; 12
participants did not report their age and gender). As seen in Table 1, although we did not
have a nationally representative sample, we obtained participants from a range of religious,
economic, and educational backgrounds, that were living in various regions across the
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country. Participants completed a set of measures at both Time 1 and 2 that were important
for assessing attitude change. Additionally, participants completed measures at Time 2
specifically about their reactions to the protests. We describe these two set of measures
below.3
Table 1
Participants’ demographic characteristics
Characteristic
Age
18-20
21-30
31-40
41-50
51-60
≥ 61
Did not report
Gender
Male
Female
Did not report
Race
Malay
Chinese
Indian
Religion
Islam
Buddhism
Christianity
Hinduism
Taoism
Sikh
No religion

n

%

19
158
148
58
23
4
12

4.50
37.44
35.07
13.74
5.45
0.95
2.84

213
197
12

50.47
46.68
2.84

218
177
27

51.66
41.94
6.40

217
98
56
14
14
2
21

51.42
23.22
13.27
3.32
3.32
0.47
4.98

3

The data presented in this manuscript is one component of a larger project on Malaysians’
socio-political attitudes that aimed to test multiple research questions. The exclusion criteria were
selected to ensure data quality before any analyses were conducted to test our hypotheses.
Although we could not conduct analyses including the participants excluded at Time 1 since we
do not have Time 2 data for them, we also analyzed the data using all participants at Time 2 (i.e.,
without excluding any data), and we found virtually the same results as reported in this paper.
This suggests that our results were largely robust, stable, and not dependent on the exclusion
criteria we chose (see Supporting Information online).
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Monthly household income
Less than RM 2,000
26
RM 2,000-RM 4,000
82
RM 4,000-RM 6,000
108
RM 6,000-RM 8,000
68
RM 8,000-RM 10,000
60
More than RM 10,000
75
Did not report
3
Education level
Some primary/secondary school
11
Graduated from secondary school
40
Some college
61
Graduated from college
245
Some Masters/PhD
50
Completed Masters/PhD
14
Did not report
1
Location
Selangor
142
Kuala Lumpur
90
Johor
38
Penang
27
Sarawak
24
Perak
18
Kelantan
16
Sabah
15
Negeri Sembilan
14
Melaka
13
Pahang
12
Kedah
8
Terengganu
3
Perlis
1
Did not report
1
Note. Percentages may not add up to 100% due to rounding.

6.16
19.43
25.59
16.11
14.22
17.77
0.71
2.61
9.48
14.45
58.06
11.85
3.32
0.24
33.65
21.33
9.00
6.40
5.69
4.27
3.79
3.55
3.32
3.08
2.84
1.90
0.71
0.24
0.24

Measures collected at both Time 1 and Time 2
Movement identity. Participants were asked to select one of the 7 following
options to describe their identity in relation to the Bersih movement: “A very active
opponent of the Bersih movement”, “Unsupportive of the Bersih movement, and
sometimes an active opponent”, “Unsupportive of the Bersih movement”, “Neutral”,
“Supportive of the Bersih movement, but not active”, “Supportive of the Bersih movement,
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and sometimes an active participant”, “A very active participant of the Bersih movement”.
The items were adapted from Dunlap and McCright’s (2008) measure of movement
identity that was deemed appropriate for assessing both support and opposition to a
movement, particularly amongst the heterogeneous public. Higher scores indicate a more
supportive movement identity.
Support for social change. Participants were asked to report the extent to which
they agreed or disagreed with four statements assessing support for social change on a scale
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The items were developed based on the
actual political platform of the Bersih movement (“The political system in Malaysia needs
to be reformed”, “The democratic system in Malaysia needs to be improved”, “Those who
are involved in corruption need to be held accountable for their actions”, “The elections in
Malaysia need to be made fair”; αT1= .80; αT2 = .86).
Measures of reaction to protests collected at Time 2
Empowerment reactions.
Positivity. Participants reported the extent to which they felt each of the following
emotions when thinking about the Bersih 5 demonstrations, on a scale from 1 (not at all)
to 7 (extremely): “excited”, “proud”, “strong”, “inspired”, “empowered”, “joyful”, and
“hopeful” (Drury & Reicher, 2005; αT2 = .98).
Anger toward government. Participants reported the extent to which they felt
“angry with the government”, and “annoyed with the government”, when thinking about
the Bersih 5 demonstrations, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely; Iyer et al., 2007;
rT2 = .87).
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Perceived effectiveness of protests. Participants reported on the extent to which
they believed that the Bersih 5 demonstrations were “effective”, “influential”, “successful”,
and “well-organized” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; αT2 = .94).
Perceived legitimacy of protests. Participants reported on the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with the following statements on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree): “Bersih 5 was justified”, “The demands of Bersih 5 are legitimate”,
“Given the current situation in the country, there were good reasons to hold Bersih 5” (αT2
= .92).
Threat reactions4.
Anxiety. Participants reported the extent to which they felt “uneasy”, “worried”,
and “fearful” on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely) when thinking about the Bersih
5 demonstrations (αT2 = .91).
Anger toward protests. Participants reported the extent to which they felt “angry
with Bersih 5” and “annoyed with Bersih 5”, when thinking about the Bersih 5
demonstrations, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely; Iyer et al., 2007; rT2 = .92).
Perceived danger of protests. Participants reported on the extent to which they
agreed that the Bersih 5 demonstrations were “violent”, “chaotic”, “unsafe”, and
“disruptive” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree; αT2 = .95).

4

We also measured the extent to which participants felt “hopeless” and “weak” when thinking
about the Bersih 5 demonstrations (rT2 = .85) as part of our threat composite. However, in
hindsight, the hopelessness items were not specifically worded in relation to threat, thus
participants could have interpreted the items as a disempowerment response. It is therefore
ambiguous whether the hopelessness measure is a threat response or merely the conceptual
reverse of empowerment. Due to reviewers’ noting this conceptual issue, we dropped the
hopelessness and weak measures from the threat composite in our analyses reported in the main
text. The findings remain consistent when we do include these measures in the threat composite
(see Supporting Information online).
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Results
Panel attrition
To test for systematic dropouts from Time 1 to Time 2, we compared the
participants who responded at both Time 1 and Time 2 (N = 422) to those who responded
only at Time 1 and did not return for Time 2 (N = 190) on key demographics (i.e., age,
gender, race) and the two variables measured at Time 1 (i.e., movement identity and
support for social change). We used chi-square tests for categorical variables, and
independent t-tests for continuous variables. It was found that 73.65% of Malay and
72.54% of Chinese participants returned at Time 2, however only 37.50% of Indian
participants returned at Time 2, χ²(2) = 37.79, p < .001. There were no significant
differences between the samples on any other variable (all ps > .22). Importantly,
participants did not differ on movement identity and support for social change (ps > .30).
Protest Reaction Variables: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
We conducted a CFA for a two-factor solution for the reaction measures, whereby
the composite measures of 1) positive emotions, anger toward government, perceived
effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of protests loaded onto the first latent factor
(empowerment reactions), and 2) anxiety, anger toward Bersih, and perceived danger of
protests loaded onto a second latent factor (threat reactions). The model fit was acceptable:
χ2 (11) = 54.15, p < .001, SRMR = .03, NFI = .98, CFI = .98. All the unstandardized
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parameter estimates were significant at p < .001, and b ranged from .73 to 2.045. Thus,
composite measures of empowerment (αT2 = .88) and threat reactions (αT2 = .89) were
created. The two reaction variables were negatively correlated, r = -.67, p < .001. The
correlations between the individual measures included in the empowerment and threat
composites are displayed in Table 2.
Table 2
Correlations among measures in the empowerment (1-4) and threat (5-7) composites.
M (SD)
1. Positivity
2. Anger toward
government
3. Perceived
effectiveness
4. Perceived
legitimacy
5. Anxiety
6. Anger toward
protests
7. Perceived
danger of
protests

4.43
(1.75)
5.24
(1.57)
4.69
(1.48)
5.01
(1.58)
3.63
(1.59)
2.68
(1.78)
2.93
(1.69)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

.41***

-

.89***

.43***

-

.83***

.50***

.86***

-

-.49***

-.30***

-.48***

-.51***

-

-.65***

-.38***

-.66***

-.69***

.68***

-

-.56***

-.32***

-.57***

-.61***

.69***

.80***

-

Note. *** p < .001

5

We also tested a four-factor solution CFA, whereby 1) positivity and anger toward the
government loaded onto a factor of empowerment emotions, 2) perceived effectiveness and
legitimacy of protests loaded onto a factor of empowerment beliefs, 3) anxiety and anger toward
Bersih loaded onto a factor of threat emotions, and 4) perceived danger of protests loaded onto a
factor of threat beliefs. The four-factor solution CFA also provided acceptable model fit: χ2 (4) =
39.91, p <.001, SRMR = .02, NFI = .98, CFI = .99. However, the high correlations among the
composite measures within the empowerment emotions and beliefs (rs = .41-.89), as well as
within the threat emotions and beliefs (rs = .68-.80), indicate that most of the variance between
the emotions and beliefs within empowerment and threat respectively, are shared. In our
conceptualization of empowerment and threat, we also did not a priori hypothesize a theoretical
distinction between the emotions and beliefs that underlie these psychological constructs. Thus,
we find it parsimonious to use a two-factor solution to test how empowerment and threat
reactions predict movement identity and support for change.
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Changes Before and After the Protest
Paired samples t-test found that on average, movement identity was higher after the
protests (MTime 2 = 4.61, SDTime 2 = 1.06) compared to before (MTime 1 = 4.45, SDTime 1 = .94);
t(419) = 3.89, p < .001, d = .19. However, on average, support for social change was lower
after the protests (MTime 2 = 6.27, SDTime 2 = .99) compared to before (MTime 1 = 6.36, SDTime
1

= .83); t(421) = -2.37, p = .018, d = -.11. To assess whether the strength of the relationship

between movement identity and support for social change shifted across time, we used
Raghunathan, Rosenthal and Rubin’s (1996) recommendation for comparing two
correlations among the same sample. We found that the correlation between movement
identity and support for social change was significantly stronger after the protests (rTime 2 =
0.43, p < .001), compared to before (rTime 1 = 0.17, p < .001; z = 4.17, p < .001).
Using Reactions to Protest as Predictors of Movement Identity and Support for
Change
The means, standard deviations and correlations between variables at Time 1 and
Time 2 are displayed in Table 3. As expected, Time 1 and Time 2 scores on movement
identity, as well as Time 1 and Time 2 scores on support for change, were highly correlated.
Most people’s attitudes are not making huge shifts from before to after the protests.6
Nonetheless, if our hypothesis that reactions to the protests themselves are important in
shaping movement identity and support for change is supported, then after controlling for
the ability of Time 1 scores to predict Time 2 scores, reactions to the intervening protests
should uniquely predict Time 2 scores. This analytical method has been used in past

6

We also conducted descriptive analyses of the changes in movement identity from Time 1 to
Time 2. These analyses suggest that although few participants made large quantitative shifts in
their attitudes, among those who did change, shifts in attitudes occurred across the different levels
of Time 1 movement identity (see Supplementary Information online).
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collective action research that utilized data from two time points, with predictor variables
measured at one time point and outcome variables measured at both time points (Becker,
Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2001, Study 1; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Tausch & Becker, 2013;
see Finkel, 1995 for a statistical discussion). Specifically, we hypothesized that
empowerment reactions will positively predict Time 2 movement identity, and threat
reactions will negatively predict Time 2 movement identity, over and above the ability of
Time 1 movement identity to predict Time 2 movement identity. Similarly, we
hypothesized that empowerment reactions to Bersih 5 will positively predict Time 2
support for social change, and threat reactions to Bersih 5 will negatively predict Time 2
support for social change, over and above the ability of Time 1 support for social change
to predict Time 2 support for social change. The alternative, and certainly plausible,
possibility is that the reactions to the protests are a mere reflection of preexisting movement
identity and support for social change. If this is the case, then empowerment and threat
reactions to the protests will not significantly predict any additional variance in Time 2
movement identity and Time 2 support for social change beyond what is predicted by Time
1 movement identity and Time 1 support for social change7.

7

Another common approach in two-wave designs is the use of differences scores to assess
change (Allison, 1990; Gollwitzer, Christ, & Lemmer, 2014). Thus, we also computed difference
scores across time for movement identity and support for social change, and we found support for
our hypotheses, in that empowerment reactions were positively related to increases in movement
identity (r = .24, p < .001) and support for social change (r = .35, p < .001), whereas threat
reactions predicted decreases in movement identity (r = -.18, p < .001) and support for social
change (r = -.22, p < .001). Although the covariate approach (i.e., using Time 1 as a covariate)
and the difference score approach are different types of analyses and can sometimes yield
different conclusions (e.g., Lord, 1967), we find converging evidence with both methods. To be
consistent with prior research in this area (e.g., Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2001; Stürmer
& Simon, 2004; Tausch & Becker, 2013), we present the covariance approach within the main
text. For details of the difference score analyses, please see Supplementary Information online.

34

Table 3
Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables at Time 1 and Time 2.
M
Variables
1
2
3
4
5
(SD)
1. Movement identity
(Time 1)

4.45
(.94)

2. Support for social
change (Time 1)
3. Movement identity
(Time 2)
4. Support for social
change (Time 2)

6.36
(.83)
4.61
(1.06)
6.27
(.99)

5. Empowerment
reactions (Time 2)
6. Threat reactions
(Time 2)

6

.17***

-

.64***

.20***

-

.32***

.62***

.43***

-

4.84
(1.37)

.61***

.30***

.73***

.54***

-

3.08
(1.52)

-.48***

-.36***

-.57***

-.48***

-.67***

-

Note. *** p < .001

Reactions to Protest as Predictors of Movement Identity. At Step 1 of a
hierarchical regression analysis, movement identity at Time 1 predicted greater movement
identity at Time 2, b = .72, SE = .04, t(418) = 17.06, p < .001, R2 = .41. As hypothesized,
at Step 2, empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a significant increase
in R2, indicating that reactions to the protest uniquely predicted movement identity at Time
2, beyond what could be predicted by movement identity at Time 1, R2change = .19, Fchange
(2, 416) = 99.71, p < .0018. Specifically, stronger empowerment reactions to the protests
predicted greater movement identity at Time 2, b = .37, SE = .04, t(416) = 10.37, p < .001,

8

When empowerment and threat were entered at separate steps of the regression analyses, rather
than together at the same step, there was still a significant R2 change at each level of when
empowerment or threat were first entered into the regression model to predict movement identity
(see Supplementary Information online).
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and stronger threat reactions to the protests predicted weaker movement identity at Time
2, b = -.07, SE = .03, t(416) = -2.42, p = .016.
Reactions to Protest as Predictors of Support for Social Change. At Step 1 of a
hierarchical regression analysis, support for social change at Time 1 predicted greater
support for social change at Time 2, b = .74, SE = .05, t(420) = 16.27, p < .001, R2 = .39.
As hypothesized, at Step 2, empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a
significant increase in R2, indicating that reactions to protest uniquely predicted support for
social change at Time 2, beyond what could be predicted by support for social change at
Time 1, R2change = .14, Fchange (2, 418) = 61.78, p < .0019. Specifically, stronger
empowerment reactions to the protest predicted more support for social change at Time 2,
b = .25, SE = .03, t(418) = 7.48, p < .001, whereas stronger threat reactions did not
significantly predict support for social change at Time 2, however it was in the expected
negative direction, b = -.05, SE = .03, t(418) = -1.64, p = .102.10
Reactions to Protest as Simultaneous Predictors of Movement Identity and Support
for Social Change
To test both outcomes (movement identity and support for social change)
simultaneously, we conducted a path analysis with 1) Time 1 movement identity, Time 1
support for social change, empowerment, and threat reactions entered as exogenous

9

When empowerment and threat were entered at separate steps of the regression analyses, rather
than together at the same step, there was still a significant R2 change when empowerment or
threat were first entered into the regression model to predict support for social change. However,
the effect of threat became non-significant when empowerment was added as a predictor (see
Supplementary Information online).
10
We also asked participants whether they attended prior Bersih protests and the Bersih 5 protests
specifically. We conducted exploratory analyses to test the role of protest participation in shaping
people’s reactions to the protests. We report the details of these analyses in the Supplementary
Information online.
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variables, and 2) Time 2 movement identity and Time 2 support for social change entered
as endogenous variables. Mirroring the regression analyses above, we modeled 1) Time 1
movement identity, empowerment, and threat as predictors of Time 2 movement identity,
and 2) Time 1 support for social change, empowerment, and threat as predictors of Time 2
support for social change. The model fit the data well, χ2 (3) = 4.40, p = .222, SRMR =
0.01, NFI = 1.00, CFI = 1.00. The direction and significance of all paths were as
hypothesized, except for the negative link between threat and support for social change at
Time 2 which was not statistically significant, although it was in the hypothesized direction
(see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Path model depicting empowerment and threat reactions to protests as
simultaneous predictors of movement identity and support for social change at Time 2,
while controlling for movement identity and support for social change at Time 1.

Discussion
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Collective action aims to elicit a reaction from targeted audiences with the goal of
instigating support for social change. However, we know little about the effects that
protests have on mobilizing or demobilizing support for its cause amongst broader society.
To begin to address this question, we situated the present research around a mass protest
event that occurred in Malaysia to study how public attitudes may shift from before to after
the protests. We find that protests can trigger empowerment and threat reactions, which
can subsequently shape the public’s support for the movement and for social change.
Specifically, we found that experiencing empowerment in response to the protests
promoted a supportive movement identity and more favorable attitudes toward social
change after the protests. By contrast, threat reactions to the protests promoted an
oppositional movement identity and less favorable attitudes toward social change after the
protests occurred. In this particular context, our findings also showed that empowerment
reactions were a stronger predictor of changes in movement identity and social change than
threat reactions. Taken together, this research demonstrates the immediate psychological
impact of a real-world protest on society.
While prior psychological research has largely focused on those who directly
participate in collective action by explaining their motivations (e.g., Haslam & Reicher,
2012; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and personal outcomes
derived from participation (see Vestergren, Drury, & Chiriac, 2017 for a review), more
recent research has begun focusing on the consequences of protests on those who are not
involved in the original action (Feinberg et al., 2017; Schwartz, 2016; Thomas & Louis,
2014). Additionally, research from political science and sociology has indirectly linked
various protest occurrences to public attitudes (e.g., Andrews et al., 2016; Wallace et al.,
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2014). Our study contributes to this growing area of research by demonstrating that
individual-level shifts in attitudes before and after a protest can be linked to reactions to
the protest itself. Further, given that most extant research in psychology, including
collective action research, has been concentrated in Western regions (see Henrich, Heine,
& Norenzayan, 2010 for a discussion), the present research tested relevant psychological
concepts in a previously underexplored social and political context.
Our findings are also consistent with existing social psychological models on
collective action. The Social Identity Model of Collective Action posits that thinking of
oneself in terms of a group member promotes collective action through group-based anger
and efficacy (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008). This model has been extended to describe
how participation in collective action can fuel anger and efficacy beliefs, and consequently
contribute to stronger group identification, therefore creating a reciprocal and dynamic
model of collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2012). If we view collective action itself as
a starting point of mobilizing others, as we do in the present research, we find that the
extent to which protests arouse feelings of anger over injustice and beliefs in the
effectiveness of the protest – which we include in our conceptualization of empowerment
– promotes shifts in movement identity even amongst those who are observers (not
participants) of collective action. In addition, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM;
Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005) describes how crowd dynamics can empower its participants
during collective action. We show that members of the broader public can likewise feel
empowered in response to collective action, which can in turn promote support for the
movement. Similarly, given that Tausch and Becker (2013) demonstrated how emotional
responses to the policy successes and failures following a movement can motivate future
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collective action, we build on this work to reveal that the emotional and cognitive
experiences in response to collective action itself can mobilize or demobilize broader
public support for social change. Collective action, therefore, does not only cause change
within those who directly participate in the action, but can also incite change within other
members of society.
Beyond our primary hypothesized effects, it is important to note several other
findings. Most interestingly, we found that the association between movement identity and
support for social change was stronger after the protests. Although the measure of support
for social change was developed based on the explicit goals of the Bersih movement, the
relatively modest correlation between movement identity and support for social change
before the protests may mirror past work on the principle-implementation gap (Dixon,
Durrheim, & Tredoux, 2007), suggesting that even when people support certain goals in
principle (e.g., social change), they may fail to support the efforts needed to achieve those
goals (e.g., a social movement). A somewhat stronger correlation between movement
identity and support for social change after the protests may indicate that the protests
reduced the principle-implementation gap in people’s attitudes. Thus, examining the
strength of relationship between these outcome variables, and the specific predictors of
these outcomes (i.e., empowerment vs. threat in response to protests), may be more
informative of the change processes occurring, rather than the average differences in
attitudes. Indeed, after the protests occurred, the average support for social change was
slightly lower than at baseline, whereas the average level of movement identity was slightly
higher. These results point to the importance of disentangling and keeping clear the
distinction between the average effect of the protests on attitudes versus the within-
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participant change due to reactions to the protest.
Limitations
One of the major strengths of the current research was its panel design, by which
we could assess individual-level change in attitudes in a way that was tightly linked to a
real-world event, thus affording us sound internal validity. However, at the same time, our
findings may not be generalizable to other types of protests, and there is clearly a need for
further research in different contexts. The present research focused on peaceful mass
protests that occurred in a democratic country, which has also largely been the focus of
prior work on collective action (see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016 for a discussion). It is possible
that violent protests, or protests that occur in extremely repressive or non-democratic
countries may elicit more polarized psychological reactions among the public. It is also
possible that in societies where the frequency of protests is much higher and the culture of
dissent is prevalent, the ability of a protest to elicit public responses may be muted.
Additionally, we used a broad definition of “the uninvolved” to include societal
members who largely did not participate in collective action (i.e., Bersih 5). Nevertheless,
even those who did not directly participate in the protests on the streets may have engaged
in behaviors related to the protests, such as social media activism or informal discussions
online with friends and family about the protests, which could have influenced their
responses to the protests and their subsequent attitudes. Indeed, prior research has found
that social media plays a prominent role in the consumption of political news and the
expression of people’s political attitudes (e.g., Gil de Zúñiga, Jung, & Valenzuela, 2012;
Valenzuela, 2013), through which people may encounter information that challenges or
reinforces their attitudes (e.g., Messing & Westwood, 2012; Stroud, 2010). Taken together,
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while our findings provide initial understanding of the immediate processes through which
protests may influence broader social attitudes, future research is needed to test the
moderators of these effects.
Future Directions
The present research motivates several questions for future research. For one, what
are the factors that shape empowerment and threat responses to protests? Given the
importance of group identification in motivating collective action (van Zomeren et al.,
2008), it is possible that the extent to which people identify with a low-status group
advocating for its rights or a high-status authority legitimizing the status quo (e.g., a
governing regime), can determine whether the public audience will be mobilized in favor
of, or against, a movement for social change (Subašić et al., 2008). In addition, media
framing of events may influence public responses to protests (e.g., McLeod & Detenber,
1999; Shoemaker, 1984). For instance, media depictions of protests as violent or chaotic
can be threatening, whereas coverage that highlights the enthusiasm and unity amongst
protesters may be empowering. While the current research focused on the immediate
impact of a collective action, it is possible that in response to social movements, other
forms of mobilization may develop over time, such as solidarity protests by those who are
not directly affected by an injustice (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015; Stewart et al,
2016), or reactionary counter-movements (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Thus, future
research could consider the long-term effect of collective action on various audiences,
including uninvolved third-parties who may be potential sympathizers, and adversarial
groups that may mobilize against protests for social change.
Concluding Remarks
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In conclusion, while existing models of social change puts forth the idea that the
ability for social movements to achieve societal change critically relies on raising support
for the movement amongst broader society (e.g., Moscovici, 1980; Passini & Morselli,
2013; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008), and social movement scholars
have extensively discussed how protests are intentionally designed to elicit a reaction from
its targeted audience (e.g., Benford & Snow, 2000; Blee & McDowell, 2012; McAdam,
1983), to our knowledge, no psychological research to date has explicitly tested how
members of the public respond to ongoing protests. The present research contributes to our
theoretical understanding of the immediate impact of protest occurrence on public attitudes
and has practical applied value by showing that the promise of mass protests in shaping the
public’s subsequent attitudes critically relies on the relative ability of protests to elicit
empowerment and threat reactions.
Addendum: The Role of Race
The results from Chapter 2 provide initial evidence of how reactions to the focal
Bersih 5 protest event shaped subsequent public attitudes toward the Bersih movement and
support for social change. However, the public is far from homogenous; not all members
of the public may be similarly affected by a protest for social change. In particular, research
on intergroup dynamics have shown that advantaged group members are often motivated
to defend the status quo, whereas disadvantaged group members are instead motivated to
challenge it (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2008). This dynamic may be at play in Malaysia,
which is a multiracial country made up primarily of the Malay majority group and Chinese
and Indian minority groups. The Malays, who are viewed as the original inhabitants of the
country, hold greater political power than the Chinese and Indian minorities, who are
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descents from immigrants during the colonial era. Given that the Bersih movement aims to
reform the electoral system, it challenges the government which is primarily represented
by Malays. Although the goals of the movement are not explicitly targeting any one race,
the movements’ demands have been racialized. Critics of the Bersih movement have
argued that it destabilizes the government, creates racial divisions, and threatens the special
privileges of Malays (Smeltzer & Pare, 2015). It is therefore plausible that public reactions
to Bersih may differ across race.
This addendum focuses on formally testing whether race moderates the results
presented in the manuscript in Chapter 2. First, I examine whether the changes in Bersih
movement identity and support for social change from before to after the Bersih 5 protest
was different among Malays and non-Malays (i.e., Chinese and Indians). Second, I test
whether empowerment and threat reactions to the Bersih 5 protest differed by race. Third,
I also test whether race influenced the extent to which empowerment and threat reactions
to the Bersih 5 protest shaped subsequent Bersih movement identity and support for social
change. Given that there was only a small percentage of Indian Malaysian participants due
to logistical constraints during data collection, the Chinese and Indian participants were
combined to form the non-Malay group as the racial minorities in Malaysia.
Does Race Moderate Changes in Attitudes from Before to After the Protest?
Movement Identity
At Time 1 before the protest occurred, Malays on average had lower levels of
supportive movement identity (MTime 1 = 4.09) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime 1 =
4.84). At Time 2 after the protest occurred, Malays once again had lower levels of
supportive movement identity (MTime 2 = 4.31) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime 2 =
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4.94). However, there was no significant interaction between race and time in predicting
changes in Bersih movement identity from before to after the protest occurred, F(1, 418) =
2.17, p = .141. Among both racial majority (i.e., Malays) and minority (i.e., Chinese and
Indians) groups, there was an increase in supportive movement identity, from before (Time
1: MMalays = 4.09; MChinese and Indians = 4.84) to after the protest occurred (Time 2: MMalays =
4.31; MChinese and Indians = 4.94), F(1, 418) = 14.77, p < .001.
Support for Social Change
At Time 1, before the protest occurred, Malays on average did not significantly
differ on support for social change (MTime 1 = 6.38) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime
1

= 6.35). At Time 2 after the protest occurred, Malays once again did not significantly

differ on support for social change (MTime 1 = 6.26) compared to Chinese and Indians (MTime
1

= 6.29). There was also no significant interaction between race and time in predicting

support for social change from before to after the protest occurred, F(1, 420) = .57, p =
.452. Among both racial majority (i.e., Malays) and minority (i.e., Chinese and Indians)
groups, there was a main effect of time such that there was a small decrease in support for
social change from before (Time 1: MMalays = 6.38; MChinese and Indians = 6.35) to after the
protest occurred (Time 2: MMalays = 6.26; MChinese and Indians = 6.29), F(1, 420) = 5.51, p =
.019.
Does Race Moderate Empowerment and Threat Reactions to the Protest?
There was a significant effect of race on empowerment reactions in response to the
Bersih 5 protest, F(1, 420) = 21.09, p < .001. Malays on average reported lower levels of
empowerment (M = 4.55) compared to Chinese and Indians (M = 5.15). There was also a
significant effect of race on threat reactions in response to the Bersih 5 protest, F(1, 420)

45

= 29.53, p < .001. Malays on average reported higher levels of threat (M = 3.46) compared
to Chinese and Indians (M = 2.68).
Does Race Moderate the Extent to Which Reactions to the Protest Shape
Subsequent Attitudes?
Movement Identity
There was no significant interaction between race and empowerment reactions to
the protest in predicting subsequent movement identity, F(1, 413) = .04, p = .834.
Regardless of race, empowerment reactions promoted a more supportive movement
identity after the protest, b = .51, SE = .05, t = 10.14, p < .001. There was also no significant
interaction between race and threat reactions to the protest in predicting subsequent
movement identity, F(1, 413) = 2.36, p = .126. Regardless of race, threat reactions
promoted a less supportive movement identity after the protest, b = -.09, SE = .04, t = 2.00, p = .047.
Support for Social Change
There was a significant interaction between race and empowerment reactions to the
protest in predicting subsequent support for social change, F(1, 415) = 5.24, p = .023.
Simple slopes analyses revealed that the positive link between empowerment and support
for social change after the protest was somewhat weaker among Malays (b = .27, SE = .06,
t = 4.62, p < .001), compared to Chinese and Indians (b = .48, SE = .07, t = 6.84, p < .001).
However, there was no significant interaction between race and threat reactions to the
protest in predicting subsequent support for social change, F(1, 413) = 2.36, p = .126.
Regardless of race, threat reactions promoted less support for social change after the
protest, b = -.10, SE =.05, t = -2.22, p = .027.
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Taken together, the polarizing effects of the protest generally did not appear to
differ across racial groups, except for the effect of empowerment on subsequent support
for social change being stronger among Chinese and Indians (vs. Malays). Nevertheless,
we do observe that Malays (vs. Chinese and Indians) reported relatively lower levels of
empowerment and higher levels of threat from the Bersih 5 protest. We also observe that
Malays consistently reported a less supportive Bersih movement identity before and after
the Bersih 5 protest occurred. These race-based differences in attitudes toward Bersih raises
several questions: What underlying beliefs motivate the Malay majority group to show
more negative reactions to the Bersih protest and movement? What is the consequence of
this potential backlash toward Bersih? Chapter 3 seeks to examine these questions.
Bridge to Chapter 3
Since the publication of the manuscript from Chapter 2, recent research has
examined when and how collective action for social change may promote negative
reactions or backlash among the public, specifically among advantaged group members. In
particular, Saguy and Szekeres (2018) examined changes in gender system justification,
which refers to people’s legitimization of gender inequalities. Across a two-wave
longitudinal study conducted before and after the 2017 Women’s March in the United
States, Saguy and Szekeres (2018) focused on the effects of being exposed to the Women’s
March either in person, through the television, news, or social media. They found that
protest exposure predicted divergent attitudes among men and women. Men who were
weakly identified with their gender showed lower levels of gender system justification
when they were more exposed to the protests. By contrast, men who were highly identified
with their gender showed higher levels of gender system justification when they were more
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exposed to the protests. Among women, gender identification did not change the link
between exposure to the protests and levels of gender system justification. This work
suggests that while some men may be more likely to go against gender-based hierarchies
after the Women’s March, other men may instead exhibit elevated levels of support for
gender inequality.
While Saguy and Szekeres’s (2018) research demonstrated that advantaged group
members may exhibit backlash toward collective action that challenges the status quo, there
remains an open question about the underlying mechanisms and its implications for social
movement dynamics. Thus, Chapter 3 presents a manuscript aimed to understand why
advantaged group members may exhibit elevated levels of threat in response to movements
for social change, as well how support for reactionary counter-movements may arise as a
result of this threat. In particular, the focus will be on a hierarchy-legitimizing myth tied to
a group’s status and power in society: the sense of psychological ownership over one’s
country. This myth refers to the belief that a group should be more entitled to determine
the rules and norms in a given society because it was the first to inhabit or establish the
country. Chapter 3 therefore complements Chapter 2 by examining one potential reason
for polarized public attitudes in response to movements social change.
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CHAPTER 3
PSYCHOLOGICAL OWNERSHIP AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
“This is our soil, our land, the land where our blood has spilled.”
– Alwi Che Mat.
“This country does belong to White people, culturally, politically, socially, everything. We
defined what America is.”
– Richard Spencer.
The quotes above are from leaders who have mobilized people to participate in
rallies aiming to retain their group’s special positions within their respective countries. The
first quote is from a speech of a Malay leader during the Himpunan Maruah Melayu (Malay
Dignity Rally) on September 16th 2015 in Malaysia. Clad in red and branded as the Red
Shirts, the rally was organized by Malay supremacist groups aiming to defend the
government against the pro-democracy electoral reform movement, named Bersih which
means “clean” in Malay. The Bersih movement has been criticized for challenging the
government and accused of threatening the rights of Malays (Smeltzer & Pare, 2015). The
second quote is from a leader of the Alt-Right movement in the United States during a
speech, at a time in which the country has witnessed an upsurge of White nationalism.
While many cities and towns have begun removing Confederate monuments because of
ties to African American slavery, a range of far-right groups came together in
Charlottesville, Virginia on August 11th and 12th 2017 to oppose the removal of a
Confederate leader’s statue, arguing that the monument stands as a symbol of American
heritage.
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These two quotes come from two very different social and political contexts, yet
both are strikingly similar; they reflect the ideology of psychological ownership over a
country. Psychological ownership involves perceiving a sense of entitlement, privilege,
and the right to determine the rules and codes of conduct in a particular society (Verkuyten
& Martinovic, 2017). This sense of ownership can be derived from being the first to inhabit
or establish the country (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), and is often present in the
rhetoric of various reactionary movements organized by majority group members to uphold
the status quo (e.g., Due & Riggs, 2008; Khan, Svensson Jogdand, & Liu, 2017; MoretonRobinson & Nicoll, 2006). The present research aimed to examine the link between
psychological ownership and attitudes toward social movements that are either for or
against social change. We propose that majority group members’ who have greater
psychological ownership will perceive more threat from progressive collective action
demanding for social change, which will subsequently predict greater support for
reactionary collective action against social change. Thus, ownership beliefs could promote
efforts to re-assert the rights of the group believed to “own” a country, and may partially
explain the rise of reactionary counter-movements that we observe in various societies.
To examine the interplay between progressive and reactionary movements, we
situated the present research in two different contexts in which there are real-world tensions
between opposing social movements: 1) the Bersih electoral reform movement and the progovernment Red Shirt movement in Malaysia, and 2) the Black Lives Matter racial justice
movement and the White nationalist Alt-Right movement in the United Stated. These
contexts also allowed us to examine psychological ownership beliefs in a country in which
the majority group is acknowledged to be the native people (i.e., Malays in Malaysia),
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versus a country in which the majority group is not native to the land but is credited as
“founding” the country (i.e., Whites in America). Thus, we propose that psychological
ownership, whether derived from native or founder ownership beliefs, will promote greater
threat in response to movements for social change, which will in turn foster greater support
for movements against social change.
Psychological Ownership
People often feel that they, personally or collectively, “own” various material and
non-material objects, such as resources, institutions, and physical spaces. A key aspect of
psychological ownership is a sense of control over the object that is owned, which can
justify various efforts aimed at maintaining power and influence over the object (Brown,
Lawrence, & Robinson, 2005; Lyman & Scott, 1967). In the present research, we focused
on territorial claims of ownership, which involves believing that a group is entitled to
“own” a country because of their primacy in inhabiting and/or establishing it. This ideology
has been referred to as autochthony, which means “sprung from the land” in ancient Greek
(Cueppens & Geschiere, 2005; Geschiere, 2009; Martinovic & Verkuyen, 2013). Not all
groups may derive ownership over their country in the same way. In particular, majority
group members differ in whether they can claim to be native to, or founders of a particular
nation depending on their unique history and socio-political contexts.
To be native is to claim ownership based on the first-possession principle, in other
words, being the first to acquire and inhabit the land (Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005;
Giguère, Lalonde, & Jonsson, 2012; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, in
Malaysia, Malay are widely acknowledged to be the original inhabitants of the country,
and are legally known as bumiputeras, which literally translates to “sons of the soil” (Neo,
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2006). They hold special privileges at the expense of non-Malays (e.g., Chinese and Indian
Malaysians) who are descendants of immigrants groups (Noor & Leong, 2013). By
contrast, to be founders of a nation is to claim ownership based on the formative principle,
which refers to being the first group to establish the nation along with its guiding principles,
laws, and constitution (Gans, 2001; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017). For example, White
Americans cannot legitimately claim to be indigenous to the land which was first inhabited
by Native Americans, but White American can and do claim to be founders of the country.
The founding figures were descendants of European settlers, which has helped define
White American identity (Lipsitz, 2006). Native and founder ownership beliefs are
therefore culturally-bound and dependent upon the history of colonialism in a particular
country.
Prior research has theoretically distinguished between native and founder
ownership (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017), but to our knowledge, this distinction has not
been demonstrated empirically. Most work on collective psychological ownership to date
has focused on claims of native ownership. For example, prior research in Western Europe
has found that claims of primo-occupancy beliefs among indigenous groups promoted
prejudice (Brylka, Mahonen, Jasinskaja-Lahti, 2015; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013) and
opposition to the rights of immigrants (Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015).
However, both native and founder ownership claims may form the basis of intergroup
conflict (Geschiere, 2009; Toft, 2014). For instance, in Australia, Whites, who are not
native to Australian land but are acknowledged to be founding figures of Australia, have
claimed ownership over the country to exclude recent immigrants (Due & Riggs, 2008)
and even Aboriginal Australians (Garbutt, 2006). In the present research, we seek to more
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clearly distinguish between native and founder ownership, and subsequently demonstrate
that when majority group members cannot legitimately claim native ownership, they can
and do derive founder ownership over their country.
Further, we aim to examine the downstream consequences of both native and
founder psychological ownership on attitudes toward social movements that are either for
or against social change. Specifically, we propose that majority group members’ claims of
ownership over their country will promote perceived threat in response to movements for
social change, which will in turn promote support for reactionary counter-movements
against social change. Our approach therefore takes into account culture-specific ideologies
in a nation (see also Osborne, Yogeeswaran, & Sibley, 2017), which is responsive to recent
calls for integrating cultural contexts in collective action research (van Zomeren & Louis,
2017).
Threat in Response to Social Change and the Rise of Reactionary Movements
A large body of research has shown that perceived threat promotes negative
intergroup attitudes (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Threat includes
concerns about a group’s well-being, and perceiving challenges to a group’s status or
values (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Prior work has shown that when majority group
members perceive threats to their group’s well-being and status within society, it can
trigger reactionary efforts to preserve existing social hierarchies from which they benefit
(Blumer 1958; Bobo, 1999). Recent work has found that when White Americans are
reminded that they would become a numerical minority by 2050, they reported more
negative attitudes toward racial minorities (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014; Outten, Schmitt,
Miller, & Garcia, 2012).
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Given that psychological ownership beliefs are a powerful source of defining the
ingroup’s special position within society, and movements for social change by their nature
challenge the status quo and thus the majority group’s higher status in the system, we
propose that majority group members’ endorsement of psychological ownership over their
country will predict greater threat in response to protests for social change. Indeed, during
the U.S. Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, African Americans’ efforts to push for equal
rights were seen as threatening White Americans’ position of power (Bobo, 1988). More
recent work has shown that the gains in political rights for African Americans can be
perceived as a loss for White Americans, which in turn promoted a belief in anti-White
bias (Norton & Sommers, 2011; Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014). Thus, it is plausible that
perceived threat from minority’s demands for social change could propel majority group
members to support reactionary efforts that defend existing structural relations.
In line with the idea that advantaged group members may act collectively against
social change efforts, prior work has shown that when White South Africans and nonAboriginal Australians felt that they were deprived in their respective countries, they were
more supportive of political actions to benefit their ingroup (Cakal, Hewstone, Schwar, &
Heath, 2011; Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2007). Further, recent research has also examined
the psychological predictors of collective action challenging the system versus collective
action defending the system. This work has found that the extent to which people justified
an illegitimate system (Osborne, Jost, Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, 2018), had different
moral foundations (Milesi & Alberici, 2018), and perceived threat from the outgroup
(Cakal, Hewstone, Guler, & Heath, 2016) can differentially predict support for progressive
versus reactionary collective action. However, this work has not directly examined the
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relationship or potential tensions that can arise between these collective actions, such as
how the existence of one social movement may promote the rise of the other.
Social movement scholars have long theorized that movements often grow
contingent upon one another, since the mobilization for a cause can draw countermobilization against it (Meyer, & Staggenborg, 1996; Mottl, 1980). For example, the
achievements made by the U.S. civil rights movement were met with pro-White resistance
efforts (Andrews, 2002), and the protests for land reforms in Mexico had reciprocal effects
on counter-protests as both groups aimed to influence the government (Inclan, 2012). Thus,
in the present research, we draw on prior research on psychological ownership to
understand how negative reactions toward collective action for social change can promote
support for collective action against social change. We propose that majority group
members’ endorsement of psychological ownership over their country will predict greater
threat in response to collective for social change, which will in turn promote support for
reactionary collective action to uphold the status quo.
Overview of Studies
Three studies were conducted to examine how psychological ownership (both
native and founder ownership) operates within two different socio-political contexts, and
help explain the rise of reactionary movements that aim to counter efforts for social change.
Situated in the Malaysian context, Study 1 tested whether native ownership beliefs among
the Malay majority (but not racial minorities) will predict greater threat from prodemocracy protests, which will subsequently promote greater support for a progovernment counter-movement. Next, a pilot study was conducted to differentiate between
founder ownership beliefs and native ownership beliefs. Situated in the U.S. context,
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studies 2 and 3 tested whether founder ownership beliefs among the White majority (but
not racial minorities) will predict greater threat from a racial justice movement, which will
subsequently promote greater support for White nationalistic counter-protests. The data,
analysis code, and complete study materials are available at https://osf.io/nph6r/
Study 1
Study 1 was conducted around mass street protests for electoral reform in Malaysia,
a multiracial country in which the Malay majority holds greater political power than
Chinese and Indian minorities (Smeltzer & Pare, 2015). In response to corruption within
the government, the Bersih movement, meaning “clean” in Malay, was formed over a
decade ago to push for clean and fair elections (Y. H., Khoo, 2014). It’s fifth round of
protests, Bersih 5, took place on November 19th 2016 and attracted thousands of
Malaysians to the streets (Chandran, 2016). To counter the Bersih 5 protests, a progovernment movement, named the Red Shirts, mobilized its supporters to organize a
counter-protest to protect the dignity and rights of Malays. The Red Shirt protests drew a
much smaller crowd than Bersih 5, and dispersed after meeting the police blockades that
separated them from the Bersih 5 protesters. These two protests that occurred concurrently
provided a unique real-world opportunity to assess how racial majority and minority groups
in Malaysia responded to both protests. Thus, we surveyed Malaysian participants two
weeks before, and immediately after the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests. We aimed to test
whether the extent to which the Malay majority group endorsed greater native ownership
beliefs than the Chinese and Indian minority groups will predict more perceived threat from
the Bersih 5 protests (but not from the Red Shirt protests), and subsequently predict greater
support for the Red Shirt movement.
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Participants and Procedure
A sample of Malaysian participants were recruited to complete online surveys on
their social and political attitudes via TurkPrime, a survey research platform. At Time 1,
612 participants completed the first survey (296 Malays, 244 Chinese, and 72 Indians; age:
M = 32.46, SD = 9.61, range = 18-71; gender: 317 males and 274 females; 21 participants
did not report age and gender). At Time 2, 422 participants returned to complete a second
survey (218 Malays, 177 Chinese, and 27 Indians).11 Participants completed a set of
measures at both Time 1 and 2. For cross-sectional analyses, we used all data from
participants who responded at Time 1 (n = 612). For longitudinal analyses, we only used
data from participants who responded at both time points (n = 422). A sensitivity analysis
indicated that with 612 participants, we would be able to detect (with α = .05) an effect of
r = 0.13 in a bivariate correlation with 95% power, whereas with 422 participants, we
would be able to detect an effect of r = 0.16 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The
measures relevant to the present study were included as part of a larger survey on
Malaysians’ socio-political attitudes aiming to test multiple research questions.12
Specifically, at Time 1, we measured native ownership and Red Shirt movement identity.
At Time 2, we measured threat reactions toward the Bersih 5 protests and threat reactions
toward the Red Shirt protests, as well as the Red Shirt movement identity again.13 The

11

See Supporting Information for details on participant recruitment and exclusion criteria.
Analyses from this dataset that aimed to test different research questions were previously
reported in another paper (author(s) name removed for anonymity). In that paper, threat was a
predictor rather than an outcome variable, and threat was measured using a different scale (i.e.,
emotional reactions toward and beliefs about the Bersih 5 protests). In the present research, threat
perceptions were measured in response to both the Bersih and Red Shirt protests using a measure
of threat that was equally applicable to both protests.
13
See Supporting Information for full items.
12

57

items were measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) unless
noted otherwise.
Measured only at Time 1
Native ownership (αT1 =.90). We used four items from the Martinovic and
Verkuyten (2013) autochthony scale (e.g., “The original inhabitants of a country are more
entitled than newcomers”).
Measured at Time 1 and Time 2
Red Shirt movement identity. Participants were asked to select one of the seven
following options to describe their movement identity, adapted from Dunlap and McCright
(2008): “A very active opponent of the Red Shirt movement”, “Unsupportive of the Red
Shirt movement, and sometimes an active opponent”, “Unsupportive of the Red Shirt
movement”, “Neutral”, “Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, but not active”,
“Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, and sometimes an active participant”, “A very
active participant of the Bersih movement”. Higher scores reflect a more supportive
movement identity.
Measured only at Time 2
Threat from Bersih protests (αT2 = .94). We adapted six items from the threat
measure used in Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and Ellemers (2013) to be about Bersih 5 (e.g.,
“The demonstration is not compatible with the culture and values of Malaysia”).
Threat from Red Shirt protests (αT2 = .92). We used same six items used to
measure threat from Bersih protests, but the instructions were adapted to be about the Red
Shirts.
Results
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Table 4 shows means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations of key
variables at Time 1 and Time 2. We also tested for race-based differences on these
variables. As shown in Table 5, Malays reported greater endorsement of native ownership,
a more supportive Red Shirt movement identity, and higher threat from Bersih protests,
compared to Chinese and Indian minorities.

Table 4
Means, standard deviations and correlations between variables at Time 1 and Time 2
in Study 1.
Variables
1. Native ownership
(Time 1)
2. Threat from Bersih
protests (Time 2)
3. Threat from Red Shirt
protests (Time 2)
4. Red Shirt movement
identity (Time 1)
5. Red Shirt movement
identity (Time 2)
Note. * p < .05, *** p < .001

M
(SD)
4.86
(1.68)
3.21
(1.68)
5.20
(1.53)
3.22
(1.08)
3.00
(1.11)

1

2

3

4

5

.36***

-

.05

-.06

-

.26***

.33***

-.24***

-

.12*

.34***

-.32***

.53***

-

Table 5
Race-based differences on key variables in Study 1.
Outcome
Time 1
Native ownership
Red Shirt movement
identity
Time 2
Threat from Bersih
protests
Threat from Red
Shirt protests
Red Shirt movement
identity

Malay majority

Chinese and
Indian minorities
M
SD

df

F

p

1.61

1, 610

205.13

< .001

2.96

1.12

1, 609

45.22

< .001

1.68

2.69

1.52

1, 420

41.31

< .001

5.14

1.50

5.27

1.56

1, 420

.71

.401

3.14

1.07

2.84

1.13

1, 420

7.77

.006

M

SD

5.67

1.21

4.02

3.52

.90

3.70
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Cross-Sectional Analysis. To test the hypothesis that native ownership will
explain the link between being a Malay majority (vs. a racial minority) and endorsing a
more supportive Red Shirt movement identity at Time 1, we used conditional process
modeling using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013; model 4). Race was
introduced as the IV (1 = Malay majority, 0 = Chinese and Indian minorities), native
ownership as the mediator, and Red Shirt movement identity at Time 1 as the DV. The
analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of being Malay on more supportive Red Shirt
movement identity, through greater native ownership beliefs, b = .16, SE = .05, 95% CI
[.069, .267]. After accounting for this indirect effect, the direct effect of being Malay on
more supportive Red Shirt movement identity remained significant, b = .39, SE = .09, p <
.001, 95% CI [.206, .578] (see Figure 2).

Native ownershipT1
1.66***

Malays
(vs. Chinese or
Indian Malaysians)

.10***

.39*** (.56***)

Red Shirt
counter-movement
identityT1

Figure 2. The indirect effect of race on Red-Shirt counter movement identity via native
ownership beliefs at Time 1, before the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred.

Longitudinal Analysis. To test the hypothesis that Malays’ higher level of native
ownership at Time 1 will predict greater threat from Bersih protests at Time 2, which in
turn will predict a more supportive Red Shirt movement identity at Time 2, we conducted
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conditional process modeling using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013;
model 6). Race was introduced as the IV (1 = Malay majority, 0 = Chinese and Indian
minorities), native ownership as the step 1 mediator, threat from Bersih protests as the step
2 mediator, and Red Shirt movement identity at Time 2 as the DV. The analysis revealed
a significant indirect effect from race to Red Shirt movement identity, first through native
ownership and then through threat from Bersih protests Bersih, b = .11, SE = .03, 95% CI
[.062, .181]. After accounting for this indirect effect, the direct effect from race to Red
Shirt movement identity became non-significant, b = .11, SE = .12, p = .381, 95% CI [.133, .347] (see Figure 3).

.28***

Native ownershipT1

.22***

1.80***

Malays
(vs. Chinese or
Indian Malaysians)

Threat from
Bersih 5 protestsT2

.11 (.30**)

Red Shirt
counter-movement
identityT1

Figure 3. The indirect effect of race on Red-Shirt counter movement identity via native
ownership beliefs at Time 2, after the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred.

Discussion
Based on two-wave panel data collected in Malaysia before and immediately after
a mass protest calling for electoral reform (Bersih 5) as well as a counter-protest defending
the government (Red Shirts), Study 1 tested the relationship between native ownership and
counter-movement attitudes among racial majority (Malays) and minority (Chinese and
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Indians) group members. At Time 1, before the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred,
we found that Malays endorsed greater native ownership beliefs compared to Chinese or
Indian Malaysians, which in turn predicted a more supportive Red Shirt counter-movement
identity. At Time 2, after the Bersih 5 and Red Shirt protests occurred, we found that
Malays’ higher endorsement of native ownership beliefs reported at Time 1 predicted more
threat in response to the Bersih 5 protests (but not the Red Shirt protests) at Time 2 and
subsequently, a more supportive Red Shirt movement identity at Time 2. These findings
demonstrate that native ownership beliefs play a key role in predicting counter-movement
attitudes for majority group members.
While Study 1 focused on native ownership beliefs related to the first-possession
principle, these beliefs may not be the only form of ownership that can promote countermovement attitudes among majority group members. As outlined earlier in the
introduction, another powerful sense of ownership comes from being a member of a group
that first established a particular nation, namely, founder ownership beliefs. In some
countries, like Malaysia, the group widely acknowledged as the original inhabitants is the
same group acknowledged as the nation’s founding figures. However, in other countries,
the group that founded the country are not the original inhabitants.
In many regions around the world that have been colonized, a history of oppression
and violence by European settlers have led to the systematic displacement of indigenous
groups that have long inhabited those regions. In countries such as the United States,
Canada, and Australia, the sense of ownership that White majority group members feel
over their country today could be tied to the national founding figures of the country, who
were descents of Anglo-European colonizers. To test this idea, we conducted a pilot study
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in the U.S. context by adapting the native ownership items from Study 1 to be about founder
ownership. We investigated whether White Americans’ beliefs in founder ownership,
rather than native ownership, would be associated with a greater sense of personal
psychological ownership over the country, and a stronger perception that original
Americans are White, U.S.-born, Christian and English-speakers – which is the prototype
of a “true” American (Devos & Banaji, 2005).
Pilot Study
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 147 non-Hispanic White Americans via MTurk to complete a brief
online survey (age: M = 39.57, SD = 13.42, range: 19–71; gender: 59 males, 88 females).
Participants were randomly assigned to answer the native ownership items (n = 78) or the
founder ownership items (n = 69). Participants also reported on their personal
psychological ownership over the country, and perceived characteristics of original
Americans. A sensitivity analysis indicated that we would be able to detect (with α = .05)
an absolute difference of .30 between the slopes of the two groups, with 95% power (Faul
et al., 2009).
Measures
Items were measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
Native ownership. We used the same four items from Study 1 (α = .95).
Founder ownership (α = .90). We adapted the autochthony measure from
Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) by replacing the words “original inhabitants” with the
word “founders” (e.g., “The founders of a country are more entitled than newcomers”).
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Personal psychological ownership (α = .88). We adapted the psychological
ownership measure from van Dyne and Pierce (2004) (developed originally for
organizational contexts) to be about ownership over one’s country (e.g., “I feel a very high
degree of ownership for this country”).
Characteristics of original Americans (α = .86). Participants indicated the extent
to which they agreed that original Americans “are Christian”, “are born in the U.S.”,
“identify as White”, and “speak English”.
Results and Discussion
Endorsement of founder ownership was related to stronger personal psychological
ownership (r = .53, p < .001). By contrast, endorsement of native ownership beliefs were
not significantly related to personal psychological ownership (r = .02, p = .851). The
difference between these correlations were significant, Z = 3.38, p < .001 (Raghunathan,
Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1996). In addition, founder ownership was more strongly related to
endorsement of original Americans as Christian, U.S.-born, White and English-speaking
(r = .65, p < .001) compared to native ownership beliefs (r = .43, p = .001). The difference
between these correlations was marginally significant, Z = 1.87, p = .062 (Raghunathan et
al., 1996). These pilot findings suggest that White Americans may derive a sense of
ownership from being a part of the group that founded the country.
Study 2
The pilot study showed that founder ownership is central to White American’s
sense of ownership over their country. Study 2 aimed to test whether founder ownership
beliefs would predict greater threat in response to a movement for social change, and
subsequently, more support for a reactionary counter-movement. The study was situated
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around the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement which aims to achieve justice and
equality for Black people. A counter-movement that has recently emerged is the Alt-Right
(or the Alternative Right), which refers to a collection of White supremacist groups whose
core belief is that White civilization is under attack, and therefore advocates for the
protection of White people. A recent issue that has stirred controversy between BLM
supporters and Alt-Right supporters is the removal of Confederate monuments in the
United States. BLM supporters have pushed for the removal of these monuments because
they honor defenders of slavery. In response, counter-protests by Alt-Right supporters have
emerged, arguing that Confederate monument should be preserved because they
memorialize American history. We hypothesized that among White Americans, founder
ownership will predict more threat from the BLM movement (but not the Alt-Right
movement), which will subsequently predict more support for counter-protests to preserve
Confederate monuments.
Participants and Procedure
We recruited 202 participants to complete online surveys via MTurk. Of those, 151
were non-Hispanic Whites. Given that we aimed to examine the attitudes of non-Hispanic
Whites in this study, we excluded 41 participants who did not self-identify as White and
who were Hispanic (age: M = 39.71, SD = 12.41, range: 19 – 76; gender: 63 males, 88
females). A sensitivity analysis indicated that with this sample size, we would be able to
detect (with α = .05) an effect of r = 0.26 in a bivariate correlation with 95% power (Faul
et al., 2009).
Measures
All items were measured on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree).
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Founder ownership (α = .95). We used the same 4 items from the pilot study.
Threat from BLM protests (α = .96). We adapted the 5 items used in Study 1 to
be about BLM (e.g., “The protests are not compatible with American values”).
Threat from Alt-Right protests (α = .91). We used the same items that measured
threat from BLM, but the instructions were adapted to be about the Alt-Right.
Criticism of BLM protesters (α = .97). We adapted 5 items from McLeod and
Detenber (1999) to be about BLM (e.g., “The protesters tend to be troublemakers”).
Criticism of Alt-Right protesters (α = .92). We used the same items that measured
criticism of BLM protesters, but the instructions were adapted to be about the Alt-Right.
Support for anti BLM actions (α = .89). We developed 3 items (e.g., “The police
should closely the monitor the activities of the movement”).
Support for anti Alt-Right actions (α = .84). We used the same items that
measured support for anti BLM actions, but the instructions were adapted to be about the
Alt-Right.
We found that the measures of threat from BLM protests, criticism of BLM
protesters, and support for anti BLM actions were strongly correlated with one another (rs
≥ .82, p < .001). Thus, we combined the three measures into a composite of anti BLM
attitudes (α = .95). Similarly, the measures of threat from Alt-Right protests, criticism of
Alt-Right protesters, and support for anti Alt-Right actions were strongly correlated (rs ≥
.59, p < .001), and were combined into a composite of anti Alt-Right attitudes (α = .87).
Support for protests to preserve civil war monuments (α = .94). Participants
were asked the extent to which they agreed with 6 statements about protesters who want to
preserve Confederate monuments (e.g., “I can sympathize with their cause”).
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Results
Bivariate correlations showed that founder ownership was related to greater anti
BLM attitudes (r = .54, p < .001), and greater support for protests to preserve civil war
monuments (r = .27, p < .001). By contrast, founder ownership was not significantly related
to anti Alt-Right attitudes (r = -.11, p = .196). To test the hypothesis that the link between
founder ownership and support for protests to preserve civil war monuments is explained
in part by anti BLM attitudes, we conducted conditional process modeling using 10,000
bootstrapped samples (Hayes, 2013; model 4). Founder ownership was entered as the IV,
anti BLM attitudes as the mediator, and support for protests to preserve civil war
monuments as the DV. There was a significant indirect effect from founder ownership to
support for protests to preserve civil war monuments via anti BLM attitudes, b = .25, SE =
.05, 95% CI = [.1592, .3630]. After controlling for this indirect effect, the direct effect was
no longer significant, b = -.01, SE = .07, t = -.12, p = .906, 95% CI = [-.1556, .1381] (see
Figure 4).

.56***

Founder ownership

Anti
Black Lives Matter
attitudes

-.01 (.24***)

.45***

Support for protests
to preserve
civil war monuments

Figure 4. The indirect effect of founder ownership on support for protests to preserve civil
war monuments via anti Black Lives Matter attitudes.
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Study 2 demonstrated that White Americans’ belief in founder ownership predicted
greater anti-BLM attitudes, which subsequently predicted more support for counterprotests to preserve civil war monuments. Study 2 focused exclusively on the downstream
consequences of founder ownership beliefs among White Americans. However, various
theories of intergroup relations have argued that minority group members may sometimes
defend the status quo (system justification, Jost, Banaji & Nosek, 2004; belief in a just
world, Hafer & Bègue, 2005; social dominance orientation, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, &
Malle, 1994). This literature would suggest that people of color may also endorse founder
ownership beliefs. We agree with this possibility, however, we further propose that founder
ownership will be particularly predictive of counter-movement attitudes among White
Americans, given that the national founders are uniquely linked to the history and
formation of White American identity. Thus, Study 3 aimed to test whether founder
ownership beliefs will be differentially linked to reactionary counter-movement attitudes
among majority and minority group members. We expected that founder ownership beliefs
will predict greater threat from BLM and greater support for counter-protests to preserve
civil war monuments among White Americans, and not among people of color.
Study 3
Participants and Procedure
There were 484 participants recruited via MTurk to complete online surveys. Of
those, 364 were non-Hispanic Whites, and 120 were from a minority race or ethnicity (19
Hispanic Whites, 9 American Indian/Alaskan Native, 41 Asian, 37 Black or African
American, 12 mixed race, 1 Middle Eastern, and 1 other). There were also 3 participants
that did not respond to the demographic questions, and 1 participant that did not identify
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with any race; therefore, these participants were excluded from analyses (age: M = 38.49,
SD = 13.13, range: 18 – 82; gender: 197 males, 285 females, 2 other).14 A sensitivity
analysis indicated that we would be able to detect (with α = .05) an absolute difference of
.19 between the slopes of the two groups, with 95% power (Faul et al., 2009).
Measures
Founder ownership (α = .93), anti BLM attitudes (α = .93), and support for protests
to preserve civil war monuments (α = .94) was measured using the same items from Study
2.
Results
Bivariate correlations showed that founder ownership was related to greater anti
BLM attitudes (r = .50, p < .001), and greater support for protests to preserve civil war
monuments (r = .35, p < .001). Anti BLM attitudes were also related to greater support for
protests to preserve civil war monuments (r = .54, p < .001). As seen in Table 6, we also
tested for race-based differences, which showed that White people and people of color did
not differ on founder ownership beliefs. However, Whites reported greater anti BLM
attitudes and greater support for protests to preserve civil war monuments compared to
racial minorities.

14

Before responding to the measures, half of the participants were randomly assigned to view
images of vandalized confederate monuments. However, there were no effects of the
manipulation, thus we collapsed participants across conditions.
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Table 6
Race-based differences on key variables in Study 3.
Outcome

White majority
M
SD

Racial minorities
M
SD

Founder ownership

4.85

2.23

4.90

Anti BLM attitudes

5.52

2.25

Support for
protests to preserve
civil war
monuments

5.93

2.19

df

F

p

1.98

1, 482

.05

.817

4.64

2.19

1, 482

13.75

< .001

5.28

2.16

1, 482

8.08

.005

Race as a Moderator of the Link Between Founder Ownership and Social Movement
Attitudes
There was a significant interaction between race and founder ownership in
predicting anti BLM attitudes, F(1, 480) = 9.62, p = .002. Simple slopes analyses revealed
that greater founder ownership predicted greater anti BLM attitudes among White people,
b = .59, SE = .04, t = 13.09, p < .001, but the relationship between founder ownership and
anti BLM attitudes was weaker among people of color, b = .28, SE = .09, t = 3.17, p = .002.
There was also a significant interaction between race and founder ownership in
predicting support for protests to preserve civil war monuments, F(1, 480) = 11.24, p <
.001 Simple slopes analyses revealed that greater founder ownership predicted greater
support for the protests among Whites, b = .43, SE = .05, t = 8.99, p < .001, but there was
no significant relationship between founder ownership and support for the protests among
people of color, b = .08, SE = .09, t = .81, p = .421.
Moderated Mediation Analysis
To test the overall hypothesis that founder ownership will predict greater anti BLM
attitudes, which will in turn promote greater support for protests to preserve civil war
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monuments, among Whites but not people of color, we conducted conditional process
modeling using bootstrapping with 10,000 resamples (Hayes, 2013; model 8). The
moderated mediation analysis tested the moderation (by race) of both the direct path from
founder ownership to support for protests to preserve civil war monuments and the indirect
path from founder ownership to support for protests via anti BLM attitudes. The index of
moderated mediation was significant (b = .14, SE = .06, 95% CI [.0325, .2604]), which
indicates that the strength of the relationship from founder ownership to support for protests
via anti BLM attitudes was significantly different for Whites and people of color. Followup examination of these conditional indirect effects revealed that for Whites, there was
significant indirect effect of founder ownership on support for protests through anti BLM
attitudes (b = .27, SE = .04, 95% CI [.1973, .3474]). There was also a significant indirect
effect among people of color, although to a lesser extent (b = .13, SE = .05, 95% CI [.0322,
.2341]). After controlling for these indirect effects, the direct effect of founder ownership
on support for protests remained significant for Whites (b = .17, SE = .05, t = 3.22, p =
.001, 95% CI [.0632, .2605]), but not for people of color (b = -.05, SE = .09, t = -.60, p =
.549, 95% CI [-.2200, .1171]) (see Figure 5).

White people

.59***

Founder ownership

Anti
Black Lives Matter
attitudes

.16*** (.43***)
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.45***

Support for protests
to preserve
civil war monuments

People of color

.28**

Founder ownership

Anti
Black Lives Matter
attitudes

-.05 (.08)

.45***

Support for protests
to preserve
civil war monuments

Figure 5. The indirect effects of founder ownership on support for protests to preserve civil
war monuments via anti Black Lives Matter attitudes, moderated by race.

Discussion
Study 3 replicated the findings from Study 2 in that founder ownership beliefs
predicted more anti BLM attitudes, and subsequently greater support for protests to
preserve civil war monuments among White Americans. Study 3 extended Study 2 by
showing that the link between founder ownership and protests to preserve civil war
monuments via anti BLM attitudes was stronger among White Americans compared to
people of color. Interestingly, Study 3 showed that White people and people of color did
not differ on endorsement of founder ownership beliefs, whereas Study 1 found that Malays
endorsed native ownership more than Chinese and Indian minorities. Nevertheless, in both
studies, we consistently found that ownership beliefs predicted more support for a countermovement. Additionally, although White people and people of color endorsed founder
ownership to the same extent, the degree to which founder ownership beliefs predicted
counter movement attitudes differed between the groups. Thus, founder ownership is more
strongly tied to White Americans’ support for counter movements in response to protests
for racial justice.
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General Discussion
When we observe progressive social movements pushing for equality and justice,
we also often observe reactionary counter-movements aiming to defend the status quo. Our
project aims to understand this dynamic by focusing on the role of psychological ownership
– a belief that the natives or founders of a particular country should be ordained with greater
rights and privileges compared to newcomers (Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2017).
Distinguishing between ownership that stems from being native to a land, versus ownership
that stems from being founders of a nation, our findings demonstrated that in the different
social and political contexts of Malaysia and the United States, native or founder ownership
among majority group members promoted greater threat from movements for social
change, which in turn predicted support for reactionary counter-movements.
Specifically, Study 1 found that the Malay majority endorsed greater native
ownership beliefs compared to Chinese and Indian minorities, which promoted perceived
threat from pro-democracy protests demanding electoral reforms, that subsequently
predicted greater support for a pro-government counter-movement in Malaysia. Study 2
showed that founder ownership beliefs among the White majority predicted greater
perceived threat from a racial justice movement, which in turn predicted greater support
for nationalistic counter-protests in the U.S. Study 3 replicated this effect, and
demonstrated that the link between founder ownership and support for nationalistic
counter-protests via threat from racial justice protests was stronger among White people
compared to people of color. Taken together, these findings revealed how psychological
ownership operates within two different socio-political contexts, which can help explain
the rise of reactionary efforts against social change in these regions.
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Contributions to Research on Intergroup Relations and Collective Action
This research builds our understanding of reactionary counter-movements by
identifying the key role of ownership beliefs. While prior work has found that native
ownership beliefs endorsed by majority group members have detrimental effects on
intergroup relations (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013; Smeekes et al., 2015), it has not
examined people’s ownership beliefs when they are not native to the land. Drawing on
Verkuyten and Martinovic’s (2017) theorizing of two principles that underlie
psychological ownership – the first possession principle and the formative principle – the
present research showed that psychological ownership can take different forms depending
on the socio-political history of majority group members. Being the first to inhabit a
country provides the group with native ownership beliefs. However, when a group cannot
claim to be native to a country, they may derive founder ownership from belonging to a
group that first established the country after displacing indigenous communities. Beyond
distinguishing between native and founder ownership, we demonstrated that both forms of
ownership beliefs were related to defensive efforts to counter social change. This work
contributes to our understanding of how culture-specific ideologies are linked to collective
action, and helps fill a gap in the literature which has largely overlooked the role of culture
(van Zomeren & Louis, 2017).
Further, by focusing on the factors that promote reactionary collective action
against social change that aims to preserve the status quo, the present work extends prior
research on the motivations to support collective action for social change that challenges
the status quo (Milesi & Alberici, 2018; Osborne et al. 2018). The global upsurge of ringwing movements that aim to defend and protect the dominant group’s status at the expense
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of intergroup equality and justice (Galston, 2018; Grevin, 2016) calls for a greater
understanding of why majority group members come to support such efforts. The present
research showed that experiencing threat in response to movements for social change
predicts support for counter-movements. This finding contributes to our understanding of
how mobilization for one cause can promote counter-mobilization – a dynamic that social
movement scholars have long documented (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).
The present research also suggests that collective action may in part be a
contestation about psychological ownership in society. This contestation is rooted in direct
physical acts, as a common protest tactic is to occupy public spaces to increase the visibility
of issues that marginalized groups face (e.g., McAdam, 1983; Snow, Rochford, Worden,
& Benford, 1986). These acts are often coupled with rhetoric about ownership, such as the
popular protest chant “Whose streets? Our streets!”. Relatedly, discursive research on place
identity and attachment has shown that the ways in which groups construct the meaning of
a place can provide them with a sense of belonging within society (Dixon & Durrheim,
2000; Kirkwood, McKinlay, & McVittie, 2013). Thus, collective action may be viewed as
an expression and construction of psychological ownership. Mobilization for or against
social change may depend on whether a group can successfully use the rhetoric of
ownership to rally supporters.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Although the present research was grounded on real-world tensions that exist
between social movements, and tested hypotheses derived from prior theorizing and
empirical work, the longitudinal and correlational design of our studies precludes causal
claims. While we showed that ownership beliefs predict support for counter movements to
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defend the status quo, it is possible that people may rationalize their support for counter
movements by drawing on ownership beliefs. Ongoing movements pushing for equality
and justice, as well as the rhetoric of counter movements defending the current status
relations, might also increase majority group members’ ownership beliefs. The potentially
cyclical relationship between claims of ownership and reactionary collective action await
further empirical testing.
In the present work, we focused on majority group members in Malaysia as a case
in which native ownership operates, and majority group members in the U.S. as a case in
which founder ownership operates. One open question is whether our findings will hold in
other contexts. We believe that native ownership beliefs would predict reactionary efforts
to social change in other countries in which the dominant group members can legitimately
claim to be indigenous to the land (e.g., Germans, French). By contrast, founder ownership
beliefs should similarly operate in other countries in which descendants of European
colonizers are credited as national founders (e.g., Canada, Australia).
Further, while we limited our focus to understanding native and founder ownership
claims to a country, it is important to recognize that the content of ownership beliefs itself
can be severely contested. Territorial ownership plays a key role in various intergroup
conflicts, for example, between Israel and Palestine, and between the Singhalese and
Tamils in Sri Lanka. Indeed, prior research on intractable conflicts has shown that societies
develop collective memories that reinforce the group’s dominant orientation toward the
conflict, which can include beliefs about land ownership (Bilali, 2011). Future research
may examine how psychological ownership is constructed among people on both sides of
a conflict, and how these beliefs may mobilize or demobilize collective action.
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Addendum: Myths that Legitimize a Group’s Higher Status in Society
Psychological ownership beliefs may be a form of system-legitimizing belief that
allows dominant group members to justify their power and status within a society. Such a
belief may be conceptually and theoretically linked to other beliefs that uphold the status
quo and are widely subscribed by members in a society. In line with this idea, when
Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) first developed the measure of native psychological
ownership (or autochthony), they tested its convergent and divergent validity, as well as its
predictive validity. Among native Dutch, Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) found that
native psychological ownership was distinct from ethnic conceptions of national
belonging, which refers to the belief that the “true” members of a country share a common
ancestry or descent. Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) further showed that both native
psychological ownership beliefs and ethnic conceptions of national belonging promoted
greater prejudice towards immigrants in the Netherlands.
In Chapter 3, for studies in the U.S. context, we adapted the measure of native
psychological ownership from Martinovic and Verkuyten (2013) to instead measure
founder psychological ownership to capture the idea that people may legitimize the higher
status of White Americans because the White racial identity in the U.S. is historically tied
to the founding fathers of the country. It is therefore important to assess how founder
ownership beliefs may be similar or different from related system-legitimizing myths. One
important belief system that is foundational to the national ethos of the U.S. is meritocracy
beliefs. As a part of the “American Dream”, meritocracy beliefs refer to the idea that any
individual, regardless of their background, can improve their status in society by working
hard (Hochschild, 1996). This implies that low-status groups in society deserve their
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condition because they simply did not put in the effort to succeed (O’Brien & Major, 2005),
which can subsequently justify social inequality and the status quo (Jost & Hunyady, 2005).
It therefore follows that meritocracy beliefs predict more opposition to race-based
affirmative action policies and help justify claims of anti-White bias (Fraser & Kick, 2000;
Wellman, Liu, & Wilkins, 2015). It is possible that meritocracy beliefs could would also
be a key part of White Americans’ backlash toward the Black Lives Matter movement, and
support for reactionary counter-protests to defend White people’s status in society. This
addendum will focus on the role of meritocracy beliefs by reanalyzing portions of the data
from the manuscript in Chapter 3. In particular, I examine the link between founder
ownership beliefs and meritocracy beliefs, and I also test how meritocracy beliefs may
operate as an underlying mechanism promoting support for counter-movements.
How Do Meritocracy Beliefs Relate to Founder Ownership Beliefs?
In Study 2 of the manuscript reported in Chapter 3, the survey focused on the
attitudes of non-Hispanic White Americans. In this study, meritocracy beliefs were
measured to explore its distinction and overlap with native ownership beliefs. Exploratory
factor analysis with oblimin rotation showed that four items measuring founder ownership
beliefs and the three items measuring meritocracy beliefs loaded onto separate factors. The
rotated factor pattern showed high factor loadings (i.e., standardized regression
coefficients) for the founder ownership items (.87 < B < .93) and the meritocracy items
(.57 < B < .83). Thus, separate composite variables were created for founder ownership
beliefs (α = .95) and meritocracy beliefs (α = .81). Bivariate correlations showed that
founder ownership beliefs was related to more meritocracy beliefs (r = .42, p < .001).
Meritocracy beliefs was also related to more threat from the Black Lives Matter movement
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(r = .63, p < .001) and more support for protests to preserve civil war monuments (r = .44,
p < .001).
How Do Meritocracy Beliefs Relate to Backlash?
To test the role of meritocracy beliefs as an additional explanatory variable for
reactionary counter movements, I conducted serial mediation using PROCESS with 10,
000 bootstrapped samples (Hayes, 2013; model 6). Founder ownership was entered as the
IV, meritocracy beliefs and anti Black Lives Matter (BLM) attitudes were the serial
mediators, and support for protests to preserve civil war monuments was the DV (see
Figure 6). The results revealed that founder ownership beliefs predicted more meritocracy
beliefs (b = .33, SE = .06, t = 5.66, p < .001, 95% CI [.2159, .4475]), which in turn promoted
more threat from BLM (b = .64, SE = .08, t = 7.63, p < .001, 95% CI [.4766, .8097]), and
subsequently more support for civil war protests (b = .35, SE = .08, t = 4.13, p < .001, 95%
CI [.1818, .5147]). There was a significant indirect effect from founder ownership to
meritocracy to anti BLM attitudes to pro-civil, b = .07, SE = .03, 95% CI [.0334, .1341].
In addition, the indirect effect from founder ownership to support for protests to preserve
civil war monuments via anti BLM attitudes remained significant, b = .12, SE = .04, 95%
CI [.0486, .2249], suggesting that the mediation patterns reported in Study 2 in Chapter 3
remained consistent after accounting for the role of meritocracy beliefs as an additional
mediator.
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Meritocracy beliefs

.64***

Anti Black Lives
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.35***
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.34***
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Support for protests
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civil war monuments

Figure 6. The indirect effects of founder ownership on support for protests to preserve civil
war monuments via meritocracy beliefs and anti Black Lives Matter attitudes, among nonHispanic Whites (from Study 2).

Bridge to Chapter 4
While Chapter 3 focused on how reactionary counter-movements can arise in
response to movements for social change, the movements investigated thus far have largely
been peaceful, legal, and therefore normative within their societies. While it is true that
some Bersih protests and Black Lives Matter protests have resulted in clashes with the
police or damages to public property, the movement organizers explicitly relied on nonviolent approaches to civil resistance. It is also true that the Red Shirt protests by Malay
supremacists in Malaysia, and the Alt-Right protests by White supremacists in the United
States have turned violent on certain occasions. However, collective actions that are violent
and/or illegal remain relatively rare in these societies. This observation reflects the political
context of Malaysia and the United States in which conflict between groups often do not
take the form of overt hostility. In fact, normative forms of protest such as mass street
demonstrations are viewed as a reflection of a healthy democracy. Thus, by examining
largely democratic, peaceful contexts, I have been limited to focusing on normative forms
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of collective action. This limitation is also reflected in the broader psychological literature
on collective action that has largely sought to explain why people engage in normative
forms of collective action such as mass public protests (for a review, see Becker & Tausch,
2015).
The focus on normative collective action alone does not allow us to extrapolate
psychological findings to contexts in which people may be driven to nonnormative forms
of collective action to achieve group goals. To begin addressing this gap, Chapter 4
investigates public attitudes toward collective action in a context in which violence and
warfare is the lived experience of many. By doing so, we can better examine why both
sides of an ongoing conflict may come to support nonnormative versus normative forms of
collective action. In particular, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict provides a suitable context
to study this dynamic. The social and political climate in Israel is in part characterized by
opposing social movements that are pro-Israel versus pro-Palestine. Chapter 4 focuses on
identifying the psychological process that predict Arab and Jewish Israelis support for
different forms of collective action to advance the rights of their respective groups.
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CHAPTER 4
INGROUP IDENTIFICATION, JUSTICE AND COLLECTIVE ACTION
In protracted conflict settings, people on both sides of a conflict often engage in
actions to fight for the rights of their respective groups. Collective action can be extremely
non-normative, such as when Palestinians targeted Jewish Israelis through suicide
bombings in their struggle for self-determination, or when Jewish Israelis attacked
Palestinians by burning buildings and killing civilians to defend their rights to an
independent Jewish state (Bishara, 2002). Collective action can also be largely normative,
such as when Palestinians marched down the streets to resist forced eviction from their
homes, or when Jewish Israelis held protests to assert their right to live in settler areas
(Marteu, 2009). These examples illustrate that people may pursue various forms of actions
to improve the conditions of their group. What might lead people to support the more nonnormative forms of collective action, such as aggression against civilians, versus the more
normative forms of collective action, such as public street protests?
Ample research has demonstrated that a sense of injustice and identification with
one’s group are central to collective action (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).
However, this work has mainly examined perceptions of injustice and group identification
as unidimensional, rather than multidimensional constructs. We argue that different ideas
about how to seek justice and different ways in which people identify with their groups will
determine whether people are more supportive of nonnormative actions or normative
actions. Specifically, we propose that ingroup glorification promotes support for
nonnormative collective action through a desire for retributive justice, whereas ingroup
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attachment promotes support for normative collective action through a desire for
restorative justice.
Collective Action
Researchers have identified two different forms of collective action: Nonnormative
and normative collective action (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright,
Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). As defined by Wright et al. (1990), nonnormative collective
actions are those that fall outside the scope of existing laws, customs, and codes of conduct
in a society, for example violent street protests and terrorism; by contrast, normative
collective actions are those that fall within the laws, customs, and codes of conduct in a
society, for example peaceful street protests, sit-ins and strikes. This conceptualization
overlaps with other taxonomies of collective action: illegal and legal (Finkel, Muller, &
Opp, 1989), activism and radicalism (Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009), hostile and
benevolent (Zaal, van Laar, Stahl, Ellemers, & Derks, 2011), as well as violent and nonviolent actions (Thomas & Louis, 2014). To refer to distinct forms of collective actions,
we use normative and nonnormative collective action to be consistent with the terminology
used by Wright et al. (1990), Tausch et al. (2011), and Becker and Tausch (2015). It is also
important to note that the normativeness of a particular action is defined in relation to the
broader social system, rather than from the perception of the group undertaking the action.
Although traditionally the literature has focused on the socio-psychological
predictors of normative collective action, scholars have also begun to examine the
predictors of nonnormative collective action. To understand the factors that predict
nonnormative versus normative collective action, prior work has investigated group-based
efficacy and emotions as two prominent pathways that differentially predict nonnormative
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and normative collective action tendencies (for a review, see Becker & Tausch, 2015). This
research has found that strong beliefs in group-based efficacy and feelings of anger over
injustice predict normative collective action. By contrast, lack of group-based efficacy
beliefs and, instead, strong beliefs in the efficacy of using aggression to reach group goals
and feelings of contempt over injustice predict nonnormative collective action (Saab,
Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016; Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016;
Tausch et al., 2011).
While there is prior research on how various forms of efficacy beliefs (i.e., efficacy
of peaceful vs. violent actions) and emotions (i.e., anger vs. contempt) shape distinct
collective action tendencies, perceptions of injustice and ingroup identification have
typically been studied as single, unidimensional constructs. There is extensive evidence
that stronger perceptions of injustice and ingroup identification motivate greater collective
action (for a review, see van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, research on reactions to
ingroup-committed wrongdoing and group identification has suggested that people demand
for justice and identify with their ingroups in more than one way (e.g., Roccas, Klar, &
Liviatan, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto, Feather, & Platow, 2008). As we review next, this work
has demonstrated that the ways of pursuing justice and identifying with groups can have
differential downstream consequences for intergroup emotions, attitudes, and behaviors.
Distinct notions of justice and modes of ingroup identification may thus also differentially
relate to the forms of collective action people support.
Justice Notions
A prominent explanation behind why people act against injustice is the feeling that
one’s group is deprived compared to others. Relative deprivation theory posits that a
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subjective sense that one’s group is treated unequally or unjustly can propel collective
action (Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). Building on this fundamental
idea, we propose that the specific ways in which people demand for ingroup justice may
shape support for different types of collective actions. When faced with injustice, people
may have divergent ideas about how to restore justice. Research on interpersonal and
intergroup wrongdoing has found that there are two prominent notions of justice (Goode
& Smith, 2016; Wenzel et al., 2008; Wenzel & Okimoto, 2010). People who feel victimized
may seek retributive or restorative justice. Retributive justice focuses primarily on
unilateral punishment of the offender, while restorative justice focuses primarily on
bilateral repair of the relationship between victim and offender by means of compensation,
apology, and reaffirmation of shared values between the two parties (Wenzel et al., 2008).
Preferences for retributive or restorative justice have important implications in
shaping intergroup relations in the aftermath of intergroup conflict. Although there is some
evidence suggesting that retributive justice mechanisms (e.g., international criminal
tribunals) can have positive effects in terms of promoting reconciliation (Study 3 and 4, Li,
Leidner, Petrović, Orazani, & Rad, 2017), notions of retributive justice have been linked
to destructive intergroup outcomes such as aggressive conflict resolution strategies
(Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013) and support for future violence (Study 1 and 2, Li et.
al., 2017). By contrast, notions of restorative justice have been linked to peaceful
intergroup outcomes such as forgiveness of perpetrators (Regalia, Pelucchi, Paleari, Manzi,
& Brambilla, 2015) and support for peace deals to resolve conflict (Leidner et al., 2013).
Building on this prior work, we move beyond conflict resolution attitudes and policy
preferences to investigate collective action outcomes.
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Although no prior work, to our knowledge, has examined how justice orientations
may predict distinct collective action outcomes, recent work in the Israeli-Palestinian
context showed that the motivation to punish the outgroup’s past behavior promoted
violent collective action tendencies, whereas motivation to change the outgroup’s future
behavior promoted nonviolent collective action tendencies (Study 2 and 3, Hasan-Aslih,
Netzer, van Zomeren, Saguy, Tamir, & Halperin, 2018). While this work did not explicitly
examine the role of justice concerns, it is likely that punitive goals mirror the notion of
retributive justice, whereas change-oriented goals mirror the notion of restorative justice,
thereby providing indirect support for our proposed link between retributive justice and
nonnormative collective action, and between restorative justice and normative collective
action. In addition to examining the link between justice orientations and distinct collective
action outcomes, we further examine the role that different modes of group identification
play in predicting both justice orientations and collective action.
Group Identification
Group identification – that is, the extent to which people subjectively share an
identity with others – plays a crucial role in motivating collective action (for a review, see
van Zomeren et al., 2008). Various social psychological models of collective action have
focused on the role of group identification. For instance, scholars have theorized that when
people consciously engage in a power struggle to improve the condition of their group
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001), or when identities become linked to relevant group norms
(Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009), group identification will prompt collective action.
While group identification is a central feature of collective action, it has mostly been
studied as a unidimensional construct, such that stronger identification with a group

86

promotes collective action to benefit the group. However, the content and meaning of a
group identity can shape the downstream consequences of ingroup identification on
intergroup relations (Livingstone & Haslam, 2008). Many scholars in the social identity
literature, however, have theorized that group identification is a multidimensional construct
(Ashmore, Deauz, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Leach et
al., 2008; Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008; Schatz,
Staub, & Lavine, 1999), such that the different components of group identification can
have distinct consequences for group-based emotions, attitudes, and behaviors.
In the context of intergroup conflicts, ingroup glorification and attachment are
critical in shaping relevant conflict attitudes (Castano, 2008; Roccas et al., 2006). As
defined by Roccas et al. (2006), glorification is based on beliefs in the ingroup’s superiority
over other groups, and (unconditional) deference to ingroup authorities, whereas
attachment is based on feelings of emotional connection and commitment to one’s group,
as well as a desire to contribute to the group. These dimensions of group identity integrate
earlier distinctions such as pseudo-patriotism and genuine patriotism (Adorno, FrankelBrunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), nationalism and patriotism (Kosterman &
Feshbach, 1989; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 2005), as well as blind and constructive
patriotism (Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). Prior research has demonstrated that
glorification (but not attachment) predicts hostile intergroup outcomes, such as the denial
of ingroup violence against outgroups (Bilali, 2013) and dehumanization of victims
(Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), thereby prolonging conflict. Further,
there is also empirical support for a positive link between glorification and retributive
justice (Li et al., 2017). By contrast, attachment promoted greater guilt over ingroup
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wrongdoings (Roccas et al., 2006). By extension, it is plausible that stronger ingroup
attachment would instead motivate restorative justice. Integrating the literatures on
dimensions of ingroup identification and notions of justice to understand support for
different forms of collective action, we propose that glorification will promote support for
nonnormative collective action through a desire for retributive justice, whereas attachment
will promote support for normative collective action through a desire for restorative justice
(see conceptual Figure 7).

Glorification

Retributive justice

Non-normative
collective action

Attachment

Restorative justice

Normative
collective action

Figure 7. Conceptual model of the link between modes of ingroup attachment, notions of
justice, and different forms of collective action.
Overview of Present Research
We situated the present research around the ongoing intractable and asymmetrical
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). Although high and
low status groups do respond to conflict as a function of their primary role in the conflict
(e.g., perpetrators or victims; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; for a review see Li & Leidner, in
press), it is also the case that both sides can view themselves as victims (Leidner et al.,
2013; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Indeed, Palestinians and Jewish Israelis
continue to undertake various forms of collective action in pursuit of justice for their
respective ingroups (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The Israeli-Palestinian context therefore
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provides high ecological validity with strong real-world relevance to study collective action
on both sides of an intergroup conflict. To do so, we surveyed Arab (Study 1) and Jewish
Israelis (Study 2) to test whether there are distinct pathways from modes of ingroup
identification to notions of justice, and subsequently to collective action outcomes. Further,
during a period of real-world conflict escalation (i.e., the 70th anniversary of Israeli
independence and Palestinian Al-Nakba) we examined the effects of emphasizing
retributive versus restorative justice on the aforementioned pathways among Jewish
Israelis (Study 3). All three studies received ethics approval from the institutional review
board at our university. De-identified data will be made available at the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research (www.openicpsr.org). Verbatim materials
are available as online Supplementary Materials.
Study 1
Method
Participants and Procedure. One hundred and sixty-five Arab Israelis were
recruited through the Midgam Project (www.midgam.com) to complete an online survey
on attitudes toward conflict and were subsequently compensated with a small monetary
reward.15 Seventeen participants did not complete the survey (i.e., dropped out midway),
thus 148 participants were retained for analyses (78 males, 70 females; age range = 19 to
57 years, M = 30.98, SD = 8.60). The measures of interest were included as brief scales (2-

15

Given that we did not have direct access to Palestinians specifically, we broadly sampled Arab
Israelis, many of whom would identify as Palestinian. On the surveys, participants were asked
about their identification with Palestinians, and the measures of justice notions and collective
action were in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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4 items each) as part of a longer survey on Arab Israelis’ socio-political attitudes16.
Although we did not conduct an a priori power analysis to determine sample size, a
sensitivity analysis indicated that with 148 participants, we would be able to detect (with α
= .05) an effect of r = 0.24 in a bivariate correlation with 80% power (Faul et al., 2007).
Measures.
Glorification and attachment. Participants were asked the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with each statement about their identity using items from Roccas et al.
(2006), on an analog scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Four items
measured glorification (α = .65; e.g., “The Palestinian people are better than other people
in all respects”). Four items measured attachment (α = .90; e.g., “I am strongly committed
to the Palestinian people”). Glorification and attachment was positively correlated, r = .48,
p < .001.
Retributive and restorative justice. Participants were asked to which extent they
agreed or disagreed with statements about how to deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
to achieve justice, adapted from Leidner et al. (2013), on an analog scale of 1 (strongly
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Two items measured support for retributive justice: “For
the sake of justice, Jewish Israelis have to suffer” and “The only way to restore justice is
to punish Jewish Israelis” (r = .63, p < .001). Two items measured support for restorative
justice: “To restore justice, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on rules of a
peaceful world” and “Without Jewish Israelis giving a sincere apology for having acted
wrongly, the injustice is not completely restored” (r = .18, p = .041). Unexpectedly, we

16

The survey aimed to test several research questions as part of a larger project on conflict
attitudes, and therefore included measures that did not pertain to the research questions addressed
in this paper.
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found that the two restorative justice items were differentially correlated with the
retributive justice items. Whereas the restorative justice item regarding apology was
positively correlated with retributive justice (r = .18, p = .041), the restorative justice item
regarding shared values item was negatively correlated with retributive justice (r = -.38, p
< .001). Given its low correlation with the other intended restorative justice item and the
positive (rather than negative) correlation with the retributive justice measure, we dropped
the apology item and only used the shared values item as a single-item measure of
restorative justice.
Nonnormative and normative collective action. Participants were asked to what
extent they supported or opposed various action in the struggle of Arab citizens to improve
their situation in Israel, on an analog scale of 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support).
Two items measured support for nonnormative collective action: “Non-violent yet
unlawful actions of protest (such as participating in unauthorized demonstrations, blocking
roads, etc.)” and “Violent actions of protest (physically confronting police, property
damage, etc.)” (r = .38, p < .001). Three items measured support for normative collective
action: “Actions of protest online (such as signing petitions, sharing information on
Facebook, etc.)”, “Actions of protest in Israel within the law (such as participating in
authorized demonstrations, distribution of informational materials, etc.)”, “Actions of
protest abroad within the law (such as participating in demonstrations overseas, meeting
foreign politicians, etc.)” (α = .85). The composite scores of nonnormative collective action
and normative collective action were not significantly correlated, r = -.11, p = .204.
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Results
The means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations among the variables are
displayed in Table 7. Consistent with expectations, glorification was positively correlated
with retributive (but not restorative) justice, and with nonnormative (but not normative)
collective action. Attachment was positively correlated with restorative (and also
retributive) justice, and with normative (and marginally, with nonnormative) collective
action.
Table 7
Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables in Study 1.
Variables
1. Glorification
2. Attachment
3. Retributive justice
4. Restorative justice
5. Nonnormative
collective action
6. Normative
collective action

M
(SD)
4.53
(1.53)
4.46
(2.13)
2.74
(1.66)
7.29
(1.95)
2.61
(1.66)
6.16
(2.07)

1

2

3

4

5

6

.48***

-

.30***

.29***

-

.13

.20*

-.38***

-

.26**

.15†

.49***

-.47***

-

.06

.21*

-.17†

.44***

-.11

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05,

†

-

p < .09

To simultaneously investigate whether glorification predicted nonnormative
collective action through retributive justice, and whether attachment predicted normative
collective action through restorative justice, we conducted a path analysis using SAS 9.4.
The model, depicted in Figure 8, fit the data well, χ2(6) = 5.42, p = .492, SRMR = .04,
RMSEA < .01, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .97 (n = 124). We allowed the error terms of glorification
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and attachment (b = 1.71, SE = .03, t = 5.25, p < .001), retributive and restorative justice
(b = -1.48, SE = .31, t = -4.71, p < .001), and nonnormative and normative collective action
(b = .31, SE = .22, t = 1.39, p = .163) to correlate, reflecting their theoretical
conceptualization as two parts of a broader construct (i.e., group identification, justice
demands, and collective action, respectively). As seen in Figure 2, glorification predicted
greater retributive justice (b = .31, SE = .09, t = 3.52, p < .001), which, in turn, predicted
greater nonnormative collective action (b = .25, SE = .08, t = 2.99, p = .003). Attachment
predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, SE = .08, t = 3.37, p < .001), which, in turn,
predicted greater normative collective action (b = .49, SE = .08, t = 6.06, p < .001). The
indirect effect from glorification to nonnormative collective action via retributive justice
was significant, b = .08, SE = .03, t = 2.28, p = .023, and so was the indirect effect from
attachment to normative collective action via restorative justice, b = .12, SE = .04, t = 2.95,
p = .003.

Figure 8. Path model for Study 1. Unhypothesized paths are in grey. Coefficients are
unstandardized estimates.
In addition to the indirect pathway from glorification to nonnormative collective
action through retributive justice, the direct path from glorification to nonnormative
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collective action was also significant (b = .24, SE = .09, t = 2.81, p = .005). Further, in
addition to the positive path from restorative justice to normative collective action, there
was also a significant negative path from restorative justice to nonnormative collective
action (b = -.32, SE = .07, t = -4.84, p < .001). Although these paths were not hypothesized,
their presence is not inconsistent with the hypothesized paths and therefore does not take
away from our predicted model. Specifically, these additional paths suggest that the
relationship between glorification and nonnormative collective action remained significant
even after accounting for the role of retributive justice in predicting nonnormative
collective action; and that restorative justice, in addition to positively predicting normative
collective action, also negatively predicted nonnormative collective action. We also
conducted separate regression analyses to test the links between (a) glorification and
attachment to retributive/restorative justice, and (b) retributive and restorative justice to
nonnormative/normative collective action. Results of these regression analyses converged
with the results of the path analysis reported above.
Alternative Model Testing
It is plausible that people’s support for collective action shapes their notions of
justice, rather than their notions of justice shaping support for collective action. People may
justify or rationalize their support for nonnormative collective action by supporting
retributive justice, and similarly rationalize their support for normative collective action by
supporting restorative justice. Thus, we tested an alternative model where 1) glorification
predicted nonnormative collective action, and nonnormative collective action predicted
retributive justice, and where 2) attachment predicted normative collective action, and
normative collective action predicted restorative justice (i.e., we reversed the order of the
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mediating and the outcome variables). Although the model fit was acceptable, χ2(5) =
10.10, p = .072, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .76, NFI = .94 (n = 124), The Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) also indicated the empirical superiority of the hypothesized
model (AIC = 35.42) over the alternative model (AIC = 42.10). It was not appropriate to
conduct a chi-square difference test given that these models were not nested.
Power Analysis
We conducted sensitivity analysis with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang &
Buchner, 2007), which indicated that with a sample size of 128, we would have been able
to detect a bivariate correlation of at least .24, with a two-tailed α of .05 at 80% power,
which is slightly below the smallest correlation of interest that we found (r = .20),
suggesting that the study was slightly underpowered.
Discussion
Study 1 investigated how different modes of group identification (attachment and
glorification) predict distinct notions of justice (retributive and restorative), and how these
in turn predict support for different types of collective action (normative and
nonnormative), among a sample of Arab Israelis in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. In line with hypotheses, the results revealed that ingroup glorification predicted
more retributive justice, and subsequently more support for nonnormative collective action,
whereas ingroup attachment predicted more restorative justice, and subsequently more
support for normative collective action. Additionally, we found that restorative justice also
predicted less support for nonnormative collective action. Although this link was not
hypothesized, it is consistent with our theorizing and suggests that restorative justice does
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not only promote support for normative collective action, but also reduces support for
nonnormative collective action.
It is important to note that the restorative justice measure used in our model was
focused on restoring shared values, not on providing compensation. As in prior research,
we had initially measured restorative justice as both compensation (apology) and
restoration of shared values (Leidner et al., 2010, 2013). However, we found that seeking
an apology from the other side in the conflict was positively correlated with retributive
justice and seeking restoration of shared values between one’s own and the other side of
the conflict was negatively correlated with retributive justice. This suggests that
participants understood the apology item more in retributive (rather than in restorative)
terms. This pattern has also been found in past research; the apology dimension of
restorative justice does not always load with restorative justice (Leidner et al., 2013, Study
2), and can sometimes load with retributive justice (Leidner et al., 2010). Consistent with
theorizing from Darley and Pittman (2003) who argued that retributive justice is a
combination of punishment and compensation, it is possible that demanding compensation
is part of retributive justice because it is a way to hold the perpetrator group accountable,
and even punish it by means of public shaming. In line with this, Leonard, Mackie, and
Smith (2011) found that when victims received an apology from the perpetrator group,
their desire for retribution reduced, which indirectly suggests that apology may satisfy
some desire for retributive justice.
Study 2
While Study 1 found evidence in support of our model in a sample of Arab Israelis,
Study 2 further tested our model with another group involved in the same conflict: Jewish
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Israelis. The method for Study 2 was largely identical to Study 1. The key difference was
that we adapted the measures to the perspective of Jewish Israelis (e.g., promote Jewish
Israeli rights). We also added more items to measure our variables of interest, in particular
address the acceptable but not ideal reliability of the four-item glorification measure in
Study 1. By anchoring on the same conflict, we sought to examine whether the same
psychological processes occurred on both sides of the conflict, thereby providing a test of
generalizability.
Method
Participants and Procedure. An a priori power analysis conducted using
G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) estimated a sample size of 319 to detect a correlation of r =
.20 (i.e., the smallest correlation of interest in Study 1) with 95% power, with a two-tailed
α of .05. To account for potential attrition and exclusions, we recruited 364 Jewish Israelis
through the Midgam Project to complete an online survey on their socio-political attitudes
in exchange for a small monetary reward. After excluding 13 participants who did not
complete the survey (e.g., dropped out midway), 4 participants who were not Israeli
citizens, 40 participants who were not native Hebrew speakers, and 13 participants who
were multivariate outliers (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), 294 participants were retained
for analyses (155 males, 139 females; age 19 to 57 years, M = 38.03, SD = 12.81). With
this sample size, we achieved 93% power.
Measures. The survey measures matched those used in Study 1 but were adapted
to the Jewish Israeli context.
Glorification and attachment. Participants were asked to what extent they agreed
or disagreed with similar statements used in Study 1 adapted for Jewish Israelis, and
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including additional items from Roccas et al. (2006), on an analog scale of 1 (strongly
disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). Specifically, in addition to the four glorification items from
Study 1, we included four more items to measure glorification (α = .86; e.g., “It is disloyal
for Israelis to criticize Israel”), thereby using the complete eight-item scale from Roccas et
al. (2006). Similarly, in addition to the four attachment items from Study 1, we included
four more items to measure attachment (α = .85; e.g., “It is important for me to help my
country”), thus using the complete eight-item scale from Roccas et al. (2006). Glorification
and attachment were positively correlated, r = .53, p < .001.
Retributive and restorative justice. Participants were asked to what extent they
agreed or disagreed with similar statements used in Study 1 about how to deal with the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to achieve justice, using additional statements adapted from
Leidner et al. (2013), measured on an analog scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly
agree). Specifically, in addition to the two items from Study 1, three more items were
included to measure support for retributive justice (α = .91; e.g., “Justice is only fully
served when there are punitive measures against the Palestinians for their actions”), thus
using the full scale from Leidner et al. (2013). In addition to the two items from Study 1,
three more items were included to measure support for restorative justice (e.g., “For justice
to be reinstated, Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on which ethical values should not
be violated”, “For justice to be fully reinstated, the Palestinians need to express remorse to
the Israeli victims and their family members for what happened”), thus using the full scale
from Leidner et al. (2013).
A reliability analysis on the five restorative justice items indicated that the itemtotal correlation for the two items about value reaffirmation was low (rs = .26 and .24,
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respectively). Further, an exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation revealed that the
compensation items and value restoration items loaded onto two distinct factors. We
therefore created separate composite variables for restorative justice through value
compensation and restorative justice through value restoration. Mirroring Study 1, we
found that the compensation and value restoration dimensions of restorative justice were
differentially correlated with retributive justice. Specifically, restorative justice through
compensation was positively correlated with retributive justice (r = .61, p < .001), whereas
restorative justice through value reaffirmation was negatively correlated with retributive
justice (r = -.14, p = .020). This suggests that participants saw restorative justice through
compensation as more retributive rather than restorative in nature. Thus, we excluded the
three items on restorative justice through compensation, and only used the two items on
restorative justice through value reaffirmation as our measure of restorative justice (r = .55,
p < .001).
Nonnormative and normative collective action. Participants were asked to what
extent they supported or opposed various actions in the struggle of Jewish Israelis to
support their cause and protect their rights in Israel (adapted from Tausch et al., 2011;
Shuman et al., 2016), on an analog scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support).
Six items were developed to measure support for nonnormative collective action (α = .80;
e.g., “Organize disruptive direct actions (for example, sit ins in buildings to block
entrances, block roads or highways) to advocate for Jewish settler rights”, “Violent protests
(physically confronting police, property damage, etc.) to defend the rights of Jewish
settlers”). Another six items were developed to measure support for normative collective
action (α = .94; e.g., “Sign petitions to advocate for the rights of Jewish Israelis”,
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“Participate in authorized non-violent demonstrations to support Jewish settler rights”).
The composite scores of nonnormative and normative collective action were positively
correlated, r = .41, p < .001.17
Results
Means, standard deviations, and correlations among the main variables are reported
in Table 8. Consistent with Study 1, glorification was positively correlated with retributive
justice, and with nonnormative collective action; attachment was positively correlated with
restorative justice, and with normative collective action.

Table 8
Means, standard deviations, and correlations between variables in Study 2.
Variables

M
(SD)

1

1. Glorification

6.16
(1.59)

-

2. Attachment
3. Retributive justice
4. Restorative justice

7.55
(1.32)
4.56
(2.25)
7.18
(1.65)

2

3

4

.53***

-

.42***

.07

-

.15**

.21***

-.14*

-

5

5. Nonnormative
collective action

3.22
(1.55)

.32***

.02

.61***

-.21***

-

6. Normative
collective action

6.25
(1.95)

.56***

.36***

.47***

.14*

.41***

6

-

Note. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05

17

The nonnormative collective action composite included items on both violent and non-violent
actions. Given past findings that violent and non-violent nonnormative actions sometimes load
onto the same factor (e.g., Shuman et al., 2016) but other times onto different factors (e.g.,
Tausch et al., 2011), we also tested our model using either violent or non-violent nonnormative
collective action as the outcome composite measure of nonnormative collective action. We found
virtually the same results as reported herein (see Supplementary Materials for details), suggesting
that our effects generalize across violent and non-violent forms of nonnormative action.
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To simultaneously test whether glorification predicts nonnormative collective
action through retributive justice, and whether attachment predicts normative collective
action through restorative justice, we conducted a path analysis using SAS 9.4. The model,
depicted in Figure 9, fit the data well, χ2(3) = 7.43, p = .059, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .07,
CFI = .99, NFI = .99 (n = 292). As we did in Study 1, we allowed the error terms of
glorification and attachment (b = 1.11, SE = .14, t = 8.01, p < .001), retributive and
restorative justice (b = -.66, SE =.19, t = -3.42, p < .001), and nonnormative and normative
collective action (b = .39, SE = .11, t = 3.54, p < .001) to correlate, reflecting the conceptual
idea that they are part of a broader construct (i.e., group identification, notions of justice,
and collective action, respectively). As seen in Figure 3, glorification predicted greater
retributive justice (b = .77, SE = .09, t = 8.99, p < .001), which predicted greater
nonnormative collective action (b = .41, SE = .03, t = 12.66, p < .001). Attachment
predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, SE = .07, t = 3.63, p < .001), which predicted
greater normative collective action (b = .12, SE = .06, t = 2.13, p = .033). The indirect effect
from glorification to nonnormative collective action via retributive justice was significant,
b = .31, SE = .04, t = 7.33, p < .001. The indirect effect from attachment to normative
collective action via restorative justice was marginally significant, b = .03, SE = .02, t =
1.84, p = .066.
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Glorification

.77***

Retributive justice

.41***

.29***

-.38***

-.12**

Attachment

Restorative justice

.26***

Non-normative
collective action

.12*

Normative
collective action

.25**

.35***

Figure 9. Path model for Study 2. Unhypothesized paths are in grey. Coefficients are
unstandardized estimates.
As in Study 1, in addition to the hypothesized effects, several other paths were also
significant (see Figure 3). Again, although these paths were not hypothesized, their
presence was not inconsistent with the hypothesized paths. Specifically, these additional
paths suggest that there was a negative relationship between attachment and retributive
justice (b = -.38, SE = .10, t = -3.61, p < .001), and restorative justice and nonnormative
collective action (b = -.12, SE = .04, t = -2.80, p = .005). There was also a positive
relationship between glorification and normative collective action (b = .35, SE = .07, t =
4.84, p < .001), and retributive justice and normative collective action (b = .29, SE = .04, t
= 6.57, p < .001). As in Study 1, we also conducted separate regression analyses to test the
effects of (a) glorification and attachment on retributive/restorative justice, and of (b)
retributive and restorative justice on nonnormative/normative collective action. Results of
these regression analyses again converged with the results of the path analysis.18

18

We also tested our model using only the measures for which we had comparable items in Study 1 (i.e.,
without the additional items for group identification and notions of justice used only in Study 2). This model
also fit the data well, χ2(5) = 15.38, p = .009, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .98, NFI = .97 (N = 292),

102

Alternative Model Testing
As in Study 1, we tested an alternative model in which 1) glorification predicted
nonnormative collective action, and nonnormative collective action predicted retributive
justice, as well as 2) attachment predicted normative collective action, and normative
collective action predicted restorative justice (i.e., we reversed the order of the mediating
and the outcome variables). The model fit was unacceptable, χ2(7) = 120.39, p < .001,
SRMR = .13, RMSEA = .24, CFI = .77, NFI = .76 (n = 292).
Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended the findings from Study 1 using a sample of Jewish
Israelis (i.e., members of the other party to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). We also
expanded on our measures of interest (group identification, notions of justice, and
collective action) by including more items to improve construct validity and reliability. We
replicated the core findings from Study 1: glorification predicted more retributive justice,
and subsequently more support for nonnormative collective action, whereas attachment
predicted more restorative justice, and subsequently more support for normative collective
action.
It is important to note that we also found several additional pathways that were
somewhat inconsistent with Study 1. Specifically, glorification and retributive justice
predicted greater support for both forms of collective action. This may be because the social
context of undertaking collective action for Arab and Jewish Israelis are in Israel, a Jewish
state. The “normativeness” of a particular action is related to the social systems in which

suggesting that our findings were stable regardless of the number of items used to measure our variables of
interest.
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people are embedded (Wright et al., 1990). Further, the measures of glorification for Jewish
Israelis were focused on glorifying Israelis, whereas for Arab Israelis, they were focused
on glorifying Palestinians. Thus, for Jewish Israelis, collective action undertaken within
the norms of Israel may resonate with glorifying Israel and may still reach their goals of
retributive justice. However, for Arabs, glorifying Palestinians and their desire for
retributive justice exclusively predicts support for actions outside the norms and laws of
Israel.
Additionally, as in Study 1, we found a negative relationship between restorative
justice and nonnormative collective action, and a negative relationship between attachment
and retributive justice. Although these paths were not hypothesized, they are not
inconsistent with our theorizing. These pathways demonstrate that restorative justice and
attachment are not only predictive of greater support for normative collective action, but
also predictive of weaker support for nonnormative collective action.
Study 3
Study 1 and 2 provided correlational evidence for our model from the perspective
of Arab and Jewish Israelis, respectively. Both studies provide evidence of mediation
through mediational analyses, through which a proposed mechanism is measured (see
measurement-of-mediation design in Spencer, Zanna, & Fond, 2005). Study 3 aimed to test
our model experimentally to provide causal evidence for the role of justice orientations as
the mediator of the link between group identification and collective action. The goal of this
approach is to manipulate the mediator by emphasizing different notions of justice, thereby
changing the strength of the mechanism between modes of ingroup identification and
distinct collective action outcomes (see moderation-of-process design in Spencer et al.,
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2005, and manipulation-of-mediator design in Pirlott & MacKinnon, 2016). This approach
is responsive to recent calls by researchers and journal editors in our field to employ
experimental designs to provide evidence of mediation (e.g., Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011;
Smith, 2012).
Study 3 manipulated people’s perceptions of justice orientations by either
emphasizing retributive justice, restorative justice, or neither (i.e., control), and examined
their effect on the link between modes of ingroup identification and different forms of
collective action. In the control condition, we expected to replicate the findings from Study
1 and 2, such that glorification would predict increased nonnormative collective action
whereas attachment would predict increased normative collective action. In the retributive
justice condition, we expected that glorification would predict increased nonnormative
action, but attachment would no longer predict increased normative collective action. By
contrast, in the restorative justice condition, we expected that attachment would predict
increased normative collective action, but glorification would no longer predict increased
nonnormative collective action.
Study 3 was conducted a week before the 70th anniversary of the Israeli Declaration
of Independence on May 14, which is preceded by the 70th anniversary of the Palestinian
Nakba Day on May 15. These dates hold radically different meanings for Israelis and
Palestinians. For Palestinians, al-Nakba (“the catastrophe”) is the annual commemoration
of the loss of Palestinian land and the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians from their
homes during the war in 1948. By contrast, Israelis celebrate the end of the war because it
led to the establishment of an independent Jewish State, which ensured a homeland for the
Jewish diaspora. In 2018, Palestinians organized the Great March of Return, a series of
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protests between March 30th and May 15th, at the border between Gaza and Israel,
demanding that Palestinian refugees displaced during the founding of Israel can return to
their land. Clashes between protesters and Israeli armed forces left over a hundred
Palestinians killed and thousands more injured (Sanchez & Oliphant, 2018). Thus, the
timing of data collection provided a high-stakes, real-world context to examine Jewish
Israelis’ support for collective action during a period of heightened intergroup conflict, as
well as a period in which the origins of the present-day conflict were especially salient.
This context also increased the external validity of our retributive versus restorative justice
manipulation, given that the question of how to best respond to Palestinians’ protests was
a critical concern among Jewish Israelis.
Method
Participants
An a priori power analysis conducted using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) estimated
that a sample of 165 per condition (495 in total) would be sufficient (80% power) to detect
differences between three groups, based on the smallest hypothesized effect we observed
in Study 2 (r = .14 between restorative justice and normative collective action) with a twotailed α of .05. To account for potential attrition and exclusions, we oversampled
participants. To help ensure we would obtain at least the desired sample of 495 participants,
and anticipating a non-negligible number of participants that would need to be excluded
from data analysis due to failed manipulation and attention checks, we recruited 607 Jewish
Israeli participants via Midgam Project to complete an online survey on their attitudes
about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our screening of the data resulted in the exclusion of
37 participants because they did not understand or pay sufficient attention to the
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manipulation material (as indicated by their incorrect answers to the attention check
questions), 26 participants because they spent significantly more time reading the material
compared to the rest of the sample, and 1 participant who was not an Israeli citizen. In total,
546 participants were retained for subsequent analyses (Nretributive = 172, Nrestorative = 170,
Ncontrol = 204; 276 females, 269 males, 1 other; age 18 to 73 years, M = 43.94, SD = 15.60).
With this final sample size, we achieved 84% power.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to a retributive justice, restorative justice, or
control condition. Participants in the retributive and restorative justice conditions read a
fictitious, but allegedly real excerpt from an article written by an ostensibly Jewish Israeli
author in which the author addresses other, presumably mainly Jewish, Israelis. In the
retributive justice condition, the article argued that the harm that the Palestinians inflicted
upon Israelis caused a severe loss of power and status to Israelis. The author of the article
then reasoned that restoring justice would require Palestinians to be punished for their
actions, proportionate to the harm that Palestinian attacks caused. Such punitive measures
should hold Palestinians accountable for the suffering they caused Israelis, and thus help
Israelis to regain the power they lost. In the restorative justice condition, the article argued
that the harm Palestinians inflicted upon Israelis had disrupted the relationship between the
two groups. The author of the article then reasoned that restoring justice would require the
relationship between the groups to be repaired by reestablishing shared values and
principles that had been violated. Specifically, both groups should work towards a mutual
understanding of the harm that Palestinian attacks caused, and thus the reaffirm both
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groups’ commitment to shared values and principles. In the control condition, participants
did not read any article and proceeded directly to the survey questions.
Measures
Manipulation checks. In the retributive and restorative justice condition,
participants were asked “According to the author of the excerpt that you just read, which
of the following needs to happen in order to achieve justice between Palestinians and
Israelis?” The correct answer in the retributive justice condition was “Punish Palestinians
for their actions”, whereas in the restorative justice condition, it was “Re-establish the
shared values of our communities”. In both conditions, the incorrect answers were “There
needs to be a conflict mediation conducted by a third party” and “The author did not discuss
this issue”. Participants were also asked “Which group do you think the author belongs
to?”. The correct answer in both conditions was “Israelis”, and the incorrect answers were
“Palestinians” and “Iranians”.
Glorification and attachment were measured using the same items as in Study 2
(glorification: α = .86, M = 6.21, SD = 1.61; attachment: α = .90, M = 7.66, SD = 1.44).
Nonnormative and normative collective action were measured by adapting the
items used in Study 2 to be about Jewish Israeli rights more generally, instead of
exclusively about Jewish settler rights (which was the focus in Study 2). Participants were
asked to what extent they supported or opposed various efforts of Israelis to protect itself
from Palestinian attacks, in terms of safety, the well-being and livelihood of Israelis, and
the right to a Jewish state, on a (continuous) analog scale from 1 (strongly oppose) to 9
(strongly support). Seven items were developed to measure support for nonnormative
collective action (α = .86; M = 4.53, SD = 1.89; e.g., “participate in non-violent
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demonstrations to support Israel’s right to defend itself against Palestinian aggression, even
if the demonstrations are unauthorized”). Another set of seven items were developed to
measure support for normative collective action (α = .87; M = 7.27, SD = 1.35; e.g., “join
advocacy groups that focus on the protection of Israel through peaceful means”)
Results
First, we conducted general linear models to check for any effects of condition
(retributive, restorative, control) on our measured variables. Then, we conducted a multigroup path analysis to simultaneously test the hypothesis that glorification and attachment
would differentially predict nonnormative and normative collective action depending on
condition.
Main Effects of Condition
There was no significant effect of condition on glorification, F(2, 543) = .60, p =
.549 (Mrestorative = 6.23, SDrestorative = 1.51; Mretributive = 6.10, SDretributive = 1.73; Mcontrol =
6.28, SDcontrol = 1.58), or attachment, F(2, 543) = 0.36, p = .695 (Mrestorative = 7.69,
SDrestorative = 1.33; Mretributive = 7.59, SDretributive = 1.51; Mcontrol = 7.71, SDcontrol = 1.46),
supporting our methodological conceptualization of glorification and attachment as
independent variables.
There was no significant effect of condition on nonnormative collective action, F(2,
543) = .39, p = .675 (Mrestorative = 4.44, SDrestorative = 1.83; Mretributive = 4.62, SDretributive =
1.89; Mcontrol = 4.53, SDcontrol = 1.92). However, there was a significant effect of condition
on normative collective action, F(2, 543) = 4.84, p = .008. Specifically, normative
collective action in the restorative condition (M = 7.01, SD = 1.25) was lower compared to
the retributive condition (M = 7.35, SD = 1.39), t(543) = -2.30, p = .022, and also compared
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to the control (M = 7.43, SD = 1.37), t(540) = -2.29, p = .003. There was no significant
difference in normative collective action between the control and the retributive condition,
t(540) = 0.60, p = .547. Although we did not hypothesize any main effects of condition,
the presence of main effects does not preclude our hypothesis, which is that the link
between modes of group identification and different forms of collective action would be
moderated by condition.
Multi-Group Path Analysis
We conducted a fully unconstrained and saturated multi-group path analysis using
SAS 9.4 to assess the differences between the path estimates across the three conditions
(i.e., paths from glorification to nonnormative and normative collective action, and paths
from attachment to nonnormative and normative collective action; see Figure 10). Since
fully saturated models by definition have perfect fit, our main interest was in the
significance and magnitude of the path coefficients and their differences across conditions.
As in Study 1 and 2, we allowed the error terms of glorification and attachment, and the
error terms of nonnormative and normative collective action to correlate, reflecting their
theoretical conceptualization as two parts of a broader construct (i.e., group identification
and collective action, respectively).
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.12

-.08
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Figure 10. Multi-group path model for Study 3. Non-significant paths are in dashed lines.
Coefficients are unstandardized estimates.
In the control condition, in line with hypotheses, glorification predicted more
nonnormative collective action (b = .65, SE = .09, t = 7.18, p < .001), and only marginally
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predicted more normative collective action (b = .12, SE = .07, t = 1.73, p = .084). The effect
of glorification on nonnormative collective action was significantly stronger than the effect
of glorification on normative collective action (b = .53, SE = .10, t = 5.09, p < .001). Also
as hypothesized, attachment predicted more normative collective action (b = .30, SE = .07,
t = 4.09, p < .001), but not nonnormative collective action (b = -.08, SE = .10, t = -0.82, p
= .411). These findings replicated the correlational findings from Study 1 and 2.
In the retributive justice condition, in line with hypotheses, glorification predicted
more nonnormative collective action (b = .58, SE = .09, t = 6.24, p < .001) and more
normative collective action (b = .23, SE = .07, t = 3.18, p = .002). The effect of glorification
on nonnormative collective action was significantly stronger than the effect of glorification
on normative collective action (b = .35, SE = .11, t = 3.07, p = .002). Further, attachment
was no longer a significant predictor of normative collective action (b = .10, SE = .08, t =
1.21, p = .228) and nonnormative collective action (b = -.17, SE = .11, t = -1.63, p = .103).
In the restorative condition, inconsistent with our hypotheses, glorification
predicted more nonnormative collective action (b = .61, SE = .09, t = 6.56, p < .001) and
marginally more normative collective action (b = .12, SE = .06, t = 1.84, p = .066). Still,
the effect of glorification on nonnormative collective action was significantly stronger than
the effect of glorification on normative collective action (b = .50, SE = .10, t = 4.74, p <
.001). By contrast, as hypothesized, attachment predicted more normative collective action
(b = .33, SE = .07, t = 4.53, p < .001) and less nonnormative collective action (b = -.25, SE
= .11, t = -2.35, p = .019). The effect of attachment on normative collective action was
significantly stronger than the effect of attachment on nonnormative collective action (b =
.58, SE = .12, t = 4.89, p < .001).
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To test whether the strength of the relationships between modes of ingroup
identification and different forms of collective action differed across condition, we
systematically tested whether the path coefficients of critical paths differed across
condition according to hypotheses. To do so, we used the TESTFUNC statement in SAS
9.4, which uses z-tests to determine whether specific parameters in the model are
statistically different from each other. As predicted, we found that the link between
attachment and normative collective action was significantly stronger in the restorative
condition compared to the retributive condition (b = .23, SE = .11, t = 2.12, p = .034).
However, inconsistent with our predictions, the link between glorification and
nonnormative collective action did not significantly differ between the restorative and
retributive conditions (b = .03, SE = .13, t = .26, p = .795).19
Discussion
Replicating the findings in Study 1 and 2, the control condition in Study 3 found
that in the absence of any manipulation of justice notions, glorification predicted more
support for nonnormative collective action whereas attachment predicted more support for
normative collective action. Study 3 further demonstrated that emphasizing either
retributive or restorative justice can change (or maintain) the link between modes of
ingroup identification (glorification and attachment) with different forms of collective
action (nonnormative or normative). Specifically, the effect of glorification on greater
nonnormative collective action remained unchanged regardless of whether retributive or

19

Throughout studies 1 to 3, we consistently checked the distribution of variables for any
violations of the normality assumption. If the distribution was severely skewed, we transformed
the distribution according to Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), and then re-ran analyses with the
transformed variable(s). The results remained virtually the same when we used the transformed
variables instead of the raw variables.
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restorative justice was emphasized, suggesting that the link from glorification to
nonnormative collective action is quite stable and difficult to eliminate. Additionally, we
found that glorification also predicted more normative collective action, suggesting that
glorification may be linked to more ingroup-serving actions in general. Attachment, on the
other hand, selectively predicted more normative (but not nonnormative) collective action;
emphasizing retributive justice eliminated this link, whereas emphasizing restorative
justice maintained it.
General Discussion
People engage in various forms of collective action in pursuit of justice for their
respective groups. In the context of intractable intergroup conflict with a long history of
real or perceived injustices, collective action is often undertaken by people from both sides
of the conflict. To further understand this process, we situated the present research in the
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to test two central questions using samples of both
Arab and Jewish Israelis. First, we examined whether distinct dimensions of group
identification – glorification and attachment – would differentially predict support for
nonnormative and normative collective action, respectively. Second, we investigated
whether distinct notions of justice – retributive and restorative justice – would explain these
relationships.
In line with hypotheses, in Study 1 and 2 among Arab and Jewish Israelis
respectively, we found that glorification promoted greater retributive justice, which
predicted more support for nonnormative collective action, whereas attachment promoted
greater restorative justice, which predicted more support for normative collective action.
In addition to these hypothesized findings, we also found that glorification predicted more
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support for normative collective action, whereas attachment predicted lower support for
nonnormative collective action. Thus, group members who strongly glorify the group tend
to support any form of action that benefits the group – actions that are widely seen as
normative, and actions that are widely seen as less normative or even norm-violating.
Group members who are strongly attached to the group, on the other hand, more selectively
support actions that are widely seen as normative, but not actions that are seen as less
normative or norm-violating.
In Study 3, which was conducted among Jewish Israelis during a period of
heightened intergroup conflict (i.e., Palestinians’ March of Return at the Gaza Strip), we
found that emphasizing retributive or restorative justice produced differential effects on the
link between modes of group identification and different types of collective action.
Specifically, emphasizing retributive justice eliminated the effect of attachment on greater
normative collective action, as well as the effect of attachment on lower nonnormative
collective action. By contrast, emphasizing restorative justice promoted the effect of
attachment on greater normative collective action, and the effect of attachment on lower
nonnormative collective action. Interestingly, emphasizing either retributive or restorative
justice did not change the effect of glorification on greater nonnormative collective action.
Taken together, our hypotheses regarding the effects of attachment were supported,
while our hypotheses regarding the effects of glorification were only partially supported.
Whereas Study 1 and 2 showed evidence of an indirect effect from glorification to
nonnormative collective action via retributive justice, Study 3 did not find direct evidence
for a causal effect of glorification on nonnormative collective action via retributive justice.
Specifically, we could not eliminate the link between glorification and nonnormative
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collective action even when we emphasized restorative instead of retributive justice. By
contrast, the positive link from attachment to normative collective action via restorative
justice was supported in all three studies. For the prospects of improving intergroup
relations, these findings imply that while it may be difficult to diminish the negative
consequences of glorification, it is possible to promote the positive consequences of
attachment.
Contributions to Research on Conflict and Collective Action
The current work contributes to our understanding of collective action in intergroup
conflict contexts. Most research on collective action has focused on examining collective
action from one side of a conflict (e.g., low status group members), or collective action that
occurs in societies where engaging in collective action does not involve extraordinary risk
(for a similar argument, see Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). By situating the present research in
an ongoing, protracted intergroup conflict setting, our research has strong ecological
validity and applied value. Further, we examined collective action from the perspective of
people on both sides of an intergroup conflict, which suggests that conflict can prolong
even when – or because – both groups strive for justice for themselves by engaging in
collective action. We also build on emergent studies that have investigated collective action
in ongoing conflict settings and used non-Western samples (e.g., Bilali, Vollhardt, Rarick,
2017; Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Saguy, & van Zomeren, 2014; Saab et al., 2015; Tabri, &
Conway, 2011), which is crucial for providing a more complete picture of social
psychological processes involved in collective action.
The present research integrates the literatures on ingroup identification, intergroup
conflict and collective action. By employing multidimensional conceptualizations of
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ingroup identification and notions of justice, and applying them to the realm of collective
action, we show that distinguishing between different modes of ingroup identification and
notions of justice is critical in predicting divergent forms of collective action. Our findings
are consistent with prior research on how glorification and retributive justice (but not
attachment or restorative justice) predict hostile intergroup outcomes (e.g., Leidner et al.,
2013; Li et al., 2017; Roccas et al., 2008), but new to the work on collective action, which
has largely treated group identification and justice demands as unidimensional concepts.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
One limitation of this research is that our conceptualization of the normativeness of
collective action was defined in relation to the broader social context. Although this is
consistent with the conceptualization in prior research (Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et
al., 2011), we do not know the perspective of collective actors themselves. It is quite
possible that high glorifiers do not necessarily share the consensus view that certain actions
are nonnormative when their group engages in these actions. Instead, they may view the
actions as appropriate and necessary to achieve ingroup goals. Indeed, a central feature of
glorification is that it is tied to viewing the ingroup as morally superior to other groups,
even when presented with evidence of possibly immoral ingroup actions (Roccas et al.,
2006). Further, prior research has shown that people can come to view violence as morally
justified (Fiske & Rai, 2014). The acceptability of violence and illegal methods of
resistance is also contingent upon the interaction between protesters and police on the
ground (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Thus, it is plausible that collective action, which is
defined as nonnormative according to broader society, would be perceived as normative
by those who participate in them.
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Additionally, in the present research, we tested our hypotheses among both high
and low status group members advocating for collective action to benefit their ingroup in
the context of an ongoing, protracted intergroup conflict. Even though both Israelis and
Palestinians may see themselves as victims of the current conflict and perceive each other
as perpetrators, they have asymmetrical intergroup relations. Israel occupies Palestinian
territories and has a well-armed military force, whereas Palestine does not (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). It is therefore important to examine how power can shape the forms of
collective action that groups undertake. For high status groups, there are more opportunities
to achieve their demands for justice. For example, Israelis could fulfill their desire for
retributive justice by supporting aggressive policies against Palestinians (Maoz &
McCauley, 2008), rather than turning to violent protests themselves. By contrast, for
Palestinians, the options are far more limited; collective action undertaken by civilians may
sometimes be the only way to enact their desire for justice (Saab et al., 2016).
Implications
Our findings point to a novel way of thinking about collective action. If different
ideas about how to achieve justice can motivate different forms of collective action, then
this suggests that in order to be responsive and accountable to citizens in conflict societies,
policymakers, practitioners, and third-party states should take into account people’s
concerns for justice when responding to various collective actions. For example, effective
intervention in nonnormative collective action cannot ignore people’s underlying desire for
retributive justice. Indeed, when authorities attempt to suppress dissent, it can further
alienate protesters and their supporters (Drury & Reicher, 2000). By contrast, prior work
has shown that conflict resolution strategies such as outgroup acknowledgement of
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victimhood (e.g., Hameiri & Nadler, 2017) and international justice mechanisms (e.g., Li
et al., 2017) are more promising in terms of responding to victim’s desire for retribution
and may therefore preempt future violence.
Finally, given that prior research has shown how group identity can be strategically
used to rally supporters for a cause (e.g., Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine,
2006), it is possible that how group members frame their ingroup identity can rationalize
or justify the type of collective action they are motivated or expected to engage in. Our
findings suggest that supporters of the same cause may disagree about ways to achieve
justice, which may lead to competing approaches to collectively organize for social change.
Specifically, people who glorify their own group may look towards violent means to
accomplish their goals and use ingroup-glorifying rhetoric to justify their strategies and
mobilize supporters, whereas people who do not glorify their own group but are still
strongly attached to it, may instead look towards nonviolent means to accomplish their
goals and use rhetoric highlighting ingroup attachment to mobilize supporters. In the long
term, these dynamics could lead to moderate and radical factions within the same
movement or in larger society (for a discussion see Zald & Ash, 1966). Thus, our findings
imply that it is not merely the strength of group identity, but also the content of group
identity – specifically the extent to which people glorify or are attached to their ingroup –
that may determine the justice orientation people adopt, and subsequently, the strategies of
collective action people support during mobilization.
Addendum: The Role of Political Orientation
Chapter 4 considers the role of distinct notions of ingroup identification in the
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One key contribution of this research is that by
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viewing social identification as a multidimensional rather than a unidimensional measure,
we can observe the distinct effects of ingroup identification on justice and collective action
outcomes. However, given that ingroup glorification and attachment are relatively new
constructs, it is important to examine how these variables relate to other constructs that
prior work has established as central for understanding intergroup conflict. One construct
that plays a key role in shaping conflict attitudes in Israel-Palestine is political orientation.
Political orientation can range from left-wing to right-wing, which overlaps with
liberal and conservative leanings, respectively. In Israel-Palestine, the hawk-dove
distinction in particular is part of one’s political orientation: left-wing orientation is linked
to “dovish” attitudes such as support for compromising peace deals, whereas right-wing
orientation is linked to “hawkish” attitudes such as support for military intervention (BarTal, Bar-Tal, & Cohen-Hendeles, 2006; Maoz & McCauley, 2005). Given that glorification
also tends to be linked to conflict escalation whereas attachment tends to be linked to
intergroup reconciliation, the left-right political orientation may therefore overlap with the
glorification-attachment distinction.
Further, political conservatives tend to have greater obedience to authority and
loyalty to the ingroup (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Thus, right-wing political
orientation may be linked to ingroup glorification, which is also characterized by deference
to ingroup authority. In line with this, glorification (but not attachment) was found to
predict voting for conservative candidates in the U.S. context (Lamberty, Hellmann, &
Oeberst, 2018). There is also evidence to suggest that glorification and attachment are
related to social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (Leidner, Castano,
Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), which are personality variables characterized by preference
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for social hierarchies and submission to authority – both of which have been linked to
political conservatism (Wilson & Sibley, 2012).
Given the importance of political orientation to understanding conflict attitudes,
and the potential links between ingroup glorification and attachment to right and left
political orientation, this addendum will discuss additional analyses on how political
orientation may be related to modes of ingroup identification among Arab and Jewish
Israelis. Throughout Studies 1 to 3 reported in Chapter 3, the demographic section of the
surveys included questions on political orientation, ranging from “extreme left-wing” to
“extreme right-wing” – with higher scores corresponding to higher right-wing attitudes;
the additional analyses presented below uses this measure of political orientation.
Specifically, I first consider the relationship between right-wing political orientation and
ingroup glorification and attachment. Next, I consider how right-wing political orientation
is related to justice demands and collective action outcomes.
How Does Right-Wing Political Orientation Relate to Ingroup Glorification and
Attachment?
In Study 1, among Arab Israelis, greater right-wing orientation was negatively
related to glorification (r = -.16, p = .071), and attachment (r = -.34, p < .001). By contrast,
in Study 2, among Jewish Israelis, greater right-wing orientation was positively related to
glorification (r = .54, p < .001) and attachment (r = .33, p < .001). Similarly, in Study 3,
also among Jewish Israelis, greater right-wing orientation was positively related to
glorification (r = .58, p < .001), and attachment (r = .28, p < .001). This pattern of
correlations suggest that right-wing orientation has unidirectional links to both ingroup
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glorification and attachment. The strength of magnitude of correlations further suggest that
right-wing orientation is perhaps not synonymous to ingroup glorification and attachment.
It is also important to note that the direction of correlation between right-wing
orientation and ingroup glorification/attachment is asymmetrical among Arab and Jewish
Israelis. For Arab Israelis, right-wing orientation is related to lower glorification and
attachment of Palestinian identity; by contrast, right-wing orientation is related to more
glorification and attachment of Israeli identity. This may be because the political
continuum from left-wing to right-wing hold different meanings for Arab and Jewish
Israelis. As prior research has shown, identifying with the Palestinians cause is related to
left-wing (“dovish”) orientation whereas identifying with the Israeli cause is related to
right-wing (“hawkish”) orientation (Maoz & McCauley, 2008). Given that we measured
ingroup identification of Palestinian identity for Arab Israelis, and ingroup identification
of Jewish identity for the Jewish Israelis, the divergent links between political orientation
and ingroup identification between groups also reflects the polarization between
Palestinian and Israeli identities.
How Does Right-Wing Political Orientation Relate to Justice Demands and
Collective Action Outcomes?
In Study 1 among Arab Israelis, right-wing orientation was not significantly related
to retributive justice (r = -.07, p = .428), but it was negatively related to restorative (r = .28, p = .002). Right-wing orientation was also related to less support for nonnormative
collective action (r = -.02, p = .825), and normative collective action (r = -.32, p < .001).
In Study 2 among Jewish Israelis, right-wing orientation was related to more retributive
justice (r = .50, p < .001), but not restorative justice (r = -.06, p =.324). Right-wing
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orientation was also related to more support for nonnormative collective action (r = .34, p
< .001) and normative collective action (r = .60, p < .001). In Study 3, among Jewish
Israelis, right-wing orientation was also positively related to support for nonnormative
collective action (r = .53, p < .001) and normative collective action (r = .23, p < .001).
These patterns of findings suggest that high right-wing orientation is generally linked to
pro-Israeli (or anti-Palestinian) behaviors. Therefore, the distinctive outcomes of
glorification and attachment on retributive and restorative justice, and support for
nonnormative and normative collective action, does not appear to be reducible to one’s
political orientation.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Summary of Key Findings
The work presented in this dissertation examined public attitudes toward collective
action as a way to understand the impact of social movements on broader society. By
viewing collective action as a tool for social change, members of the broader public – who
are not necessarily participants of collective action itself – are viewed as the targeted
audience of collective action. Across three manuscripts, this dissertation examined distinct
but interrelated phenomenon in the context of ongoing social movements: 1) the immediate
impact of collective action for social change on subsequent public attitudes, 2) the rise of
reactionary counter-movements in response to movements for social change, and 3) public
support collective action to advance ingroup interests among both sides of a protracted
intergroup conflict. Below, I briefly summarize the main findings of each manuscript.
In Chapter 2, I presented findings from a two-wave longitudinal panel study on how
members of the Malaysian public reacted to a mass street protest for electoral reform
organized by the Bersih movement, and how these protest reactions influenced subsequent
attitudes toward the movement and its goals. On the one hand, experiencing empowerment
in response to the Bersih 5 protest promoted a more supportive movement identity and
more support for social change. On the other hand, experiencing threat in response to the
Bersih 5 protest promoted a less supportive movement identity and less support for social
change. This first manuscript showed that the occurrence of protests can directly influence
the attitudes of the broader public in polarizing ways.
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Chapter 3 followed up on the potential public backlash to collective action for social
change. Across a two-wave longitudinal panel study in Malaysia, and a pilot study as well
as two cross-sectional studies in the United States, this second manuscript examined the
role of psychological ownership beliefs – which is characterized by believing the group
that first inhabited or established a country should be entitled to determine the rules and
codes of conduct in a society. In the context of opposing social movements in Malaysia
and the United States, racial majority group members’ sense of collective psychological
ownership over their country elicited greater threat in response to collective action for
social change, which subsequently promoted more support for reactionary countermovements that aim to defend the status quo. Thus, the public may come to support
reactionary counter-movements as a direct response to the occurrence of movements for
social change.
Finally, Chapter 4 further investigated the dynamic of opposing social movements
in the context of a protracted intergroup conflict. As intergroup conflict intensifies, people
on both sides of a conflict may undertake various forms of collective action to advance
ingroup interests. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this third manuscript
presented findings from two cross-sectional studies with Arab and Jewish Israelis
respectively, and one experimental study with Jewish Israelis. The findings showed that
the way in which people identify with and seek justice for their ingroup, promotes support
for different forms of collective action. Specifically, ingroup glorification was linked to
retributive justice demands, which in turn promoted support for nonnormative collective
action. By contrast, ingroup attachment was linked to restorative justice demands, which
in turn promoted support for normative collective action.
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Overarching Theoretical Implications and Applied Considerations
All three investigations support the theoretical perspective that social movements
and collective action can be a means of influencing general public attitudes. As decades of
research have shown, there are many motivating factors that foster public support for the
status quo (e.g., Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
This past work has generally concluded that the public may be complicit in the perpetuation
of intergroup hierarchies and oppression. Collective action for social change can therefore
be viewed as a tool to promote intergroup equality and justice by creating a tension in the
mind of the public, and subsequently forcing them to confront issues that they might
otherwise overlook (e.g., Sharp, 1973; Tilly, 2008). In line with this, prior research from
allied fields such as sociology and political science have provided evidence of how protests
for social change can shift public opinion (e.g., Burstein & Linton, 2002; Soule & Olzak,
2004; Wallace et al., 2014). In general, this work has tended to temporally and
geographically link protest occurrence to public opinion polls. Complementing this prior
research, Chapter 2 presents some of the first data linking psychological responses to a
focal protest event with people’s subsequent attitudes. In particular, the psychological
mechanisms of threat and empowerment in response to the protest predicted divergent
public attitudes toward the movement and social change; the extent to which movements
can foster favorable public attitudes relies on the movement’s ability to elicit empowerment
rather than threat. This suggests that even if there is no visible outcome of a protest in terms
of achieving their demands (e.g., passing a legislation), protests can help build movements
and shape public opinion, thereby potentially influencing structural changes in the longterm.
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Going a step further, Chapter 3 examines how collective action for social change
may have the unintended consequence of provoking public backlash. Most research on
social movements and collective action have tended to focus on progressive movements
that aim to challenge the status quo (for a review, see Blee & Creasap, 2010). Attitudes
toward movements for and against social change are often studied in isolation, without
considering the potential dynamics between them. However, social movement scholars
have documented that opposing social mobilization are often structurally and politically
connected (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). Chapter 3 examines this connection by
demonstrating the role of psychological ownership as a legitimizing myth that may underlie
advantaged group members’ threat responses to collective action for social change, which
can subsequently foster support for collective action against social change. Further,
Chapter 4 also highlighted the link between opposing social movements by demonstrating
that the same psychological process via ingroup identification and justice demands may
mobilize support for collective action on both sides of the same intergroup conflict. Taken
together, the approaches in Chapters 3 and 4 extends our understanding of the
interdependence between social movements and raises the question of how movements
should judge the rise of counter-movements. While counter-mobilization may delegitimize
the goal of social change and perpetuate intergroup conflict, it also means that a movement
has struck a chord among the public and triggered a reaction. It is therefore not a
straightforward conclusion whether the presence of counter-movements itself may signal
the success or failure of a movement.
By exploring ongoing collective actions across different social and political
contexts, the studies included in this dissertation allows us to observe how group-based
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identities play a role in shaping attitudes toward collective action. As described in Chapter
2, in a multi-racial country in which the Malay majority group holds greater power and
privilege compared to Chinese and Indian minorities, the Bersih electoral reform
movement in Malaysia appeared to be more threatening towards the Malay majority
compared to the Chinese and Indian racial minority groups. As a follow-up, Chapter 3
showed that Malay’s higher endorsement of native ownership over their country predicted
elevated levels of threat in response to the Bersih protest. This threat subsequently
promoted more support for a counter-movement, the Red Shirts, which strives to defend
the government and the rights of Malays. Similarly, in the context of race relations in the
United States, Chapter 3 also showed that non-Hispanic White Americans’ higher
endorsement of founder ownership beliefs promoted greater threat in response to the Black
Lives Matter protests. This threat further promoted more support for protests defending
civil war monuments – which have been led by White supremacist groups under the
umbrella of the Alt-Right movement aiming to defend the rights of White people. While
Chapter 3 showed that different forms of ownership beliefs operate in Malaysia and the
United States, a common feature we observe is that majority group members that occupy a
more dominant position in the social hierarchy, may show backlash towards movements
for social change. This is in line with a fundamental idea in intergroup relations, which is
that advantaged group members are more likely to defend the status quo from which they
benefit (Pratto et al., 1994; Saguy et al., 2008), whereas disadvantaged group members are
more likely to challenge it (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990), and extends this idea
to the context of social movement dynamics across different cultures.
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While Chapter 3 focused on collective action in the context of relatively peaceful,
democratic contexts, Chapter 4 expands the focus of collective action research to an
asymmetrical protracted conflict setting. The findings from Chapter 4 showed that Arab
and Jewish Israelis come to support collective action to advance the rights of their own
group, as a function of ingroup identification and demands for justice. However, it is
important to recognize that even though that there is a similar psychological mechanism
motivating public support for collective action among both sides of the conflict, there is a
power asymmetry between the groups involved. Arabs and Jewish Israelis differ in terms
of status in Israeli society: Arab Israelis live in an ethnocracy, in which the Jewish state
serves the interests of the dominant Jewish ethnic group, whereas Arabs minorities are
subjected to discrimination across various public spheres, including social, political,
economic, and education (Yiftachel, 1997). For Arab Israelis, collective action is a means
of improving their status within society, for example, by pushing for the right of
Palestinians to return to Palestinian land, which is now occupied by Israel. By contrast, for
Jewish Israelis, collective action focuses on defending their position within society, to
ensure that Israel remains a Jewish state. Thus, the goals of collective action are radically
different in the sense that one side aims to challenge the status quo while the other side
aims to maintain it. By taking a broader view of collective action in the context of an
ongoing conflict, Chapter 4 demonstrates that very similar psychological motivations can
underlie collective action to support opposing goals. Understanding the societal outcomes
of social movements requires researchers and practitioners to consider the intergroup
hierarchies and power relations in a particular society, and the possibility that there are
common underlying psychological motivations among low and high-status groups.
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research
While this dissertation attempted to capture psychological experiences in “realtime” around ongoing political issues and protest events, the studies presented are limited
in its scope because it does not reflect the range of effects that social movements might
have on public attitudes over time. While Chapter 2 and 3 included results from a twowave longitudinal panel study, this design does not allow us to model attitude change in a
more fine-grained and dynamic manner. To overcome this problem, one possibility is to
conduct longitudinal studies with three or more waves of data collection, and field surveys
at multiple time points following critical events. This would allow researchers to isolate
the possible effects of protest events on long-term attitudes. Similar designs have been used
in other areas of research involving unpredictable events, such as resilience following
natural disasters or psychosocial adjustment after trauma, in which the same participants
are repeatedly surveyed before and after an event occurs (e.g., Bonanno & Diminich, 2013;
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). This allows the researcher to study people’s
developmental trajectories depending on specific experiences related to the focal event,
such as degree of exposure. Using a similar approach, it may be possible to model and
predict distinct trends in public opinion around social movements over time, for example,
those that become more mobilized, demobilized, or remain relatively neutral/unaffected by
collective action.
In addition, the present research is limited in its scope because it does not consider
how the public comes to know about collective action. We know that people may be
exposed to collective action through various channels – for example, by personally
encountering a protest on the streets, hearing about it from friends and family, or seeing it
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in the news. Media effects may be particularly important given its role in disseminating
information beyond the initial geographical range of an event. While Chapter 3 included
an experimental manipulation in which Jewish Israeli participants read an opinion piece
either arguing for retributive or restorative justice in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, the study still did not focus on the role of the media. However, research from
communication studies and political science have consistently shown that the ways in
which political issues are framed in the media can shape people’s subsequent attitudes (e.g.,
McLeod & Hertog, 1992; Nelson, Lawson, & Oxley, 1997; Fryberg et al., 2012). In
particular, protests and protesters pushing for social change are typically portrayed as
dangerous and deviant in mainstream media, which typically represents the interests of
dominant groups (e.g., Smith, McCarthy, McPhail, Augustyn, 2001; McLeod & Hertog,
1992). By contrast, alternative media which tends to serve the interest of marginalized
groups, typically portrays social movements in a more balanced and positive light
(Downing, 2003). Building on this past work, one question that future research might
investigate is the downstream consequences of exposure to mainstream versus alternative
media on public attitudes toward social movements for social change.
This dissertation also highlights the how social movements can face backlash from
advantaged group members but does not offer possible solutions to this issue. Prior work
has shown that movements can face the challenge of building solidarity between groups
that have divergent levels of power and privilege. This includes alliance-building between
movements (peace and environmental justice movements; Beamish & Luebbers, 2009),
involving advantaged group allies within a movement (racial justice movements;
Droogendyk, Wright, Lubensky, & Louis, 2016), and promoting solidarity across nations
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(movement to support Syrian refugees, Thomas et al., 2018). One possible way movements
strive to overcome intergroup divisions is by creating an inclusive movement identity that
includes the different groups in society that the movement aims to unite (e.g., Reicher,
Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Subašić et al., 2008). While prior research
has shown that leaders effectively engage in rhetorical strategies to foster a common group
identity through speeches and public forums (e.g., Fiol, 2002; Seyranian & Bligh, 2008;
Steffens & Haslam, 2013), it remains an open question whether such tactics are effective
in shaping support for a movement among groups that have unequal status relations in
society. Future research may explore whether and how movements can proactively diffuse
tensions and deescalate threat responses.
Concluding Remarks
Social movements are a key part of public life. While it is true that only a small
number of people participate in collective action for social change, the implications of such
actions extend well beyond the participants of collective action themselves. This
dissertation showed that collective can influence broader public opinion, by eliciting
greater support for the cause, or provoking backlash and counter-mobilization, and even
perpetuating intergroup conflicts. Understanding the outcomes of social movements on
public opinion therefore requires researchers and practitioners to consider both the
immediate and long-term societal impact of collective action, as well as movements that
may challenge or defend the status quo. By moving beyond psychological explanations of
why people participate in collective action to examining the societal implications of these
actions, social psychological theorizing can begin to address the crucial question of how
social change can be supported, achieved, and sustained.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
This appendix contains additional information and analyses for the manuscript in
Chapter 2. Below is a direct reproduction of the Online Supplementary Information for the
paper published in the European Journal of Social Psychology (Selvanathan & Lickel,
2018). Each section reported below corresponds to a specific footnote within the
manuscript.
Analyses without excluding participants
As described in footnote 3, we ran analyses using all available data at Time 2 (i.e.,
without excluding any participants at Time 2), and we found virtually the same results as
reported in the main text. Specifically, over and above the effect of Time 1 movement
identity on Time 2 movement identity [b = .33, SE = .04, t(443) = 7.91, p < .001, R2 = .41],
empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a significant increase in R2
[R2change = .20, Fchange (2, 443) = 109.41, p < .001]. Stronger empowerment reactions
predicted greater movement identity at Time 2 [b = .37, SE = .03, t(443) = 11.17, p < .001],
and stronger threat reactions predicted weaker movement identity at Time 2 [b = -.07, SE
= .03, t(443) = -2.44, p = .015]. Similarly, over and above the effect of Time 1 support for
social change on Time 2 support for social change [b = .57, SE = .04, t(444) = 13.93, p <
.001, R2 = .38], empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a significant
increase in R2 [R2change = .14, Fchange (2, 444) = 67.04, p < .001]. Stronger empowerment
reactions predicted greater support for social change at Time 2 [b = .25, SE = .03, t(444) =
7.86, p < .001], and stronger threat reactions predicted lower support for social change at
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Time 2 [b = -.06, SE = .03, t(444) = -2.04, p = .042]. Thus, these findings suggest that our
results are largely robust and not dependent on the exclusion criteria that we selected.
Hopelessness – a threat or disempowerment response?
As described in footnote 4, we also measured the extent to which participants felt
hopelessness (assessed as responses to the items “weak” and “hopeless”) in response to the
protests, which we conceptualized as a measure of threat. It is possible that the
hopelessness measure is the conceptual reverse of empowerment, and thus should be
reverse-scored and included in the empowerment composite rather than the threat
composite. However, CFA analysis revealed that a two-factor solution for the reaction
measures in which the reverse-scored hopelessness item was grouped with positive
emotions, anger toward government, perceived effectiveness, and perceived legitimacy
onto the first latent factor (empowerment reactions), and anxiety, anger toward protests,
and perceived danger of protests loaded onto the second latent factor (threat reactions), did
not provide a good fit to the data: χ2 (17) = 291.09, p < .001, SRMR = .10, NFI = .89, CFI
= .90. Thus, empirically we could not justify including hopelessness in the empowerment
composite measure. Alternatively, when we conducted a CFA for a two-factor solution for
the reaction measures in which the composite measures of positive emotions, anger toward
government, perceived effectiveness, and perceived legitimacy of protests loaded onto the
first latent factor (empowerment reactions), and hopelessness was instead grouped with
anxiety, anger toward Bersih, and perceived danger of protests to load onto a second latent
factor (threat reactions), the model provided a good fit to the data: χ2 (17) = 143.23 p <
.001, SRMR = .05, NFI = .95, CFI = .95. Thus, for these supplementary analyses, we
created a composite measure of threat which included the hopelessness measure (αT2 = .89).
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This threat composite and the empowerment composite were negatively correlated, r = .64, p < .001.
We then analyzed the data using the composite measures of empowerment and this
alternative threat composite which included the hopelessness measure, and we found
virtually the same results as reported in the main text. Specifically, over and above the
effect of Time 1 movement identity on Time 2 movement identity [b = .34, SE = .04, t(416)
= 7.58, p < .001, R2 = .41], empowerment and threat reactions together contributed to a
significant increase in R2 [R2change = .19, Fchange (2, 416) = 99.49, p < .001]. Stronger
empowerment reactions predicted greater movement identity at Time 2 [b = .38, SE = .04,
t(416) = 10.61, p < .001], and stronger threat reactions predicted weaker movement identity
at Time 2 [b = -.07, SE = .03, t(416) = -2.35, p = .019]. Similarly, over and above the effect
of Time 1 support for social change on Time 2 support for social change [b = .58, SE = .06,
t(418) = 13.55, p < .001, R2 = .39], empowerment and threat reactions together contributed
to a significant increase in R2 [R2change = .14, Fchange (2, 418) = 62.64, p < .001]. Stronger
empowerment reactions predicted greater support for social change at Time 2 [b = .24, SE
= .03, t(418) = 7.59, p < .001], and stronger threat reactions predicted lower support for
social change at Time 2 [b = -.06, SE = .03, t(418) = -2.00, p = .046].
Descriptive information on changes in movement identity
As described footnote 6, descriptive analyses may provide further information
about the attitudinal changes that occurred from Time 1 to Time 2, and can supplement our
inferential analyses reported in the main text. We assessed the descriptive changes in
participants’ attitudes by focusing on movement identity in two ways. First, we examined
the number of participants at each of the 7 levels of movement identity at Time 1, and
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observed whether participants became less supportive, did not change, or became more
supportive of Bersih at Time 2 (see supplementary Table 1 below). Second, we clustered
participants into three groups at Time 1 (supportive, neutral, unsupportive), and observed
whether participants changed in their level of support or remained the same (see
supplementary Table 2 below). As these tables show, although few participants made large
quantitative shifts in their attitudes, among those who did change, shifts in attitudes
occurred across the different levels of Time 1 movement identity (unsupportive, neutral,
supportive).
Beyond the distribution of participants at different levels of movement identity, we
also examined the average levels of empowerment and threat at each level of change (see
supplementary Table 2 below). Descriptively, we observed that those who became more
supportive at Time 2 had higher levels of empowerment relative to threat, whereas those
who became less supportive at Time 2 had higher levels of threat relative to empowerment.
Further, those who became neutral at Time 2 seemed to have ambivalent reactions to the
protest, such that they reported somewhat similar levels of empowerment and threat. These
patterns suggest that the extent to which empowerment or threat shaped changes in
movement identity were not restricted to the extreme ends of the scale, but occurred to
some extent at the various levels of movement identity.
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Supplementary Table 9
Descriptive changes in participants’ Bersih movement identity from Time 1 to Time 2.
Change at Time 2
Total

Less
supportive of
Bersih

No change in
level of
support for
Bersih

More
supportive of
Bersih

5

N/A

2

3

6

0

0

6

3. Unsupportive of the Bersih movement

33

5

13

15

4. Neutral

175

20

99

56

154

23

102

29

45

18

22

5

2

0

2

N/A

420

66

240

114

Time 1
1. A very active opponent of the Bersih
movement
2. Unsupportive of the Bersih movement,
and sometimes an active opponent

5. Supportive of the Bersih movement, but
not active
6. Supportive of the Bersih movement, and
sometimes an active participant
7. A very active participant of the Bersih
movement
Total

Supplementary Table 10
Descriptive changes in participants’ Bersih movement identity from Time 1 to Time 2, and the average
levels of empowerment and threat at each level of change.
Movement identity
at Time 1 and Time 2
Unsupportive at Time 1
(score: 1-3)
Still unsupportive at Time 2
Became neutral at Time 2
Became supportive at Time 2
Neutral at Time 1
(score: 4)
Became unsupportive at Time 2
Still neutral at Time 2
Became supportive at Time 2
Supportive at Time 1
(score: 5-7)
Became unsupportive at Time 2
Became neutral at Time 2

Empowerment
M (SD)

Threat
M (SD)

2.27 (.92)
3.62 (.95)
5.15 (.50)

5.47 (1.25)
3.95 (1.21)
3.52 (.74)

99
56

2.66 (1.12)
4.27 (.89)
5.24 (.83)

5.10 (1.47)
3.60 (.99)
2.61 (1.02)

201
1
24

5.14 (N/A)
4.62 (.75)

5.31 (N/A)
3.35 (1.55)

Number of participants
46
26
15
5

175
20

137

Still supportive at Time 2

176

5.79 (.82)

2.22 (1.19)

Assessing change with difference score analyses
As described in footnote 7, another approach to examine change in two-wave
designs is through the use of difference scores. Thus, we computed difference scores of
movement identity and support for social change by subtracting each participants’ Time 1
scores from their Time 2 scores. We report the correlation between the measures of reaction
to protests and the changes in movement identity and support for social change in
Supplementary Table 3 below. Each measure of protest reaction was correlated with
changes in movement identity and support for social change in the expected direction.

Supplementary Table 11
Correlation between reactions to protests and changes in movement identity and support for social
change

4.43 (1.75)

Changes in movement
identity
.21***

Changes in support for
social change
.28***

M (SD)
1.

Positivity

2.

Anger toward government

5.24 (1.57)

.19***

.29***

3.

Perceived efficacy

4.69 (1.48)

.20***

.32***

4.

Perceived legitimacy

5.01 (1.58)

.21***

.33***

5.

Anxiety

3.63 (1.59)

-.14**

-.16***

6.

Anger toward protests

2.68 (1.78)

-.19***

-.24***

7.

Perceived danger

2.93 (1.69)

-.15**

-.20***

8.

Hopelessness

3.03 (1.56)

-.17***

-.17***

The relative effects of empowerment versus threat
As stated in footnote 8 and 9, to assess the predictive power and relative effects of
empowerment and threat, we conducted separate regression analyses in two ways: 1)
entering empowerment a step before threat, or 2) entering threat a step before
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empowerment, when predicting movement identity or support for social change at Time 2,
while controlling for movement identity, or support for social change at Time 1,
respectively. As these tables show, we find consistent evidence that empowerment and
threat predicted attitudes at Time 2 over and above Time 1 attitudes, however the effect of
threat appears to be weaker and smaller than the effect of empowerment on subsequent
attitudes.
Supplementary Table 12
Empowerment and threat as predictors of movement identity at Time 2, while controlling for movement
identity at Time 1, with empowerment entered first, and then threat.

Variable

b

SE

t

p

df

R2

.72

.04

17.06

<.001

418

.35

.04

7.75

<.001

.42

.03

13.83

<.001

.33

.04

7.46

<.001

.37
-.07

.04
.03

10.37
-2.42

<.001
.016

Change statistics
R2change

R2change F

R2change p

.41

-

-

-

417

.60

.19

191.35

<.001

416

.60

.01

5.85

.016

Step 1
Movement identity at
Time 1
Step 2
Movement identity at
Time 1
Empowerment
Step 3
Movement identity at
Time 1
Empowerment
Threat

Supplementary Table 13
Empowerment and threat as predictors of movement identity at Time 2, while controlling for movement
identity at Time 1, with threat entered first, and then empowerment.

Variable
Step 1
Movement identity at
Time 1
Step 2
Movement identity at
Time 1

b

SE

t

p

df

R2

.72

.04

17.06

<.001

418

.41

.54

.04

12.09

<.001
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Change statistics
R2change

R2change F

R2change p

-

-

-

Threat
Step 3
Movement identity at
Time 1
Threat
Empowerment

-.23

.03

-8.56

<.001

.33

.04

7.46

<.001

-.07
.37

.03
.04

-2.42
10.37

.016
<.001

417

.50

.09

73.25

<.001

416

.60

.10

107.47

<.001

Supplementary Table 14
Empowerment and threat as predictors of support for social change at Time 2, while controlling for
support for social change at Time 1, with empowerment entered first, and then threat.
Change statistics
Variable
Step 1
Support for social
change at Time 1
Step 2
Support for social
change at Time 1
Empowerment
Step 3
Support for social
change at Time 1
Empowerment
Threat

b

SE

t

p

df

R2

.74

.05

16.27

<.001

420

.60

.04

14.30

<.001

.28

.03

10.97

<.001

.59

.04

13.62

<.001

.25
-.05

.03
.03

7.48
-1.64

<.001
.102

R2change

R2change
F

R2change p

.39

-

-

-

419

.52

.14

120.41

<.001

418

.53

.003

2.68

.102

Supplementary Table 15
Empowerment and threat as predictors of support for social change at Time 2, while controlling for
support for social change at Time 1, with threat entered first, and then empowerment.
Change statistics
Variable
Step 1
Support for social
change at Time 1
Step 2
Support for social
change at Time 1
Threat
Step 3
Support for social
change at Time 1
Threat
Empowerment

b

SE

t

p

df

R2

.74

.05

16.27

<.001

420

.61

.05

13.47

<.001

-.19

.02

-7.73

<.001

.59

.04

13.62

<.001

-.05
.25

.03
.03

-1.64
7.48

.102
<.001
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R2change

R2change
F

R2change p

.39

-

-

-

419

.46

.08

59.81

<.001

418

.53

.06

55.92

<.001

The role of participation in protests in shaping people’s reactions to protests
Although we did not intentionally recruit participations who have joined Bersih
protests in the past (i.e., Bersih 1, 2, 3 or 4), or those who joined the Bersih 5 protests, we
nonetheless had 100 participants who reported joining Bersih protests in the past, and 68
participants who joined the Bersih 5 protests. Of those 68 who joined the Bersih 5 protests,
50 participants also took part in other Bersih protests in the past, while for the remaining
18 participants, Bersih 5 was the first Bersih protest they attended. As described in footnote
10, we conducted exploratory analyses to test whether prior participation in Bersih protests,
or participation in Bersih 5 specifically, would moderate the extent to which empowerment
and threat predicted subsequent movement identity and support for social change. First, it
is important to note that, perhaps unsurprisingly, those who participated in Bersih protests,
either in the past or in Bersih 5 specifically, had greater empowerment and lower threat in
response to Bersih 5, as well as greater movement identity and support for change at both
Time 1 and Time 2, compared to those who did not participated in any Bersih protests.
Beyond these differences however, moderation analyses would test the following question:
does empowerment and threat differentially predict subsequent movement identity or
support for social change, among those who participated in Bersih protests (either in prior
Bersih protests or Bersih 5 specifically) versus those who did not have such experiences?
To examine this question, we tested for how participation in the prior Bersih protests (N =
100) moderated the extent to which empowerment or threat responses to Bersih 5 shaped
movement identity or support for social change at Time 2, while controlling for support for
movement identity or support for social change at Time 1, respectively (using PROCESS,
model 1; Hayes, 2013). We then ran parallel analyses using Bersih 5 participants (N = 68)
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as the moderator to test for an effect of participation. Below, we report the findings from
these analyses.
Does participation in prior Bersih protests moderate the effect of empowerment
on subsequent attitudes? Prior participation in Bersih protests did not significantly
moderate the effect of empowerment in response to Bersih 5 on subsequent movement
identity, F(1, 415) = 1.32, p = .252, or on support for social change, F(1, 417) = .02, p =
.900.
Does participation in prior Bersih protests moderate the effect of threat on
subsequent attitudes? Prior participation in Bersih protests moderated the effect of
experiencing threat in response to Bersih 5 on subsequent movement identity, F(1, 415) =
16.78, p < .001. Among those who participated in Bersih protests in the past, threat was
not related to movement identity, b = -.09, SE = .05, p = .064, 95% CI [-.1769, .0050]).
However, among those who did not participate in Bersih protests in the past, threat
predicted a less supportive movement identity, b = -.31, SE = .03, p = < .001, 95% CI [.3713, -.2510]). Similarly, prior participation in Bersih protests moderated the effect of
experiencing threat in response to Bersih 5 on subsequent support for social change, F(1,
417) = 7.38, p = .007. Among those who participated in Bersih protests in the past, threat
was not related to support for social change, b = -.06, SE = .05, p = .186, 95% CI [-.1597,
.0312]). However, among those who did not participate in Bersih protests in the past, threat
predicted lower support for social change, b = -.21, SE = .03, p < .001, 95% CI [-.2669, .1565]).
Does participation in Bersih 5 protests moderate the effect of empowerment on
subsequent attitudes? Participation in Bersih 5 did not moderate the effect of feeling
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empowered on subsequent movement identity, F(1, 415) = .03, p = .873, or on support for
social change, F(1, 417) = 2.29, p = .131.
Does participation in Bersih 5 protests moderate the effect of threat on
subsequent attitudes? Participation in Bersih 5 moderated the effect of threat in response
to Bersih 5 on subsequent movement identity, F(1, 415) = 9.50, p = .002. Among those
who participated in Bersih 5, threat did not significantly predict movement identity, b = .09, SE = .06, p = .122, 95% CI [-.2025, .0241]). By contrast, among those who did not
participate in Bersih 5, threat predicted a less supportive movement identity, b = -.29, SE
= .03, p = < .001, 95% CI [-.3414, -.2307]). Participation in Bersih 5 did not however
moderate the effect of threat on support for social change, F(1, 417) = 1.63, p = .202.
Taken together, the findings from these moderation analyses suggest that
participation in prior Bersih protests, or in Bersih 5 specifically, can sometimes weaken
the extent to which threat in response to Bersih 5 protests shaped subsequent movement
identity and social change attitudes. By contrast, that was little evidence that participation
in Bersih protests influenced the extent to which empowerment shaped subsequent
movement and social change attitudes.
Analyses after excluding participants who attended the Bersih 5 protests
Beyond the moderating effects of participation in Bersih protests, it is also possible
to examine the relative effect of empowerment and threat in response to the Bersih 5
protests on Time 2 movement identity and support for change among those who did not
participate in the Bersih 5 protests (i.e., rerunning the main text regression analyses
excluding Bersih 5 participants). When we excluded participants who reported attending
the protests (N = 68), the pattern of findings were consistent with the analyses reported in
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the main text. Specifically, when we excluded those who participated in the protests
(remaining N = 354), after controlling for Time 1 movement identity, empowerment
predicted greater movement identity at Time 2 (b = .31, SE = .04, t(348) = 8.50, p < .001)
and threat predicted weaker movement identity at Time 2 (b = -.12, SE = .03, t(348) = 3.85, p < .001). Similarly, after controlling for Time 1 support for social change,
empowerment predicted more support for social change at Time 2 (b = .24, SE = .04, t(350)
= 6.07, p < .001), but threat was not significantly related to support for social change at
Time 2, although it was in the hypothesized direction (b = -.04, SE = .04, t(350) = -1.19, p
= .234). These findings suggest that the mobilizing effects of empowerment and the
demobilizing effects of threat in response to the protests were largely robust.
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APPENDIX B
SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES AND SURVEY MATERIALS
This appendix contains supplementary analyses and additional information for the
manuscript in Chapter 3.
Corresponding to Footnote 11 in the manuscript, below we describe specific details
on participant recruitment and exclusion criteria used in Study 1.
Participants and Procedure for Study 1
A sample of Malaysian participants were recruited to complete online surveys on
their social and political attitudes via TurkPrime, a survey research platform. At Time 1,
646 participants were recruited. After excluding 18 participants who failed to complete the
study, 12 participants who did not identify as either Malay, Chinese, or Indian Malaysian,
and 4 participants who took a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2 hours),
612 participants were retained for cross-sectional analyses (296 Malay, 244 Chinese, and
72 Indian Malaysians; age: M = 32.46, SD = 9.61, range = 18-17; gender: 317 males and
274 females; 21 participants did not report their age and gender). Although we initially
aimed to sample equal numbers of Chinese and Indian Malaysians, we could not reach our
desired sample size for Indian Malaysians; thus we oversampled Chinese Malaysians, and
combined Chinese and Indian Malaysian participants as the racial minority group.
At Time 2, all 612 participants were re-contacted to complete another survey. Of
those who were re-invited, 459 participants returned at Time 2 (response rate = 75%). After
excluding 13 participants who did not complete the survey, 2 participants with duplicate
entries, 4 participants who took a considerably long time to complete the survey (> 2
hours), and 18 participants whose demographics at Time 1 did not match Time 2, a sample
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of 422 participants who completed both Time 1 and Time 2 measures were retained for
longitudinal analyses (218 Malays, 177 Chinese, and 27 Indian Malaysians).
Corresponding to Footnote 13 in the manuscript, below we report the full items and
instructions that accompanied each measure for all studies.
Study 1
Native ownership (Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013)
In every country, there is typically a group of people who were the first to live there. We
are interested in your opinions about this.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?
1. The original inhabitants of a country are more entitled than newcomers.
2. Every country belongs to its original inhabitants.
3. The original inhabitants of a country have the most right to define the rules of the
game.
4. “We were here first” is an important principle for determining who decides on
what happens in a country.
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 7 (Strongly agree)
Red Shirt movement identity (adapted from Dunlap and McCright, 2008)
Thinking about the Red Shirt movement, do you think of yourself as…
§ A very active participant of the Red Shirt movement
§ Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, and sometimes an active participant
§ Supportive of the Red Shirt movement, but not active
§ Neutral
§ Unsupportive of the Red Shirt movement
§ Unsupportive of the Red Shirt movement, and sometimes an active opponent
§ A very active opponent of the Red Shirt movement
Threat from Bersih protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and Ellemers,
2013)
Thinking specifically about the Bersih 5 demonstration, to what extent do you agree or
disagree with the following statements?
1. The demonstration is not compatible with the culture and values of Malaysia.
2. The demonstration harms the reputation and image of Malaysia.
3. The demonstration endangers the physical safety of people.
4. The demonstration undermines the peace and harmony in Malaysia.
5. The demonstration is a threat to the rights of the bumiputeras (Malay people and
Indigenous people).
6. The demonstration is a threat to the rights of the non-bumiputeras (Chinese
people, Indian people, and others)
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Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 7 (Strongly agree)
Threat from Red Shirt protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and
Ellemers, 2013)
Thinking specifically about the Red Shirt demonstrations, to what extent do you agree or
disagree with the following statements?
[same 6 items as “Threat from Bersih protests”]
Demographics
What is your race?
§ Malay
§ Chinese
§ Indian
§ Other (Please specify) : ___________
What is your age? ____________
What is your gender?
§ Male
§ Female
Pilot Study
Personal psychological ownership (adapted from van Dyne and Pierce, 2004)
Think about the home or apartment that you live in, and the experiences and feelings of
ownership associated with the sentiment "This is my home!" Similarly, people may also
feel a sense of ownership for their country.
The following questions are about the sense of ownership that you may feel for your
country. Please indicate the extent to which you personally agree or disagree with the
following statements.
1. This is my country.
2. It is hard for me to think about this country as mine. (reverse)
3. I feel a very high degree of ownership for this country.
4. I sense that this is my country.
5. This country is my home.
Native ownership (Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013)
We are interested in people's ideas about ownership over a place. For this question, we
are interested in how you view the original inhabitants of a country.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
[same 4 items as in study 1]
Founder ownership (adapted from Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013)
We are interested in people's ideas about ownership over a place. For this question, we
are interested in how you view the people that founded a particular country.
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
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1.
2.
3.
4.

The founders of a country are more entitled than newcomers.
Every country belongs to its founders.
Those who founded a country have the most right to define the rules of the game.
“We founded this country” is an important principle for determining who decides
on what happens in a country.

Characteristics of original Americans (based on Devos and Banaji, 2005)
When you think about the characteristics of people who are considered the “original”
Americans, to what extent do you think they should have each of the following traits?
The "original" Americans...
1. …are born in the United States.
2. ...are Christian.
3. ...identify as White.
4. ...speak English.
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 9 (Strongly agree)
Study 2
Founder ownership (adapted from Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013)
[same as Pilot Study]
Threat from BLM protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and Ellemers,
2013)
Thinking about Black Lives Matter protests, to what extent do you personally agree or
disagree with each of the following statements?
1. The protests are not compatible with American values.
2. The protests harm the reputation of our country.
3. The protests endanger the physical safety of others.
4. The protests undermine the peace and harmony.
5. The protests threaten the rights of other people.
Threat from Alt-Right protests (adapted from Brambilla, Sacchi, Pagliaro and
Ellemers, 2013)
Thinking about the Alt-Right protests, to what extent do you personally agree or disagree
with each of the following statements?
[same 5 items as “Threat from BLM protesters”]
Criticism of BLM protesters (adapted from McLeod and Detenber, 1999)
Thinking about Black Lives Matter protesters, to what extent do you personally agree or
disagree with the following statements?
1. The protesters tend to be violent.
2. The protesters tend to be disrespectful.
3. The protesters tend to be annoying.
4. The protesters tend to be troublemakers.
5. The protesters tend to be very radical.
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Criticism of Alt-Right protesters (adapted from McLeod and Detenber, 1999)
Thinking about Alt-Right protesters, to what extent do you personally agree or disagree
with the following statements?
[same 5 items as Criticism of BLM protesters]
Support for anti BLM actions (developed for this study)
To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements
regarding the Black Lives Matter movement?
1. The police should closely the monitor the activities of the movement.
2. There should be strict security measures enforced for their activities.
3. If any of the supporters of the movement refuse to abide by the law, they should
face stern legal consequences.
Support for anti Alt-Right actions (developed for this study)
To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements
regarding the Alt-Right movement?
[same 3 items as Support for anti BLM actions]
Support for protests to preserve civil war monuments (developed for this study)
Recently, some towns and cities have been removing Confederate monuments related to
the Civil War, such as monuments of Robert E. Lee. On the next page, we ask you some
questions about protests around this issue.
-There have been protests saying that Confederate monuments should be preserved as an
important part of American heritage.
To what extent do you personally agree or disagree with each of the following statements
regarding these protesters who want to preserve Confederate monuments?
1. People need to listen to their arguments.
2. They deserve a platform to share their views.
3. I can sympathize with their cause.
4. They have good intentions.
5. People are too quick to dismiss them.
6. They mean no harm.
Scale: 1 (Strongly disagree) – 9 (Strongly agree)
Study 3
Founder ownership (adapted from Martinovic and Verkuyten, 2013)
[same as Pilot Study]
Anti BLM attitudes
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[same as Study 2 “Threat from BLM protests”, “Criticism of BLM protesters” and
“Support for anti BLM actions”]
Support for protests to preserve civil war monuments
[same as Study 2]
Demographic questions
(asked in Pilot Study, Study 2 and Study 3)
Please indicate your age (in years):
_______________________________
What is your gender?
§ Male
§ Female
§ Other (Please specify): _______________________
What is your racial identity?
§ American Indian/Alaskan Native
§ Asian
§ Black or African American
§ Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander
§ White or Caucasian
§ More than one race (Please specify): ______________________
§ Other (Please specify): _______________________
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APPENDIX C
SURVEY MATERIALS
The verbatim survey materials for all three studies are reported below.
Study 1
Group identification
(Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006)
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of the following statements by
moving the cursor below it. Keep in mind that all your answers are stored anonymously
and cannot be linked back to you. There are no right or wrong answers, we are interested
in your personal opinion.
Glorification:
1. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the Palestinian
leadership
2. All Palestinian people should respect Palestinian customs, norms, and leadership
3. Relative to other peoples, the Palestinian people are very moral
4. The Palestinian people are better than other peoples in all respects
Attachment:
1. It is important to me to contribute to the Palestinian people
2. I am strongly committed to the Palestinian people
3. Being Palestinian is an important part of my identity
4. It is important to me that others see me as a Palestinian
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)
Justice demands
(Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 2013)
In the next series of questions, you will be asked how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
should be treated in order to achieve justice. Please move the cursor to indicate how
much you agree or disagree with each statement. There are no right or wrong answers, we
are interested in your personal opinion.
Retributive justice:
1. For the sake of justice, Jewish Israelis have to suffer
2. The only way to restore justice is to punish Jewish Israelis
Restorative justice through value reaffirmation:
1. To restore justice, Jewish Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on rules of a
peaceful world
Restorative justice through compensation:
2. Without Jewish Israelis giving a sincere apology for having acted wrongly, the
injustice is not completely restored
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)
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Collective action
(developed for this study)
The questions below are about the efforts of Arab Israelis to improve the conditions of
their group. To what extent do you support or oppose the following actions for the
struggle of Arab citizens to improve their situation in Israel? Please move the cursor
below each statement to indicate your response. Please remember that since we are
interested in your opinion, there are no right or wrong answers.
Nonnormative collective action:
1. Non-violent yet unlawful actions of protest (such as participating in unauthorized
demonstrations, blocking roads, etc.)
2. Violent actions of protest (physically confronting police, property damage, etc.)
Normative collective action:
1. Actions of protest online (such as signing petitions, sharing information on
Facebook, etc.)
2. Actions of protest in Israel within the law (such as participating in authorized
demonstrations, distribution of informational materials, etc.)
3. Actions of protest abroad within the law (such as participating in demonstrations
overseas, meeting foreign politicians, etc.)
Scale: 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support)
Study 2
Group identification
(Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006)
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by
moving the slider below the statements. Remember that all of your responses are
completely anonymous and cannot be traced back to you in any way. There are no right
or wrong answers. We are interested in your personal opinion.
Glorification:
1. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of
our nation
2. All Israelis should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of our
nation
3. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation
4. Israel is better than other nations in all respects
5. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the leaders of our
nation propose
6. It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel
7. Other nations can learn a lot from us
8. The IDF is the best army in the world
Attachment:
1. It is important to me to contribute to my nation
2. I am strongly committed to my nation
3. Being Israeli is an important part of my identity
4. It is important to me that others see me as an Israeli
5. When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they”
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6. It is important for me to help my country
7. It is not important to me to view myself as an Israeli
8. I feel strongly affiliated with Israel
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)
Justice demands
(Leidner, Castano, & Ginges, 201)
In the next series of questions, you will be asked how the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
should be treated in order to achieve justice. In order to indicate the extent of your
agreement or disapproval with any statement, please move the cursor below it.
Remember that since we are interested in your positions, there are no right or wrong
answers.
Retributive justice:
1. For the sake of justice, the Palestinians have to suffer
2. The only way to restore justice is to punish the Palestinians
3. Justice is only fully served when there are punitive measures against the
Palestinians for its actions
4. To fully reinstate justice, the Palestinians needs to be prosecuted for its role in the
conflict
5. Justice is served at the moment that the Palestinians are punished
Restorative justice through value reaffirmation:
1. To restore justice, Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on rules of a peaceful
world
2. For justice to be reinstated, Israelis and Palestinians need to agree on which
ethical values should not be violated
Restorative justice through compensation:
1. Without the Palestinians giving a sincere apology for having acted wrongly, the
injustice is not completely resolved
2. To fully restore justice, the Israeli victims and their family members need to
receive compensation from the Palestinians for what happened
3. For justice to be fully reinstated, the Palestinians need to express remorse to the
Israeli victims and their family members for what happened
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)
Collective action
(developed for this study)
The questions below are about the efforts of Jewish Israelis to promote their cause. To
what extent do you support each of the following actions to protect the rights of Jewish
Israelis in Israel? Please move the cursor in each statement to indicate your answer.
Remember that since we are interested in your opinion, there are no right or wrong
answers.
Non-normative collective action:
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1. participate in unauthorized non-violent demonstrations to support Jewish settler
rights
2. organize disruptive direct actions (for example, sit ins in buildings to block
entrances, block roads or highways) to advocate for Jewish settler rights
3. violent protests (physically confronting police, property damage, etc.) to defend
the rights of Jewish settlers
4. damage the property of Arab villages in the settler areas
5. attack demonstrations that are organized by or on behalf of Palestinian settlers
6. price-tag campaigns to protect Israeli settlement areas
Normative collective action:
1. sign petitions to advocate for the rights of Jewish settlers
2. share information on social media to influence other people’s opinions about
Jewish settler’ rights
3. participate in authorized non-violent demonstrations to support Jewish settler
rights
4. organize lawful public opinion campaigns to protect Jewish settler rights
5. lobby groups from foreign countries to gain support for Jewish settlement rights
6. lobby domestic Israelis politicians and policy makers to ensure the rights of
Jewish settlers are protected
Scale: 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support)
Study 3
Manipulation
(developed for this study)
On the next screen, you will see a short excerpt from an article in a paper written by a
Israeli author, Eitan Harel, in which he addresses other Israelis. Please read the article
carefully and focus on the content. We will ask you some questions about it later.
Restorative justice condition:
We can achieve justice by re-establishing our shared values
Author: Eitan Harel
Over the years, the harm that Palestinians have inflicted upon Israelis have brought up the
crucial question of how to restore justice between us. In public, populated areas around
Israel, such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, there have been suicide bombings, knife attacks,
and shootings. In the Gaza strip, there have been stones thrown at cars and people, and
rockets fired across the border. These various attacks go against shared moral values and
ethical principles of both sides: do no harm, treat others with kindness and compassion,
live in harmony and peace. In the process, the relationship between our groups has been
severely disrupted.
To restore justice, we need to repair the relationship between our groups. To begin doing
so, there needs to be a shared understanding of, and commitment to, moral values and
ethical principles that we both agree on. Therefore, the process of achieving justice
should first and foremost revolve around both groups mutually reestablishing shared
values and principles that have been violated. Specifically, both groups should work
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towards an understanding of the harm that these attacks have caused, and based on this,
both groups should then reaffirm their commitment to the shared values and principles
that govern our lives. Any call to action that violates these shared values, will undermine
justice. The actions we take will only achieve justice when they are in line with our
shared values. In this sense, then, the mutual reaffirmation of our shared values will help
repair the relationship between our groups and therefore help serve justice.
Retributive justice condition:
We can achieve justice through punishment
Author: Eitan Harel
Over the years, the harm that Palestinians have inflicted upon Israelis have brought up the
crucial question of how to restore justice between us. In public, populated areas around
Israel, such as Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, there have been suicide bombings, knife attacks,
and shootings. In the Gaza strip, there have been stones thrown at cars and people, and
rockets fired across the border. These various attacks have taken a huge toll on Israel, be
it in terms of loss of life or loss of resources, and in this way, we have suffered a severe
loss of power and status.
To restore justice, the Palestinians need to be punished for their actions. There need to be
punitive measures to rightfully penalize the Palestinians and hold them accountable for
the suffering they have caused us. Therefore, the process of achieving justice should first
and foremost revolve around punishment of the Palestinians, proportionate to the
suffering they have inflicted upon us. Any call to action that does not include us
regaining the power and status we have lost, will undermine justice. The actions will only
achieve justice when they reestablish our power and status. In this sense, then,
punishment of Palestinian attacks will help repair our power and status and therefore help
serve justice.
Manipulation check
Please answer the following questions based on the excerpt that you have just read.
According to the author of the excerpt that you just read, which of the following needs to
happen in order to achieve justice between Palestinians and Israelis?
§ Punish Palestinians for their actions (only appeared for retributive condition)
§ Re-establish the shared values of our communities (will only appeared for
restorative condition)
§ There needs to be a conflict mediation conducted by a third party
§ The author did not discuss this issue
Which group do you think the author belongs to?
§ Israelis
§ Palestinian
§ Iranian
Group identification
(Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2006)
Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the following statements by
moving the slider below the statements. Remember that all of your responses are
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completely anonymous and cannot be traced back to you in any way. There are no right
or wrong answers. We are interested in your personal opinion.
Glorification:
1. In times of trouble, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of
our nation
2. All Israelis should respect the customs, the institutions, and the leaders of our
nation
3. Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation
4. Israel is better than other nations in all respects
5. There is usually a good reason for every rule and regulation that the leaders of our
nation propose
6. It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel
7. Other nations can learn a lot from us
8. The IDF is the best army in the world
Attachment:
1. It is important to me to contribute to my nation
2. I am strongly committed to my nation
3. Being Israeli is an important part of my identity
4. It is important to me that others see me as an Israeli
5. When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they”
6. It is important for me to help my country
7. It is not important to me to view myself as an Israeli
8. I feel strongly affiliated with Israel
Scale: 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree)
Collective action
(developed for this study)
The following statements relate to the various efforts of Israeli to protect itself vis-à-vis
the Palestinians, in terms of safety, the well-being and livelihood of Israelis, and the right
to a Jewish state. Please indicate to what extent you support any of the following actions
to protect the rights of Israelis. To express your attitude toward each statement, please
move the cursor below each statement. We are interested in your opinions, so there are no
right or wrong answers.
Non-normative collective action:
1. participate in non-violent demonstrations to support Israel’s right to defend itself
against Palestinian aggression, even if the demonstrations are unauthorized
2. organize sit-ins to block entrances to public buildings, or block roads or highways
to demand all members of the Knesset to delegitimize organizations which risk
Israel’s right to self-defense against the Palestinians
3. participate in violent counter-protests to pro-Palestinian protests, even if this
might lead to physical confrontation with Palestinian protesters
4. organize protests against pro-Palestinian protests, even if it leads to violence
against the two groups
5. damage the property of Palestinian villages to protect Israeli settlement areas, if
necessary
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6. Israeli citizens directly opposing pro-Palestinian demonstrations to disperse them
through the use of physical force
7. Even if I don’t condone it, I accept other Israeli’s rights to conduct price-tag
campaigns to protect Israeli settlement areas
Normative collective action:
1. sign petitions to advocate for the rights and well-being of Israelisshare
information on social media to increase public support for Israel’s policies
towards Palestinians
2. participate in authorized non-violent demonstrations to support Israel’s right to
defend itself against Palestinian aggression
3. organize lawful public opinion campaigns that counter pro-Palestinian rhetoric
4. lobby other groups and countries to support Israel’s right to statehood
5. lobby politicians and policy makers in Israel to strengthen measures that protect
Israelis from Palestinian aggression
6. join advocacy groups that focus on the protection of Israel through peaceful
means
Scale: 1 (strongly oppose) to 9 (strongly support)
Demographic questions
(asked in Study 1 – 3)
What is your age? ____
What is your gender?
§ Male
§ Female
§ Other
What is your citizenship status?
§ Israeli citizen
§ Resident alien
§ Work or education visa
§ Other (Please specify)
Is Hebrew your native language?
§ Yes
§ No
Supplementary Analyses
Using non-violent versus violent nonnormative collective action as outcomes
As described in foonote 17 in the manuscript, we also tested our model using the
non-violent and violent dimensions of the nonnormative collective action measure. As
reported below, we found consistent effects regardless of the measure used, which suggests
that our results generalize to both forms of nonnormative collective action.
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Using non-violent nonnormative collective action. The model fit the data well,
χ2(3) = 5.48, p = .0140, SRMR = .02, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, NFI = .99 (n = 292). As we
did in Study 1, we allowed the error terms of glorification and attachment (b = 1.11, t =
8.01, p < .001), retributive and restorative justice (b = -.66, t = -3.42, p < .001), and
nonnormative and normative collective action (b = .80, t = 5.40, p < .001) to correlate,
reflecting the conceptual idea that they are part of a broader construct (i.e., group
identification, notions of justice, and collective action, respectively). Consistent with the
findings reported in the paper, glorification predicted greater retributive justice (b = .77,
SE = .09, t = 8.99, p < .001), which predicted greater nonnormative collective action (b =
.37, SE = .05, t = 8.09, p < .001). Attachment predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26,
SE = .07, t = 3.63, p < .001), which predicted greater normative collective action (b = .15,
SE = .05, t = 2.95, p = .003). The indirect effect from glorification to nonnormative
collective action via retributive justice was significant, b = .29, SE = .05, t = 6.01, p < .001.
The indirect effect from attachment to normative collective action via restorative justice
was marginally significant, b = .04, SE = .02, t = 2.29, p = .022. After accounting for these
indirect paths, the direct path from glorification to nonnormative collective action was
significant (b = .24, SE = .07, t = 3.71, p < .001), and the direct path from attachment to
normative collective action was significant (b = .22, SE = .08, t = 2.86, p = .004).
There were also additional paths which suggest that there was a negative
relationship between attachment and retributive justice (b = -.38, SE = .10, t = -3.61, p <
.001). There was also a positive relationship between glorification and normative collective
action (b = .38, SE = .07, t = 5.28, p < .001), and between retributive justice and normative
collective action (b = .28, SE = .04, t = 6.45, p < .001).
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Using violent nonnormative collective action. The model fit the data well, χ2(3)
= 9.49, p = .033, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .09, CFI = .99, NFI = .98 (n = 292). Once again,
we allowed the error terms of glorification and attachment (b = 1.11, t = 8.01, p < .001),
retributive and restorative justice (b = -.66, t = -3.42, p < .001), and nonnormative and
normative collective action (b = -.04, t = -.34, p = .732) to correlate, reflecting the
conceptual idea that they are part of a broader construct (i.e., group identification, notions
of justice, and collective action, respectively). Consistent with the findings reported in the
paper, glorification predicted greater retributive justice (b = .77, SE = .09, t = 8.99, p <
.001), which predicted greater nonnormative collective action (b = .41, SE = .04, t = 11.06,
p < .001). Attachment predicted greater restorative justice (b = .26, SE = .07, t = 3.63, p <
.001), which predicted greater normative collective action (b = .11, SE = .06, t = 1.99, p =
.046). The indirect effect from glorification to nonnormative collective action via
retributive justice was significant, b = .31, SE = .04, t = 6.98, p < .001. The indirect effect
from attachment to normative collective action via restorative justice was marginally
significant, b = .03, SE = .02, t = 1.75, p = .081, and the direct effect from attachment to
normative collective action remained significant, b = .23, SE = .08, t = 2.80, p = .005.
There were also additional paths which suggest that there was a negative
relationship between attachment and retributive justice (b = -.38, SE = .10, t = -3.61, p <
.001), and between attachment and nonnormative collective action (b = -.21, SE = .06, t =
-3.46, p < .001). There was also a positive relationship between glorification and normative
collective action (b = .39, SE = .07, t = 5.30, p < .001), and between retributive justice and
normative collective action (b = .28, SE = .04, t = 6.27, p < .001).
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